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1The Public Debate on Economic
Liberalization in Western Europe:
Introduction
This study is an analysis of the public debate on economic liberalization
in Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the U.K., and Switzer-
land at the beginning of the new millennium. The study is thus based on
the issue economic liberalization, which will be understood in a broad
way. It includes policy fields with regard to employment politics, privati-
zation, trade and financial market regulation, as well as industrial policy.
Over the past decades the liberalization of trade, finance, and invest-
ment across the world has made unprecedented progress. Structural eco-
nomic processes like economic globalization and post-industrialization
have profoundly transformed Western European politics since the 1970s.
These transformations are not only intertwined with far-reaching eco-
nomic liberalization steps, but also altered the conflict constellations
among the crucial agents who negotiate economic reforms. This study
seeks to systematically explore these conflict constellations in the realm
of the public debate. More specifically, it will be examined how the in-
stitutional context of countries as well as the characteristics of the single
actors are shaping public conflicts on economic liberalization.
Economic liberalization is an inherently political phenomenon (see
Berger, 2000). However efficient markets may be in satisfying the needs
of their participants, they tend to centralize resources, create inequal-
ities regarding the access of individuals to them, and produce harmful
externalities (King and Pearce, 2010). Markets can thus provoke consid-
erable resentments and conflictive interests. Economic markets should
thus be perceived as embedded into the political sphere (Rodrik, 1997;
Ruggie, 2008). Yet it is similarly true that, in the last decades, they
have increasingly moved “away from centralized authoritative coordina-
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tion and control toward dispersed competition” in advanced economies
(Streeck, 2009, p. 149).
Furthermore, not all countries react similarly to the changing eco-
nomic environment. Thus, economic liberalization reforms are especially
conflictive in Western European countries since they struggle more than
other countries with the consequences of permanent austerity, i.e., the
fiscal stress induced by demographic aging and a slowdown in economic
growth (Pierson, 2001). As a matter of fact, economic liberalization has
thus become a focal issue in both public and scholarly debates in Western
Europe. And it comes as no surprise that such a salient issue provokes
heavily diverging interpretations of its perils and promises. On the one
extreme, economic liberalization is celebrated as pioneering worldwide
economic development or even paving the way to a new era of a liberal
peace. On the other extreme, it is blamed to undermine both democratic
politics and the sustainability of capitalist economies, especially in the
last crisis prone years.
Instead of participating in this inflated debate, this study aims at re-
searching more mid-range phenomena regarding the structure and con-
tent of public debates on economic liberalization. How do public disputes
on economic liberalization matter in a Western Europe that struggles
with its multi-layered political system, i,e., with the democratic deficit
at the European level and the increasing helplessness of national govern-
ments vis-a´-vis volatile economic markets? More precisely, this debate
analysis will address the questions, where does who campaign for what
and why. The first question (where) implies the inclusion of the insti-
tutional context into the analyses, i.e., the impact countries and arenas
have on the debate. The second question (who) is concerned with the
types of actors that enter the debate to shape it according to their in-
terests. The third question (what) refers to the actors’ strategies regard-
ing policy positions and valence campaigning, while the fourth question
(why) focusses on frames actors use to justify their policy stances.
These questions will be addressed in comprehensive empirical analyses
using political-economic macro data as well as media content analysis
data on six Western European countries, namely Austria, France, Ger-
many, the Netherlands, the U.K. and Switzerland. The content analysis
data provide information on the policy positions, actor references, and
frames of all actors appearing in the debate on economic liberalization
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between 2004 and 2007. The macro data in addition offer insights on
the economic development, party positions and the intensity of liberal-
ization reforms, strikes and protests in the respective countries from the
1970s until today.
In contrast to most popular literature and recent scholarly work, this
study starts from the perspective that the key question regarding the
politics of economic liberalization rather is not whether or when the
worldwide diffusion of economic liberalism leads to the dissolution of
national political systems into one neoliberal economic model. The im-
portance of national differences for policy making undoubtedly has de-
clined since the 1970s, but a multitude of national peculiarities still
exists (Schmitter and Grote, 1997; Huber and Stephens, 2001). This is
not surprising since liberalized markets met Western European countries
which historically have developed different regulatory regimes as well as
ways to intermediate interests and to decommodify the consequences of
free markets (Schwartz, 2001, p. 31). Accordingly, there is a plurality of
policy goals and therefore multiple possible conflict dimensions regard-
ing economic liberalization. While the strong cross-national convergence
pressures towards economic policy making guided by free market prerog-
atives cannot be neglected, national diversities in Western Europe will
thus nevertheless persist. The crucial question is thus rather how the
trends towards the liberalization of economic activities are reintegrated
into the existing national systems.
This study takes therefore both the convergence pressures and na-
tional varieties in the public debate on economic liberalization into ac-
count by caring about the complex relationship between political strate-
gies of actors and institutional contexts (see Schmidt, 2010; McCartney,
2009). More precisely, the overarching expectation is that Western Eu-
ropean debates on economic liberalization are dominated by a neoliberal
mainstream in favor of further market liberalization, which, however, is
both embedded and strained. On the one hand, the mainstream is em-
bedded, because it depends on the institutional context of the debates,
different actors with distinctive communicative strategies articulate pro-
liberalization stances. On the other hand, the mainstream is strained,
since varying actors are at the forefront of struggling against further
liberalization steps in different countries and arenas.
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In sum, by focussing on the competition among the full range of in-
terests amounting to the debate on economic liberalization, this study
strives for a deep and comprehensive analysis at the same time. This
means that the full set of discursive strategies in public debates and all
relevant institutional contexts are integrated into one single framework
of analysis. Located at the intersection between the political economy
and political communication literature, the main focus of the study lies
on the disparities of the debate in different countries, the characteriza-
tion of discursive strategies by actors, and the identification of debate
coalitions. These debate coalitions can be defined by the similarity of
policy positions, framing strategies and actor references of the actors
engaged in the debate. Substantively, the configuration of these coali-
tions which is emerging in the debates helps to determine the potentials
of policy reforms in different countries.
1.1 Designing the Inquiry
In recent years, there has been growing scholarly interest in the role of
public debates. Debates “play a powerful causal role in determining the
trajectory of policy change and, as such, should be treated as objects of
enquiry in their own right” (Smith and Hay, 2008, p. 359). In addition,
political communication research has long observed that the media logic
increasingly dominates policy making processes (Mancini and Swanson,
1996; Kriesi et al., 2007). In today’s established democracies, political
choices are therefore increasingly affected by political competition in
mass-mediated public debates (Sniderman, 2000, p. 75). However, while
there are studies on debates in policy fields like immigration, abortion,
and Europeanization, there is little known about public debates on eco-
nomic liberalization (see Ferree et al., 2002; Medrano, 2003; Helbling
et al., 2010).
In most simple terms, a public debate can be defined as the sum of
all public communications related to a particular issue (Helbling et al.,
2012). A debate is thus a thematically delimited part of the broader
public sphere, which Gerhards and Neidhardt (1991) define as a com-
prehensive system of communicative exchanges about all kinds of issues.
More specifically, a public debate is the result of a communication pro-
cess involving a multitude of actors which take positions, refer to each
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other, and justify these positions with interests and values. Such a defi-
nition owes a lot to conceptions established by Ferree et al. (2002) and
Anderson (1978). While Ferree et al. (2002, p. 9) speak of a “public
discourse about topics and actors related to either some particular pol-
icy domain or to the broader interests and values that are engaged”,
Anderson (1978, p. 23) defines public communication as the “realm of
discourse” in which “the deliberation of public policy” takes place.
Both definitions, on the one hand, stress the systemic character of
public communication. This means that actors engaged in a debate are
generally well aware of the opinions and arguments of other actors. Ulti-
mately, this implies that the actors’ preferences can be empirically com-
pared by pitting their publicly made statements against each other. On
the other hand, both definitions similarly speak of discourse. Here, the
term debate is put forward to describe public political communication,
since it underlines the confrontational character of public communica-
tion. Public communication may but does not have to take the form of
discourse, i.e., informed deliberation on an issue. Very likely, public com-
munication contains disputes, misunderstandings and strategic behavior
as well, since nothing more than the control of the decision making pro-
cess is at stake (Helbling et al., 2012).
From a more methodological perspective, we can think of a debate as
a window of observation that allows the analysis of the structure and
dynamic of public conflict on a specific issue. Compared to other empir-
ical assessments of policy conflicts, a focus on public debates debate has
a number of advantages. First, a debate is not related to specific events.
The polling day, for example, is the referential event to all studies of
electoral campaigns. A debate analysis, instead, covers more than the
specific dynamics of such events and should also reflect ordinary poli-
tics. Therefore, a higher stability of the results regarding overall conflict
patterns can be expected. Second, a debate includes the whole universe
of potentially relevant actors since it does not restrict the range of par-
ticipants prior to the empirical analysis. Unlike direct democratic cam-
paigns, for example, a debate is not related to a specific arena with its
typical actors. And third, by definition, a debate is not subject to ex-
ogenous time limitations. Basically, a debate has its natural origin when
the first actor starts to speak about the issue at stake, has peaks and
discontinuities, and ends when the last statement was made. It is mainly
due to pragmatic reasons that the analyses in this study are restricted
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to specific time periods. A debate analysis thus has only one crucial an-
chor: the a priori chosen issue.
A debate can also be perceived as the publicly visible part of a policy
subsystem, which, according to Sabatier and Weible (2007a, p. 192), is
inhabited by a specific set of actors who regard themselves as a “com-
munity who share an expertise in a policy domain and who have sought
to influence public policy in that domain for an extended period.” The
policy subsystem of this study is defined by the issue economic liberal-
ization, which includes a broad range of policies regarding privatization,
competition and industrial policy, employment regulation, social part-
nership, and trade and financial market regulation, which will all be
studied within the same analytical framework. Such a comprehensive
conceptualization is necessary, since conflicts on market liberalization
can arise on different policies across countries. While, for example, one
country may experiences conflicts on economic liberalization with re-
spect to employment regulations, others might be distinguished by dis-
putes on their free trade regime. A study that focuses on a broad range
of policies thus better allows to grasp the scope and intensity of political
conflicts on economic policies across different national settings.
Following a discursive institutionalist perspective (see Hay, 2001), we
assume that both the consideration of the historical development as well
as the inclusion of the full variety of societal, economic, and political in-
terests are necessary to study such a complex phenomenon as the public
debate on economic liberalization. This presupposes a comprehensive
design which cares about the historical context and innovates with the
study of all arenas and actors that influence the course of the debate.
On the one hand, the analysis will thus be embedded into an elaboration
of the development of economic liberalization by means of a thorough
literature review and secondary data analyses. This allows to combine
approaches derived from comparative political economy with theories
established by the political communication literature in order to formu-
late specific expectations on the debate analysis. On the other hand, the
following debate analysis designed in a flexible way to leave it open in
which arenas, i.e. the institutionally defined sites where the debate is
taking place, the debate runs and which actors participate. Although
the restriction of the scope of analysis is often criticized as a weakness
of studies of political conflict (Sabatier and Weible, 2007b), only few
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studies have taken this seriously so far.
Besides the historical embedding and flexible design, this book of-
fers a rich empirical account of the debate on economic liberalization,
which brings together a variety of research techniques. The data basis
is provided by an extensive content analysis of newspaper which was es-
tablished by a team of researchers including the author (see Kriesi et al.,
2012). In addition, the aggregation of the data is done more accurate
than in similar studies of political communication (e.g. Ferree et al.,
2002). More precisely, we will use multiple weights to control for biases
induced by differing statement frequencies across countries and news-
paper articles as well as the varying importance of single issues for the
debate, before the data are analyzed with descriptive statistics and mul-
tivariate models such as count regressions, clustering and factor analyses.
The design of the inquiry allows a rigorous assessment of a more com-
prehensive set of discursive strategies than usual. More specifically, we
distinguish between going public, policy position taking, valence cam-
paigning, and framing. These four strategies are seen as the essential
building elements of debate coalitions, which, in turn, mark the struc-
ture of debates. Actors first have to enter the mass-mediated debate
by using either institutionalized channels of communication or mobiliza-
tion strategies in order to gain support for their interests (going public).
Subsequently, actors need to make their policy positions visible and to
campaign for their reputation and personal competence (policy posi-
tion taking and valence campaigning). Finally, the framing strategies,
i.e. how the actors justify their statements and invoke ideological cues,
is included as the fourth discursive strategy. While framing, going pub-
lic, and policy position taking in one or another form are long-standing
devices in political communication to study public conflicts, this book
carves out the importance of valence campaigning, which is often poorly
treated as scandalization or negative campaigning.
The country sample of this study pits the three biggest European eco-
nomies, i.e., France, Germany and the United Kingdom (U.K.), against
three small Western European countries, namely Switzerland, the Nether-
lands, and Austria. The three big countries play a pivotal role in the
global economy, which is evident in the fact that they are responsible
for half of the European Union’s gross domestic product (IMF, 2010).
Beyond their pure economic strength, these economies are also distin-
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guished by their different historical pathways of economic development.
The U.K., next to the United States, is the most frequently cited ex-
ample of a liberal market economy with overwhelmingly arm’s length
relationships between business, interest associations and public author-
ities. By contrast, most scholars point to Germany when they want to
refer to a coordinated market economy, i.e., a capitalist regime with
close and mainly cooperative relationships between interest associations
(Emmenegger and Marx, 2011). France, finally, is considered an exem-
plary case of a market economy around an entrepreneurial state, where
modernization strategies have traditionally relied on major industrial
projects with far-reaching state intervention.
The three small economies, on the other hand, represent typical cases
of coordinated and adaptive Western European economies with a small
workforce and traditionally high export market dependency (Katzen-
stein, 1985). In addition, both Switzerland and the Netherlands can
be seen as liberal-leaning variants in comparison with other continen-
tal European political economies. They differ with respect to impor-
tant political-economic characteristics like a high market capitalization,
a comparatively low influence of trade unions and relatively flexible em-
ployment regulations (Schnyder and Heemskerk, 2008; Hall and Gin-
gerich, 2009). Switzerland as the only non-EU member state further
allows an evaluation of how much the European integration process af-
fects the debates on economic liberalization. Austria, on the other side,
with its traditionally very important public sector, the social-democratic
roots of its welfare state, and its exceptionally strong interlinkages to
the emerging Eastern Europe raises quite contrasting questions regard-
ing the influence of specific country characteristics. In sum, the variety
of country specific factors in the sample provides a feasible test of the
general argumentation regarding the transformation of public debates
in Western Europe.
Turning to the periods of observation of this study, most analyses
will be concerned with the first years of the 2000s, but some consid-
erations are also devoted to the historical development of conflicts on
economic liberalization. With respect to economic liberalization, the first
half of the 2000s lies in a period of an intensification of political conflicts.
New and more contentious policies are debated between adherents of the
mainstream that push for liberalization as well as actors challenging this
neoliberal dominance. In contrast to the rapid liberalization steps in the
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1990s, we accordingly can observe a stagnation of the liberalization pro-
cesses in the first years of the new millennium.
At the turn of the second millennium, there is thus a substantial shift
in the politics of economic liberalization. The rapid liberalization steps
of the 1980s and 1990s occurred in economic domains where advanced
economies have advantageous market positions, e.g., communications
and financial services. In the early 2000s, however, the debates turned to
politically sensitive economic domains. First, some highly salient events
regarding the loss of national control over core industries provoked a lot
of skepticism towards the opening of national markets: Hostile foreign
take-over of industrial giants caused fears of a sell-off of domestic in-
dustries in France (Pe´chiney) and Germany (Mannesmann), while the
U.K. and Switzerland painfully experienced the collapse of national eco-
nomic monuments (MG Rover and Swissair, respectively). Second, the
liberalization of the agricultural sector looms large in the debate in the
early 2000s. Most notably, WTO member states have been engaged in
the Doha Development Round to lower market barriers for agricultural
products since 2001. The negotiations have actually been stalled since
the ministerial meeting in Cancu´n in 2003, also because Western Euro-
pean governments made too few concessions regarding their protected
agricultural markets.
Third, labor markets increasingly became the center of attention in
the six countries in the first decade of the 21st century. The French
and German governments similarly tried to introduce broad labor mar-
ket reforms. While the German government managed to implement the
Agenda 2010 reform in 2003 despite intense protests from the radical
left and unions, the French government withdrew its reform, the Con-
trat Premie`re Embauche, in view of the fierce conflicts with the labor
movement in 2006. Finally, the 2005 Bolkestein directive, the attempt
to liberalize the service sector within the Single European Market, was
heavily criticized by the left to trigger a race to the bottom with regard
to labor market regulations.
Consequentially, political opposition towards further liberalization the-
refore has steadily grown in Western Europe in the first years of the
2000s. The global justice movements have been on stage since their
protests peaked at the WTO summit in Seattle 1999. In a similar vein,
the radical left had a slight revival in the electoral arena in Europe (e.g.,
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die Linke in Germany or the Socialistische Partji in the Netherlands).
Further, populist right-wing parties increasingly started to adopt more
protectionist policies, e.g., the Freiheitliche Partei O¨sterreichs in Aus-
tria or the Front National in France (Kriesi et al., 2012). This makes the
chosen period of observation an interesting time to explore the public
debates on economic liberalization. The first historical chapter will also
take the long-term perspective from the 1970s until the mid-2000s into
account. This introductory longitudinal comparison will assess the im-
pact of globalization, post-industrialization, and state transformation on
political contestation. Here, macro data and data from content analyses
of election campaigns are used.
Since the data collection in the project from which the debate and
election data originate was terminated at the end of 2007, the financial
and subsequent economic as well as public debt crises are not covered
by the analyses. However, it is still unclear how these shocks are chang-
ing the substantive nature of the debate on economic liberalization in
Western Europe.
1.2 Outline of the Argument
A comprehensive assessment of the public debate on economic liberal-
ization is challenging because the relationship between long-term pro-
cesses and policy outcomes do not always seem straightforward. On the
one hand, difficulties arise because that public debates are continuously
evolving and are varying across different contexts. Thus, they are a mov-
ing target whose characteristics change depending on the specific time,
country and arena where they take place. On the other hand, the in-
securities regarding the conceptualization of the debate are due to the
fact that most research on globalization, post-industrialization, and dif-
ferent capitalist regimes lack an empirically sound understanding of the
interactions between long-term developments, institutions, and public
debates (Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000). Thus, the heuristic model which
guides this research and is presented in Figure 1.1 tries to take a more
comprehensive perspective. More precisely, the model outlines the main
factors and relationships at work in the study of the economic liberal-
ization debate. The empirical exploration of the debate in the second
part of this book will focus on the aspects which are set apart by a dark
background, i.e., the conflict dimensions, contexts and discursive strate-
gies of the debates.
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Figure 1.1 Heuristic Model of the Debate Analysis: The Impact of
Long-Term Challenges and Institutions on Public Debates
Sketched in very bold strokes, issue specific long-term developments are
assumed to transform the general structure of conflict and – in combi-
nation with the institutional contexts of countries and arenas – shape
the opportunities of specific actors to engage in the debate. The actors,
in turn, apply their sets of discursive strategies to gain influence on
the decision making processes which lead to policy change. One basic
assumption is therefore that exogenous political-economic pressures as
well as the specific contexts inherent to countries and arenas do not de-
terministically translate into policy change. By contrast, policy change is
the result of discursive competition among actors, i.e., a process of social
learning in which conflicts on policies, values and norms play a crucial
role (Hall, 1993; Hay, 2000). Such processes increasingly take place in
the public.
With respect to the left side of the analytical model in Figure 1.1, the
relevant exogenous pressures with respect to the debate on economic lib-
eralization consist of globalization (understood as umbrella term for Eu-
ropeanization and internationalization), post-industrialization (summa-
rizing structural economic change like tertiarization and the feminization
of the workforce), and the changing role of the state in the economy (pri-
vatization and welfare state transformation) (see Figure 1.1). While most
scholars agree that at least one of these developments are consequential
for today’s policy making processes in advanced economies (Krugman
et al., 1995; Kollmeyer, 2009; Iversen and Cusack, 2000). However, there
is still a heightened debate going on among political economists on the
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causal relationships between the long-term developments and debates,
i.e., the puzzle remains unsolved how conflicts have changed and which
impact the developments did had on the structure of conflict.
Some scholars maintain that the long-term developments have paved
the way for the spread of economic liberalism, which could steadily
progress since the end of the Cold War. This literature concludes that
advanced economies on the long run are heading towards a Kantian
capitalist peace, since economic liberalism is singled out as a commonly
shared ideological belief in the light of growing economic interdepen-
dence (Fukuyama, 1992; Ohmae, 1995; Reich, 2007). Neo-Gramscian
accounts, by contrast, agree with the basic interpretation of dominant
convergence pressures but perceive this development as the result of a
hegemonic project of transnationally oriented elites (van der Pijl, 1998;
Forgacs, 2000; van Apeldoorn, 2002). Most of the studies from both
camps, however, tend to overestimate the transnational congruence of
capitalist interests at the expense of neglecting the still considerable na-
tional varieties of political conflicts, i.e., the still virulent fractions within
capitalist interests and the ongoing contestation of economic liberaliza-
tion from outsiders (e.g. Overbeek, 2004).
The research pursued in this study thus takes a more differentiated
perspective and starts from the assumption that a broad variety of con-
flicting interests and ideologies are clashing in debates over potential
policy changes. It is expected that there is a strong neoliberal domi-
nance on economic liberalization, but it is neither supposed to be as
hegemonic nor tacitly accepted as previous analyses have concluded. In
other words, the conflict constellations specific to the debate on eco-
nomic liberalization are expected to emerge because a variety of actors
continuously strive for the supremacy of their interests, policy stances,
and ideas and no actor completely prevails over the others.
Not only the conflict constellations, but also the dimensionality of the
debate are supposed to have changed. Globalization, post-industrializa-
tion, and the transformed role of the state in the economy have had
massive redistributive consequences, which are likely giving rise to new
conflict dimensions (Przeworsky and Yebra, 2005). Most notably, there
is ample evidence that the classical left-right divide between support for
economic freedom and market mechanisms and support for redistribu-
tion, social protection, and full employment does not structure conflicts
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on economic policies as clearly as it did until the 1970s (Gourevitch,
2002). However, while it is a common assumption in the literature that
the structure of conflict on economic issues has not remained the same,
there is no consensus in the literature on how conflicts changed in re-
sponse to the exogenous political-economic pressures.
Some scholars argue that both the structural potential of old cleav-
ages as well as the formation of new conflict dimensions is undermined
by the increasing individualization and alienation among citizens in af-
fluent democracies (e.g. Mair, 2008). Others maintain that the most
important divide has shifted to cultural issues like immigration, thus
leaving economic issues like the liberalization of markets to be merely
valence issues on which all parties agree (Kitschelt, 2007; Kriesi et al.,
2008). All this points to the expectation that the conflict dimensions of
the economic liberalization debate have become more fluid and almost
unpredictable. Even more astonishing is therefore that most of the com-
parative and international political economy literature still implicitly or
explicitly theorizes political conflict in a unidimensional way between a
political left and right (e.g., Beramendi and Anderson, 2008; Pontusson
and Rueda, 2010; Milner and Judkins, 2004; Dutt and Mitra, 2005).
It is argued in this study that the key to understand this increasing
complexity is to pursue a multidimensional approach, taking different
levels of decision making and multiple political divides into account.
Scholars in the tradition of Ruggie (1982) and Rodrik (1997), to begin
with, are primarily interested in how strongly markets are dis- and re-
embedded, i.e., whether conflicts on economic regulations remain largely
national or whether they are extended to the European or even interna-
tional levels (see Block, 2007, p. 5f.; Tarrow and Caporaso, 2009). Yet
even if the political opportunities have increased at the European and
international levels, national public debates have become transnational
in their country specific ways (Koopmans and Erbe, 2004). Moreover,
many channels to gain influence on policy making remain centered at
the national level and the European and international levels thus are
still not crucial to some policy areas (Kriesi et al., 2007).
However, not only the linkage between long-term developments and
the overall transformation of conflicts on economic liberalization (i.e.,
the constellations and dimensions; see Figure 1.1) has remained con-
tested in the literature, also the interaction between long-term trends
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and institutional patterns is not carved out clearly enough. In this con-
text, the most influential theoretical frameworks in comparative political
economy emphasize the divergent paths thesis (Kitschelt, 1999; Hall and
Soskice, 2001, p. 444). The essence of this argument in the light of a de-
bate analysis is that differences among countries are persistent because
the countries’ institutions are continuously creating different opportu-
nities for actors, which, in turn, opt for distinct policies in response
to exogenous economic pressures. Over the long run, the institutional
frameworks and corresponding market structures of different countries
become complementary to each other, since they constitute efficient equi-
libria for economic development.
Such a view contests much of the early research on globalization, which
argues that market internationalization is forcing advanced economies to
converge to a single neoliberal model (e.g. Moses, 1994). But also more
recent accounts of institutional change emphasize that there is a ten-
dency to overstate the reproduction of institutional differences (Streeck
and Thelen, 2005; Hays, 2009). As a matter of fact, the comparative po-
litical economy literature is therefore far from an agreement how strongly
path dependency keeps advanced economies on diverging paths.
A comprehensive assessment seems difficult since researchers often
overestimate the coherence within the institutional constellations: coun-
tries do merely represent a coherent set of institutional configurations,
rather, they represent complex configurations of quite improbable com-
binations of institutions (Herrigel, 2007, p. 481). In the end, adherents
of convergence and proponents of divergence have not been able to de-
velop a common research agenda that acknowledges the presence of both
distinct institutional differences as well as the consequential shifts from
solidaristic to competitive forms of economic policy making (see Thelen
and Kume, 2006). The key is to exactly specify how long-term devel-
opments interact with the institutional context to shape the opportu-
nities, constraints and strategies of the relevant actors (Ha¨usermann,
2010a; Schmidt, 2010). In other words, institutional change has to be
connected with discursive processes in order to explore the potentials
of policy change. Thus, “the research agenda [...] should not just be to
seek to convince political scientists theoretically that ideas and discourse
matter – by now all neo-institutionalists seem to have accepted this to
some degree –, but to show empirically how, when, where, and why ideas
matter for institutional change, and when they do not” (Schmidt, 2010,
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p. 21). This study sets out to show how discursive processes matter with
regard to conflicts on economic liberalization.
More precisely, there is often a conceptual gap between institutional
change and discursive processes since the formation of actor preferences
is not specified clearly enough. Preferences are usually conceptualized
on the mere basis of a “teleological means-ends schema” (Jackson, 2010,
p. 77), leading to too rigid preference definitions separated from the dy-
namic context that shapes the actors’ discursive strategies. Thus, polit-
ical decisions are the result of complex interactions between institutions
and an increasingly diverse set of actors (Cerny, 2009, p. 433f.). This
means that actors may rely on interpretations of institutionalized val-
ues, norms, and power configurations, but their preferences may as well
be shaped by strategic short-term considerations (Thelen and Steinmo,
1992; Herrigel, 2008; Jackson, 2010, p. 65). In sum, as Cerny (2009,
p. 421) emphasizes, “in all these explanations [in the political economy
literature], the role of actors as agents strategically shaping change has
been neglected”.
Moving ahead in the causal chain of the heuristic model in Figure 1.1,
it is further assumed that debate coalitions can be identified which re-
flect the impact of institutions and actor strategies on the public debate.
More specifically, debate coalitions can be distinguished by tracking the
actors’ efforts in terms of going public, policy position taking, valence
campaigning, and framing (see Sabatier, 1998; Zakharov, 2009; Helbling
et al., 2012). Going public refers to the actors’ ability to access the public
debate. Further, policy position taking and valence campaigning describe
the actors’ stances on economic liberalization and vis-a`-vis other actors,
respectively. Framing, finally, means the capability of actors to justify
their policy stances in consistence with their ideological beliefs. These
four discursive strategies lead to the formation of debate coalitions.
In addition to going public and policy position taking, which are con-
sidered by most content analyses of public conflicts, the content analysis
data used in this study also allow for the study valence campaigning
as well as framing. First, valence campaigning, i.e., references of actors
to other actors, are rarely included in data collections (but see Kriesi,
2011, for an exception). Yet such actor specific references are can deci-
sively shape the success of actors with regard to the communication of
their substantial interests. Second, this analysis additionally deals with
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the framing strategies on the actor level. Most media frame studies chose
entire articles as the units of measurement (De Vreese, 2005). This means
that such studies are not able of specifying the ownership of frames, i.e.,
to differentiate in detail which actor uses which frame. In this study, by
contrast, framing is assessed at the propositional level. This allows to
investigate not only how a debate is framed, but more importantly, who
owns which frame. Moreover, the focus on frame ownership allows to re-
veal ideological inconsistencies with respect to the framing of economic
liberalization, whereas most other framing studies usually assume that
a shared frame leads to coherent policy stances (see Noy, 2009). Yet the
debate on economic liberalization shows how similar policy positions can
be taken from actors that do not share the same core beliefs. Consider
Labour and Conservatives in the U.K. during the 1990s: both parties
were in favor of liberalization although for different reasons, i.e., they
relied on a third way or Thatcherist reasoning, respectively.
With respect to the question of which actors are involved in the for-
mation of debate coalitions, the comparative political economy research
often implicitly assumes that only few are relevant. Most notably only
public authorities, parties, or interest groups are assumed to debate and
negotiate economic policies. Such an a priori definition of the crucial
players regarding economic policy making may be reasonable for some
research purposes, but from the viewpoint of an inclusive analysis of
public conflicts, there should essentially no restrictions regarding rele-
vant actor types (Bartolini, 2005, p. 25− 27). Moreover, while it is com-
monly acknowledged that “normally hundreds of actors from interest
groups, governmental agencies, legislatures at different levels of govern-
ment, researchers, journalists, and judges” (Sabatier 2007: 3) usually are
involved in the different stages of the policy process, this dictum is sel-
dom applied in research designs.
Indeed there are some actors which are usually not rigorously enough
considered in studies of political conflicts on economic liberalization. One
important actor type which is often left aside are corporations (Blyth,
2003). It is mostly assumed that corporations have a voice in politics
through their corresponding interest groups, yet the question so far re-
mains unanswered to what extent this is really the case. In addition, the
role of experts, public welfare groups and social movements in policy
making processes on economic liberalization has rarely been explored in
much detail, too. Other actors which should also be more systematically
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included are foreign governments as well as supra- and international
bodies, since international levels of policy making have become more
important (Crouch and Farrell, 2004). The simple fact that we do not
know how important different actors are for public debates on economic
liberalization requires the inclusion in a systematic and comparative re-
search design. Examples of studies which include a large variety of actors
can be found for other policy fields (e.g., Europeanization and abortion,
(see Ferree et al., 2002; Koopmans, 2007)) and case studies of single
countries (e.g., see Burstein and Linton (2002) for the U.S.A.)
Moreover, we have very little systematic knowledge about the interac-
tions of more than two different actors during the policy processes. The
globalization literature, for instance, tends to restrict the analysis to
the interactions among governments and/or parties (e.g., Garrett, 1998;
Dutt and Mitra, 2005), whereas neoinstitutionalists mostly draw their
attention to the relationship between interest groups and public author-
ities (e.g., Hancke´ et al., 2007). These neglects are rather surprising in
light of concepts like policy coalitions or politics as networks, which, in
principle, try to explain policy change as result of widely ramified po-
litical competition involving all kinds of political actors (Sabatier, 1998;
Koger et al., 2009).
To conclude, the comprehensive perspective on long-term develop-
ments, institutional contexts, and discursive strategies which is applied
in this study allows a systematic assessment of the nature of public de-
bates in the six countries under study. This way, it can exactly be shown
how countries, arenas, and actors are shaping the potentials for policy
change regarding economic liberalization.
1.3 Structure of the book
The analytical model as outlined above will guide both the theoretical
elaborations (chapters 2 through 4) as well as the empirical analyses (as
of chapter 6) in a stepwise fashion. Chapter 2 establishes the histori-
cal foundations of the debate analysis and develops the basic expecta-
tions regarding the course of the debate on economic liberalization. The
literature review in this chapter will focus on the development of the
economic situation in Western Europe in the last four decades and its
interplay with the role of the state in economic policy making. Chapter
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2 will further discuss the formation of the pro-liberalization mainstream
and its challengers as well as new divides which structure the economic
liberalization debate. Chapter 3 contains the outline of the interplay be-
tween the institutional context of countries and arenas with public de-
bates. In the last theoretical chapter (chapter 4), the implications of the
transformative pressures and institutional contexts of conflicts for the
actors’ strategic repertoire will be presented. Consequently, hypotheses
about the actors’ discursive strategies are developed. Chapter 5, finally,
presents the methods guiding the data collection and aggregation as well
as their empirical evaluation.
In the following, the empirical analysis of the debate on economic lib-
eralization will proceed in four steps. First, chapter 6 maps the terrain.
It offers an account of the structure of debates by analyzing the degree of
internationalization and the dimensionality of the conflict on economic
liberalization in the different countries and arenas. Moreover, chapter 6
presents an assessment of the actors’ going public strategies, i.e., how
well different actors are able to enter the debate. The analysis proceeds
with the analysis of the policy positions in chapter 7, valence campaign-
ing in chapter 8 and the framing strategies in chapter 90. This chapter
centers on the questions, which perceptions do the different actors have
regarding liberalization and whether the policy coalitions share a consis-
tent framing. In each of these chapters, the importance of countries and
arenas will be explored, before the discursive strategies will be studied as
a function of actor and coalitional characteristics. To make the research
process as transparent as possible, all analyses are documented chapter
by chapter using commented syntaxes for R and Stata, which can be
retrieved together with the data sets from www.bruno-wueest.ch.
Chapter 11, finally, brings it all together. It summarizes the most im-
portant empirical evidence and discusses the ramifications of the findings
in the light of the broader research context.
Part One
A Framework to Analyze the Economic
Liberalization Debate
2Long-Term Transformations and the
Economic Liberalization Debate
To explain today’s conflicts on economic liberalization, it is necessary
to have an understanding of the economic and political development in
Western Europe during the last decades. The first part of this chapter
thus describes the major developments which are crucial to establish
expectations on the structure of debates: economic globalization, post-
industrialization, and the transformation of the role of the state with re-
spect to economic policy making. The fundamental starting assumption
is that the crucial processes currently reconfiguring political conflicts
started with the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in the 1970
(Iversen and Cusack, 2000; Kriesi et al., 2008). More specifically, after
the abandonment of the international regime which was characteristic
to the golden post-war era, political and economic changes profoundly
reshaped the preferences and conflict constellations of political actors
(Berger, 2000).
The second part chapter of this chapter will outline the main expecta-
tions regarding the impact of the three major transformative pressures
on political conflict regarding economic liberalization. A first question
in this regard is concerned with the dimensionality of the public debate.
Since the traditional, all-encompassing left-right divide seems to have
lost much of its structuring capacity for conflicts on economic liberal-
ization, newly emerging conflict lines will be discussed in detail. The
major expectation is that conflicts on economic liberalization are two-
dimensional. More precisely, it will be explained why the international-
ization of the economies and the involvement of the state in economic
affairs are emerging as new major conflict dimensions structuring the
debate on economic liberalization.
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In the third part of the chapter, the expectations regarding the basic
actor constellations in the debates are established. The convergence of
mainstream parties, coupled with the increasing transnationalization of
policy making, is hypothesized to lead to a pro-liberalization mainstream
that dominates the debate landscape. Yet public debates are not only
the terrain of the pro-liberalization mainstream, but also of challengers.
Following the labor in decline argument, the importance of the labor
movement for conflicts on economic liberalization is waning. But it is
still the most likely challenger in the debate. In contrast, many observers
point to social movements and right-wing populists as the new main
opponents of economic liberalization. The argument developed in this
study is that two main groups of challengers, namely the traditional left
and protectionist right coalition, shake up the public debate on economic
liberalization.
2.1 Evolving Economic Globalization and
Post-industrialization
A concise way of describing the relevant political-economic long-term
changes for the debate on economic liberalization is by distinguishing
globalization and post-industrialization processes. On the one hand, ad-
vancing economic internationalization and intensifying political integra-
tion can be subsumed as processes of globalization (Held and McGrew,
2000; Dreher et al., 2008; Kriesi et al., 2008).1 On the other hand, de-
velopments like tertiarization2 and the feminization of the workforce 3
can be understood as processes of post-industrialization (Iversen and
Cusack, 2000; Oesch, 2006; Ha¨usermann, 2010a). These two trends in-
tensely reshaped Western European economies, which additionally face
the permanent challenges of declining birthrates, demographic aging,
and soaring social security costs that hamper their national competi-
tiveness (Schmidt, 2001; Pierson, 2001, p. 420).
The worldwide consolidation of trade and financial markets as well
as the proceeding internationalization of production can be understood
1 Since cultural and societal aspects of globalization like growing immigration from
culturally different countries or increases in private correspondence have little
influence on debates regarding economic policy making, these aspects will be left
aside in the following discussion.
2 I.e., the increasing importance of the service sectors for the economy.
3 I.e., the massive entry of women into the working population.
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as constitutive elements of economic globalization (see Perraton et al.,
1997). Figure 2.1 presents standardized indices for economic globaliza-
tion along with tertiarization and two indicators for the general devel-
opment of the economic situation in the six Western European countries
under study (France, Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland,
and the U.K.).
First, the index on the development of international economic flows
includes data on trade, foreign direct investment flows and stocks, portfo-
lio investment, and income payments to foreign nationals (Dreher et al.,
2008).4 Second, service sector production as a percentage of GDP and
the share of service sector employment in total employment as reported
in the OECD structural analysis database5 were used to calculate the
index of tertiarization. Third, the economic misery index combines un-
employment as well as inflation into a composite measure of the economic
difficulties that kept the six countries busy.5 And finally, the gross do-
mestic product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity is shown
in figure 2.1.5 All indices are standardized to a scale ranging from 0 to
100.
The intensity of international economic flows that affect the Western
European countries more than tripled in the time from the 1970s until
today, while the growth of the tertiary sector was similarly steady and
even slightly stronger. Both developments took place in the context of
a rather constant but lately slightly falling economic output and, since
the mid-1980s, a declining and stabilizing economic misery index. Thus,
while the economic productivity does not vary much since decades, the
six Western European countries have become much more open and also
substantially tertiarized.
Not only in Western Europe, but obviously on a global scale, economic
activities have not become completely footloose, but the mobility of peo-
ple, goods, services, capital, and information has become significantly
larger (Held and McGrew, 2000; Brady et al., 2007). Since the 1970s,
most national markets for manufactured goods and financial transac-
tions have been integrated into global ones, as tariffs among advanced
economies were reduced to negligible levels (Bru¨hlhart, 2009). In a sim-
ilar vein, the advanced economies have seen an upsurge in the extent
4 Data retrieved from globalization.kof.ethz.ch [08/03/2011].
5 Data retrieved from stats.oecd.org [08/03/2011].
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Figure 2.1 Economic Long-Term Developments in Western Europe
Notes: Sources: KOF (Dreher et al., 2008) and OECD (2010). All indices were
standardized to a scale ranging from 0 to 100 across the six Western European
countries of the study.
of international lending and the displacement of conventional loan busi-
nesses by security markets (Hirst and Thompson, 1999). The reduction
of transport and communication costs further enabled large corporations
to become global players, i.e., to integrate their value chain on a world-
wide level and split their production according to comparative advantage
(Berger, 2005).
An important part of international economic flows take effect in the
financial markets. Accordingly, capital flows have enormously increased
in both amount and speed on a worldwide scale, and multinational banks
play an ever more critical role as managers of financial flows and credit
lenders (Kalinkowski and Cho, 2009). The downside of positive effects
like the more efficient allocation of financial resources is increasing finan-
cial market volatility. Consequentially, financial crises have become more
frequent and severe, which is not only visible in the recent global finan-
cial crisis, but also the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998 (Stiglitz, 2003;
Bhagwati, 2004; Quaglia et al., 2009). Rapidly industrializing countries,
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most notably China, Brazil, and India, but also Eastern European states,
which radically opened their markets since the collapse of the Comecon
system, induce further major transformations within the world economy.
The share of these emerging markets in world trade has tripled since the
1970s, and competition has increased (Perraton et al., 1997). In sum,
what Katzenstein (1985) wrote with respect to small Western European
countries has therefore become significant for all countries under study:
vulnerability in relation to the world economy is an inescapable fact of
nowadays’ economic policy making.
In addition to globalization, post-industrialization processes also have
profoundly transformed Western European economies. This process ap-
proximatively summarizes the domestic structural changes that shape
the context of economic policy making in the six countries under study.
A first major process restructuring the workforce was the massive entry
of women into the labor markets (Ha¨usermann, 2010b). A second aspect
of post-industrialization constitutes tertiarization, that is the movement
of labor and production from the agricultural and manufacturing sec-
tors to the service industries (Iversen and Cusack, 2000, p. 313f.). While
the tertiary sector, especially the financial and communication services,
experienced a high productivity growth in the last decades, most basic
labor-intensive industries declined in relative terms (see Figure 2.1).
Technological change, changing consumption patterns, saturated mar-
kets, and the competition from emerging markets has increasingly im-
paired the opportunities for the traditional industries in Western Eu-
rope, while the service sectors grew. The composition of the workforce
accordingly changed with the entry of the majority of the young people
into the service industries, while early retirement continues to happen
prevailingly in the traditional sectors.
2.2 The Changing Nature of the State
One important aspect of the macroeconomic developments outlined so
far is their interaction with a fundamental transformation of the state.
Partly as a cause and partly in consequence, but surely in lockstep
with globalization and post-industrialization, states increasingly drift
towards more workfare (Jessop, 2002), competition enhancing (Cerny,
2000) and regulatory elements (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2003). First, glob-
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alization and post-industrialization induced a significant erosion of the
effectiveness of decommodification measures6 in the traditionally gen-
erous welfare regimes of Western Europe – although there certainly is
no radical race to the bottom (Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000; Grande and
Kriesi, forthcoming; Ha¨usermann, 2010b). Welfare states are increas-
ingly rebuilt from providing free-standing social services to incorporate
more market conforming employment policies, e.g., employment subsi-
dies, training schemes, and conditional entitlement programs (Clayton
and Pontusson, 1998; Vail, 2008). This transformation was negotiated
in the context of increasingly flexible and competitive industrial rela-
tions, which led to social pacts that contain more market-conforming
policies (Rhodes, 2001). Especially since the beginning of the 1990s, la-
bor market liberalization has thus become more prominent in shaping
labor relationships in Western European economies. As a consequence,
however, economic inequality and job insecurity have increased (Rueda,
2005; Anderson and Pontusson, 2007).
Second, governments are increasingly concerned with promoting the
competitive advantage of their economies. Hence, to be successful in a
globally integrated economy, a reorientation from public production to
the provision of support for particular production and service sectors has
taken place (Sapir, 2006). Of course, states have not completely refrained
from direct market participation, but the last decades have seen a high
number of privatizations as well as the relative decline of public invest-
ment (Heinemann, 2006; Zohlnhoefer et al., 2008). Thus, the general
focus of economic policies has changed from production to redistribu-
tion and supporting business in the international markets (Vogel, 1996;
Rhodes, 2001). Western European states partly retreated from lucrative
businesses like telecommunications or the energy industry (Schneider
et al., 2005). In turn, public authorities have extensively established in-
dependent regulatory agencies in a bid to keeping credibility regarding
the provision of public goods as well as the enhancing of their economic
competitiveness (Gilardi, 2005).
Finally, public authorities have continuously shifted their routines to-
wards regulatory activities as their interactions with both the economy
and transnational governance networks have become more differentiated
(Majone, 1996; Vogel, 1996). First, the cooperation between adminis-
6 Policies to disconnect income streams from market outcomes such as
employment protection or minimum wages.
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trations and the economic sphere has become more intense, most of all
in the form of public private partnerships. Second, advanced economies
have integrated into a complex multi-level governance system (Scharpf
and Schmidt, 2000, p. 1f.). Most notably with the extension of the EU’s
regulatory scope, previously nationally oriented actors have increasingly
become involved in transnational decision-making and are now consti-
tutive parts of a multi-level governance process (Kohler-Koch, 2003).
Nation states thus have significantly transferred authority to supra- and
international bodies which, in turn, were heavily responsible for the dif-
fusion of liberalization policies (Simmons et al., 2006). Crucial steps in
this respect in the 1990s were the Treaty of Maastricht, which created the
Single European Market, the termination of the WTO Uruguay round
and the introduction of the Euro. Furthermore, the competition for capi-
tal has led to a proliferation of bilateral investment treaties which secure
the rights of foreign investors (Elkins et al., 2006). Even in policy do-
mains that have remained predominantly national affairs, such as labor
market regulations, welfare regimes or collective bargaining systems, the
influence of international and European regulatory networks is therefore
nonetheless influential (Schmidt, 2009, p. 518).
Complementing the argumentation with respect to the changing role
of the state, Figure 2.2. provides an empirical overview of three indices
corresponding to the processes related to the changing role of the state
in the economy as described so far. All indices are arranged so that they
show increasing liberalization trends on a scale from 0 to 100.7 First, the
graph indicates the KOF index for the lowering of national boundaries
which covers the dissolution of various policy instruments to shelter the
national economy, i.e., measures for formal and hidden import barriers,
tariff rates, taxes on international trade, and capital account restrictions
(Dreher et al., 2008)8.
Further, the degree of labor market deregulation is shown that sub-
sumes several variables reflecting employment security. The data, which
come from the OECD structural analysis database9, entail the share of
active labour market programs in public expenditures, the strictness of
7 All indicators are standardized by setting the highest value to 100 and the lowest
to 0. The remaining values are then recalculated correspondingly to fit into the
range from 0 to 100
8 Data retrieved from globalization.kof.ethz.ch [08/03/2011].
9 Retrieved from stats.oecd.org [08/03/2011].
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regulation on dismissals and the use of temporary contracts. Finally, an
index of state retrenchment – measured by the number of privatizations
and the share of governmental investing in total public expenditures10
– is presented.
Figure 2.2 The Evolution of the Role of the State in the Economy
in Western Europe
Notes: Sources: KOF (Dreher et al., 2008) and OECD (2010). All indices were
standardized to a scale ranging from 0 to 100 across the six Western European
countries.
While the reduction of national barriers shows a quite uniform upward
trend in all decades, public sector retrenchment begins to stabilize in
the early 1990s. The flexibility of labor markets is rather constant ex-
cept a substantial rise in the mid-1990s. where they stabilize or are even
reversed in the case of the lowering of national boundaries. The trends
thus points to growing liberalization with respect to the whole time pe-
riod, but mainly in terms of internationalization.
10 Taken from the privatization barometer (retrieved from
privatizationbarometer.net [08/03/2011]) as well as the OECD structural
analysis database.
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2.3 The Emergence of a Pro-Liberalization
Mainstream
Globalization, post-industrialization, and state transformation consti-
tute the main exogenous pressures that led to major shifts in the actor
constellations of the debate. The starting point inducing these shifts
was the embedded liberalism regime of the post-war decades which can
mainly be characterized by a prevalence of Keynesian macroeconomic
policies and economies organized on the national level which were not
heavily interdependent (Ruggie, 2008). This regime was incrementally
removed in favor of a multi-level governance system and a network of
bilateral treaties leading to a complex interdependence among advanced
economies (Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000; Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Elkins
et al., 2006). This increasing political-economic integration also provided
the backbone for the global diffusion of economic liberalism, which found
new terrain after the collapse of state socialism at the end of the Cold
War. Hence, the spread of pro-market ideas was decisively driven by the
failure of socialism and the appendant advocacy of the United States
and the Bretton Woods institutions (Simmons et al., 2006).
One of the main consequences of the growing political-economic inter-
dependence and the spread of economic liberalism is mainstream party
convergence. Center-right and center-left parties, who usually dominate
government coalitions in Western Europe, have programmatically con-
verged on economic issues (Kitschelt, 1999; Boix, 2000; Mair, 2001; Mil-
ner and Judkins, 2004; Kriesi et al., 2008). In the 1970s, the class cleavage
was the prevailing structuring element of debates on economic policies,
dividing the political opponents along the left-right dimension (Bartolini
and Mair, 1990). This historically very contentious division between la-
bor and capital, however, has lost much of its importance in structuring
political conflicts in advanced economies (Dalton et al., 1984; Hardin,
2000).
While the value change in favor of a more radical economic liberalism
first captured parties on the right in advanced economies, but both the
left in advanced economies and the political elites in many developing
countries followed suit after the end of the Cold War (Vandenbroucke,
1998). Thus, the majority of public authorities shifted to monetarist and
supply-side economic management. These changes are obviously related
to a fundamental reshaping of political conflicts on economic liberaliza-
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tion. More specifically, the long-term changes eroded the plausibility of
the left’s traditional economic recipes. Keynesian economic policies lost
much of their viability in the stagflation crisis during the 1970s (Hall,
1993). Therefore, established left parties needed to turn from sharp criti-
cism of capitalism to a more pragmatic approach on economic liberalism
in order to keep aspiring for office (Giddens, 2000; Mu¨ller-Rommel and
Poguntke, 2002). In sum, the most important consequence is the con-
vergence of the left and right mainstream parties.
Table 2.1 shows the decade averages of policy positions, issue salience,
and going public by mainstream and challenger parties in electoral cam-
paigns of the 1970s, 1990s, and 2000s.11 Policy positions show the av-
erages of the directions made by the four camps regarding economic
liberalization. The issue saliencies indicate how important economic lib-
eralization is relative to all other issues debated during the electoral
campaign. Going public, finally, shows the relative frequency of the four
camps. The data stem from a content analysis of newspapers in a two-
month selection period up to each election day (see Dolezal et al., 2012).
Radical left parties such as communists and left populists are coded as
left challengers.12 Mainstream left parties include mainly green parties
and social democrats,13 while the right mainstream consists of liber-
als, Christian democrats, and conservatives.14 Right challenging parties
summarize right-wing populists and other radical parties.15
The policy positions show three key developments. First, the party sys-
tems as a whole moved to pro-market positions, since three party camps
moved to the right and only challengers slightly strengthened their op-
11 The following national elections are covered by the data: Austria=1975, 1994,
1999, 2002, 2006; France=1978, 1988, 1995 2002, 2007; Germany=1976, 1994,
1998, 2002, 2005; the Netherlands=1973, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2003, 2006;
U.K.=1974, 1992, 1997, 2001, 2005; Switzerland=1975, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003,
2007.
12 Austria=KP; France=Parti Communiste, Force Ouvrire and smaller radical left
splinter groups; Germany=Die Linke and its predecessors;
Switzerland=Alternative Liste, PdA, Solidarit and smaller radical left splinter
groups; the Netherlands=Socialistische Partji, Groenlinks
13 Austria=Grne, SP; U.K.=Labour, Scottish National Party; France=PS,
Radicaux des Gauches, Verts; Switzerland=SPS, Grne, LdU; Germany=SPD;
Netherlands=PvdA.
14 Austria=VP, Liberales Forum; Switzerland=CVP, FDP; France=UMP/RPR,
UDF; Germany=CDU/CSU, FDP; the Netherlands=CDA, D66, VVD, SGP; the
U.K.=Conservatives, Liberal Democrats.
15 Austria=FP, BZ; Switzerland=SVP and radical right splinter groups; the
Netherlands=Lijst Pim Fortuyn; France=Front National.
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Table 2.1 Policy Positions, Issue Salience, and Going Public on
Economic Liberalization in the Electoral Arena
Left chall- Mainstream Mainstream Right chall-
enger parties left parties right parties enger parties
Position
1970 –0.57 –0.32 0.12 –0.09
1990 –0.58 –0.23 0.58 0.42
2000 –0.66 0.25 0.36 0.34
∆ 1970/2000 –0.09 +0.57 +0.24 +0.42
Issue salience
1970 22.1 19.9 20.4 10.8
1990 18.7 11.9 11.6 7.5
2000 17.1 10.3 9.5 6.5
∆ 1970/2000 –5.0 –9.6 –10.9 –4.3
Going public
1970 5.3 32.4 58.7 3.6
1990 5.2 37.3 51.8 5.8
2000 8.5 44.6 39.1 7.9
∆ 1970/2000 +3.2 +12.1 –19.6 +4.3
Notes: All numbers are decade averages. Positions range from -1=opposition to
+1=support of economic liberalization. Source: Own data established in collaboration
with Kriesi et al. (2012).
position to economic liberalization. Second, the electoral politics fo eco-
nomic liberalization has become more polarized, especially from the
1970s until the 1990s. Positive and negative positions are further away
from each other. Third and most importantly in the context of this study,
the mainstream left and right converged on a moderately pro-market po-
sition (0.25 for the mainstream left and 0.36 for the mainstream right
parties). Since these two party camps are still by far more important
in terms of going public than the other two camps, this adds to neolib-
eral dominance in the politics on economic liberalization. Furthermore,
we see that the salience of economic liberalization has decreased for
all parties, but especially so for the mainstream parties. It it thus likely
that the parties with potential governmental policies try to avoid talking
about economic liberalization reforms which usually are quite unpopular
(Kriesi et al., 2012).
Besides the reconfiguration among traditionally government-dominating
parties, new actors are forcefully entering the debate on the pro-liberalization
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side as well. Most notably, the long-term changes have been accompa-
nied by a transnationalization of politics, i.e., the transformation of the
territorial scope of conflicts beyond the nation state. To a large extent,
new layers of economic policy making have been established beyond
the nation state (Held et al., 1999, p. 80f.; Hooghe and Marks, 2001).
First, vertical mechanisms of transnationalization are responsible the
increasing involvement of supra- and international actors in national de-
bates (Lehmkuhl, 2006, p. 149). These actors mostly try to push for the
opening of markets. A telling example is the EU, which, at least until
the recent financial crisis, continuously pressured its member states to
deepen the Single European Market (Howarth, 2006, p. 85f.; Thatcher,
2007).
Second, horizontal transnationalization is a further substantive pro-
cess that brings along the increasing influence of foreign actors like for-
eign governments or multinational corporations in the countries’ debate
(Koopmans and Erbe, 2004). Most of all, the upsurge in international fi-
nancial flows has made globally operating banks politically independent
from the systems of patient capital that are essential for the functioning
of the coordinated economies in continental Western Europe (Ho¨pner
and Krempel, 2003). Moreover, the process of horizontal transnational-
ization points to the efforts by the global players among the employers
to dismantle collective bargaining, what substantially eroded the capac-
ity of coordination and social solidarity in the interest intermediation
regimes in many Western European countries (Hassel, 1999). The biggest
financial institutes and other global players thus grew out of the national
political networks they relied upon for decades.
To bring it all together, the main expectation on the debate analy-
sis accordingly is that the mainstream party convergence and transna-
tionalization have led to an pro-market mainstream in the debate on
economic liberalization (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000, p. 476f.; Grande
and Pauly, 2005). The effect of this mainstream can be described as a
continuing push towards classical liberal policy recipes (Rodrik, 2006;
Cerny, 2009). Its program, namely the favoring of trade liberalization,
floating exchange rates, integration of financial markets, and expansion
of transnational production, are backed by core beliefs about economic
freedom and the spread of material wealth.
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To really understand the coalition’s political program, it is worth re-
ferring to one of its main origins. In “What Washington Means by Policy
Reform”, John Williamson (1990) summarized the shared policy stances
of the Bretton Woods institutions, Wall Street actors and the US Trea-
sury with respect to the conditions for international loans to developing
countries (Wade and Veneroso, 1998). While some of the points raised in
the document were irrelevant for Western Europe, many policy propos-
als of this ’Washington consensus’ have been adopted by international
and European organizations, e.g., the OECD, the European Commis-
sion, and a large number of Western European governments (Alesina
and Giavazzi, 2006). In the latter case, the corresponding liberal policies
were implemented via the traditional corporatist policy making networks
(Regini, 2003; Streeck, 2006; Baccaro and Simoni, 2008).
2.4 Challenges of Neoliberal Dominance
As forcefully as the neoliberal dominance emerged from the public debate
on economic liberalization in the last decades, there are not only adher-
ents in the debate. More precisely, since globalization, post-industrializa-
tion, and the transformation of the state also have created new forms of
opposition, there is a transition from the technocratic phase of economic
liberalization to its repoliticization in the early 2000s. The traditional
and newly emerging challengers are heterogeneous and thus less easy
to conceptualize for researchers than the all-encompassing class conflict
between labor and capital that firmly structured politics for much of
the twentieth century (Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Hironaka, 2005). What
seems clear is that the movement of the established left parties to the
center of economic conflicts opens up a niche on interventionist and
protectionist issues. This gives several actors a promising opportunity
to mobilize the economic losers’ potential (De Vries and Edwards, 2009).
Following Kriesi et al. (2008, p. 4-5), economic losers are best con-
ceptualized as having insufficient exit options in terms of their employ-
ment situation. The pivotal determinant is the level of marketable skills,
since a low educational attainment hampers economic mobility in to-
days highly flexible and internationalized labor markets (Oesch, 2006;
Ha¨usermann and Schwander, 2009). The decisive political dilemma for
the politics of economic liberalization lies between claims for more dereg-
ulation to sustain the winners benefits and the increase of social and
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national protective policy solutions to shelter the losers.
In this context, the labor in decline argumentation and welfare chau-
vinism thesis can be relied upon to formulate expectations for the left
and right challengers. According to the latter, right-wing populists are
increasingly discussed contenders in the debate on economic liberaliza-
tion. According to the former, the traditional political left, i.e., radical
left parties and trade unions are perceived as oppositional forces which
struggle to sustain a decisive role (Wallerstein and Western, 2000; March
and Mudde, 2005; Ruggie, 2007). First, the radical left parties tradition-
ally seem very well suited to articulate the economic losers’ potential
in Western Europe since they mainly try to mobilize on the grievances
against an excessive capitalism. Yet, there (at best) moderate success in
the last years shows that this only happens to a marginal degree. In fact,
radical socialist, communist, maoist, and trotzkiyst parties face serious
constraints for a successful revival. Moreover, the collapse of the Soviet
union was detrimental to the electoral prospects of the classical radical
left parties, because it undermined their ideological coherence and the
credibility of their societal project. Thus, most radical left parties lost
much of their importance in the decade after the fall of the Iron Curtain
(March and Mudde, 2005). As the results from their election campaign-
ing show (see table 2.1), they mobilized slightly more radical against
economic liberalization and also had a stronger going public in the 2000s
than in the decades before. But these shifts are rather marginal and they
were also unable to reverse the general trend of declining salience of eco-
nomic liberalization in election campaigns.
Trade unions seem to be in a rather difficult situation, too. From the
postwar period until the late 1970s, labor markets became increasingly
organized in advanced economies (Wallerstein and Western, 2000). Since
the 1980s, however, trade union density and absolute membership num-
bers tend to fall in most countries, and many centralized systems of wage
setting have been breaking apart – except in countries with a Ghent sys-
tem16 (Regini, 2003; Ha¨usermann, 2010a). Therefore, they have a hard
time maintaining social protection at a fairly high level and are facing
continuous pressure to make concessions in light of high unemployment
numbers and increasing welfare costs (Baccaro and Simoni, 2008). More-
16 Systems where the main administrative responsibility over welfare payments,
particularly in the field of unemployment benefits, is held by the trade unions,
not by public authorities.
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over, the relationship between social democratic parties and unions in
Western Europe, until the 1970s a solid political coalition, has signifi-
cantly weakened in the last decades (Upchurch et al., 2009). The shift of
social democrats towards economic liberalism and their experience that
strong ties to unions are an electoral liability have made them reluctant
to strongly cooperate with the trade unions.
Against this background of the increasing difficulties of the labor
movement, social movements are often brought forward as actors that
take over the mobilization of discontent with globalization and post-
industrialization. Indeed, the political-economic changes gave rise to the
emergence of a variety of movements, commonly summarized under the
label global justice movements. These movements can be seen as coun-
termovement against the multilateral economic institutions and their
economic liberalism, which they perceive has detrimental socio-economic
effects (Ruggie, 2007, p. 27). It might therefore be anticipated that social
movements have obtained a significant standing in the debate, yet two
reason speak against this. First, since the 1960s, most social movements
have focussed on multi-cultural, pacifist, emancipatory, and cosmopoli-
tan demands, leaving economic issues aside. Second, since the peak of the
movements mobilizing against economic liberalization in the late 1990s,
the global justice movements lost much of their dynamic, even during the
recent global financial crisis (Hutter, forthcoming; Wueest, 2011). Only
in 2011, there is some significant mobilization observable with the ‘indig-
nados’ (i.e., the outraged) movement in Spain and the occupy protests
that started in New York. However, striking and demonstrating unions
clearly seem to be more active with respect to the left opposition against
global capital.
Figure 2.3 shows the salience of economic liberalization in the protest
arena and the strike activity over all six countries for the last four
decades. The salience of protests is measured as the share of participants
in protests against economic liberalization. This protest data stem from
the same research project as the debate and electoral campaign data
(see Dolezal et al., 2012). The data contains a systematic account of
the issues and positions related to less institutionalized events of po-
litical participation from 1970 to 2007. Since strikes are not covered in
the protest event data set used in this analysis, they are reported sepa-
rately. The index of strike activity stems from the Comparative Political
Data Set and is calculated by counting the number of working days lost
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per 1000 workers (see Armingeon et al., 2010). Since the indices have
a different data base – share in number of participants and number of
workdays lost –, they are not directly comparable with each other and
only their development over time should be interpreted.
Figure 2.3 Protest Against Economic Liberalization
Notes: Sources: Kriesi et al. (2011) and Armingeon et al. (2010). All indices were
standardized to a scale ranging from 0 to 100 across the six Western European
countries.
Strike activity peaked during the economic crises of the late 1970s and
early 1980s. Since then, however, strike activity markedly cooled down,
with the exception of the early 2000s, when German and French unions
were up in arms against sweeping labor market reforms of their govern-
ments and the Austrian unions against drastic pension reforms of the
right wing government. Protest activity is much more volatile, yet as
already outlined, since the strong mobilization at the end of the 1990s,
social movements tend to loose ground in terms of the opposition to-
wards economic liberalization,
Despite the historically rooted dominance of the left in the opposi-
tion against liberal capitalism, it is also probable that another group of
challengers emerges out of the conservative right to oppose the interna-
tionalization of the economies, albeit for different reason than the left.
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This right challenger expectation pits populist right parties and protec-
tionist business actors against the pro-market mainstream.
Most notably, populist right-wing parties have been successful in ex-
ploiting the existing potentials for more economic regulation (De Vries
and Edwards, 2009). Previous studies have already shown that the win-
ning formula of the populist right, a combination of cultural demarcation
and economic liberalism, which was the preferred strategy of populist
right parties during the 1990s, has lost much of its appeal in the 2000s
(Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Kitschelt, 2007). Nowadays, the right-
wing populist parties increasingly approach the losers of recent trans-
formations, also in economic terms and the working class has en masse
turned to the right-wing populists in Western Europe (Oesch, 2008).
Right-wing populists increasingly succeed in linking economic com-
petition to the endangered standard of living of the indigenous popu-
lations, as the electoral success of the True Finns this year shows (see
Grande and Kriesi, forthcoming). Their opposition to the opening of
markets is culturally motivated, since they perceive national sovereignty
and the well-being of the national workforce to be in danger (Mudde,
2007; Berezin, 2009). This welfare chauvinism expectation therefore sug-
gests that the populist right-wing parties step up as major oppositional
forces in the debate on economic liberalization. In doing so, they likely
side with protectionist business and employer associations. The results
in table 2.1., however, contrast this expectation. Right challenger par-
ties actually have become more pro-market oriented over the last four
decades. But from the 1990s to the 2000s, we observe a slight decrease of
their pro-liberalization stance, which possibly indicates a growing skep-
sis of at least some populist right parties.
In other words, opposition on the right can be expected from inter-
nationally less successful economic sectors. As Katzenstein (1985) as
well as David and Mach (2006) have shown for small Western European
economies, a conservative and protectionist faction always existed among
business actors, mainly among farmers and small businesses which a fo-
cus on domestic markets. With increasing economic integration during
the last decades, however, the frictions within business likely have be-
come more pronounced in all of Europe (Schneider and Grote, 2006).
Accordingly, some business actors may be inclined to opt for oligopolis-
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tic strategies since this allows them to keep profits within the national
economy (Roach, 2005, p. 19).
2.5 New Conflict Dimensions on Economic
Liberalization
The transformation of the fundamental conflict constellation in the de-
bate on economic liberalization is accompanied by a change in the under-
lying conflict dimensions. This change, however, poses a complex chal-
lenge to conceptualize in terms of the dimensionality of the debate, since
the long-term transformations have eroded the once overwhelming class
cleavage (Dalton et al., 1984; Kriesi, 1998; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005).
More precisely, the political conflicts on intervention in the economy
and redistribution have become heterogeneous, since the political actor’s
preferences do not align on a single dimension any more (Ha¨usermann
and Kriesi, 2011).
Nevertheless, debates in specific policy domain are never an unstruc-
tured amalgam of communicative acts. A small number of underlying
dimensions usually accurately describes the conflict lines of a debate:
“While the detailed local substance of political competition varies in id-
iosyncratic ways from setting to setting, key features of its structure are
fairly constant” (Laver and Sergenti, 2011, p. 17). Accordingly, economic
liberalization still gives rise to new political divides.
From the globalization literature, we have learnt that the simple mu-
tually exclusive separation into national and international markets no
longer exists (Tarrow and Caporaso, 2009, p. 594). National markets
have become more and more intertwined and international institutions
increasingly intervene into arenas once perceived as strongholds of do-
mestic politics. As Zu¨rn and Walter (2005, p. 273f.) highlight, the con-
sequence is that there is a growing divide between those who profit from
internationalized markets and those who profit from the sheltering of
national industries. One important factor responsible for this divide is
exposure to international competition, i.e., between the tradables and
nontradables sectors in a country (Frieden, 1991; Hays, 2009). The sec-
ond crucial variable is skill (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006). The in-
ternationalization of markets increases the demand for the abundantly
available factors of a country, which in advanced economies typically is
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high-skilled labor (Midford, 1993). Consequently, the well-educated are
beneficiaries of globalization, while low-skilled workers lose out. From
the perspective of the internationalization of the economies, the decisive
political dilemma lies thus between claims for more deregulation and lib-
eralization of the national economy to sustain the winners benefits and
the increase of social and national protective policy solutions to shelter
the losers.
Even if internationalization has become a crucial aspect of economic
policy making in Western Europe, many important steps towards liber-
alization such as privatizations and labor market reforms are still carried
out at the domestic level (Schwartz, 2001, p. 31). Moreover, the welfare
literature forcefully points to the legacy of class politics in Western Eu-
rope (Ha¨usermann, 2010a). Although cultural liberalism and cosmopoli-
tan values related to the new left have become more salient for the
political left and mainstream left parties experiment with ‘flexicurity’
approaches to restructure welfare states, it is evident that the ideologi-
cal antagonism between labor and capital still divides todays politics at
least to some extent (Kriesi et al., 2012; Pontusson and Rueda, 2010).
Apart from the opposition between state and market this divide concerns
also social policies. It thus splits labor, i.e. unions, left parties and public
interest groups (social movements and charity organizations), favoring
highly redistributive policies, and capital, i.e. right parities, employers
organizations and international firms, which prefer means tested benefit
structures (Esping-Andersen, 1999).
In sum, conflicts on economic liberalization can thus take place with
regard to domestic politics or they can be concerned with the chang-
ing relationship between the national economy and global markets, i.e.,
whether business activity should be free to move across borders or not
(Hellwig, 2008; Hall and Gingerich, 2009, p. 37). We therefore assume
two dimensions of the debate on economic liberalization, since state in-
tervention to ensure social security and state intervention to protect
national sovereignty are two strictly different aspects of economic lib-
eralization. Or, as Kitschelt (2007, p. 1183) puts it, “trade always cut
across, or was antithetical to distributive class politics.” Chapter 6 will
empirically assess the structure of the debate on economic liberalization.
For this purpose, the issue categories as listed in table 2.2 will be used
as a starting point. The categories are a first aggregation of the issues
coded during the content analyses. This preparatory work is needed since
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the hundreds of inductively collected issues were too unstructured to be
included as such into the analyses. Chapter 5 contains more information
on the data collection. Furthermore, a precise listing of the content of
the categories can be found in Table A.5 in the appendix.
In the following, the concepts underlying the classification will be de-
scribed. After the separation of the domestic from the international as-
pects of economic liberalization, a second distinction is introduced, along
which economic liberalization is further disaggregated. As Vogel (1996,
p. 3) emphasizes, economic liberalization can entail regulatory aspects or
the retreat of the public sector which activates free market mechanisms.
Moreover, since there is no zero-sum relationship between government
intervention and market processes, freer markets often imply tighter and
more widespread controls by public authorities. Each distinction is fur-
ther disaggregated as far as the numbers of coded observations for each
issue allow. All issue labels are formulated in a way that the dimensions
and issues have a clear direction in favor of economic liberalization. This
is important for the consistency of the analyses, since the meaning of
positive and negative with regard to policy statements is always the
same.
Table 2.2 Issues of the Debate on Economic Liberalization
Dimension Issue
Domestic Regulatory Retrenchment of restrictions
aspects Labor market deregulation
Activating Privatization
aspects Economic promotion
International Regulatory aspects International market deregulation
Activating Internationalization
aspects Locational competition
Thus, for both distinction, two issues are defined, except for international
market regulation. This issue contained too few statements collected in
the content analysis to further decompose. To begin with, general regula-
tory retrenchment and labor market deregulation policies, both related
to the domestic dimension and regulatory aspects, are discerned. The
issue retrenchment of restrictions entails all statements regarding the
loosening of competition constraints, more business friendly corporate
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governance, and the weakening of social partnership. For example, reg-
ulations concerning unfair competition, too high manager salaries, or
social-compensation plans fall in this category. Labor market deregula-
tion consists of statements related to more flexible employment regu-
lation, e.g., measures related to dismissal protection or shop opening
hours. Further, privatization, i.e., the cut-back or sale of state produc-
tion, is separated from general economic promotion policies, which, for
example, entail tax benefits for businesses or bailout programs of nearly
collapsing corporations.
As with the issues of the domestic dimension, regulatory aspects (in-
ternational market deregulation) are separated from policies aiming at
expanding the scope of market mechanisms in the economic sphere. In-
ternational market deregulation policies include restrictions to interven-
tions in financial markets, trade, and international labor markets as well
as the introduction of more flexible tax regimes. And finally, with respect
to activating aspects of international liberalization, internationalization
is discerned from locational competition. The former comprises the pro-
motion of trade and free movement of labor, while the latter covers tax
competition and the active promotion of foreign direct investment.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter outlined the big picture of how the macroeconomic environ-
ment and accordingly the politics on economic liberalization in Western
Europe have changed during the last decades. While the basic situation
in terms of productivity and economic misery remained fairly constant
over time, the importance of the service sectors and especially economic
exposure have steadily increased. Western Europe is far more exposed
to the global economy and also more de-industrialized than decades ago.
This has not only changed the nature of the state, but lies most likely
also at the origin of a fundamental transformation of public debates on
economic liberalization policy making in Western Europe.
The first fundamental expectation regarding the debate analysis is
the change of the public debate towards a two-dimensional structure
instead of a simple unidimensional left-right bifurcation. Furthermore,
public political competition is expected to relate to one or both of two
specific dimensionality: Either the growing importance of internation-
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alization for public conflicts or conflicts on state involvement into the
markets are structuring public debates on economic liberalization. By
testing the two-dimensionality expectation, this analysis thus sets out
to revisit the left-right paradigm often assumed in popular and scientific
accounts of conflicts on economic policy making.
This chapter also provided the historical background for the debate
analysis, from which the expectations regarding a pro-market main-
stream and its challengers from the political left and right were derived.
The transnationalization of economic policy making and mainstream
party convergence led to a pro-liberalization mainstream which should
generally entail the following actors: established parties and the corre-
sponding governments and public administrations they control, EU and
international bodies, multinational corporations and the business asso-
ciations representing them.
With regards to the key players of groups challenging the pro-liberaliza-
tion mainstream, trade unions are still expected to play an important
role in mobilizing grievances against the consequences of free markets,
although the intensity of their opposition has decreased over the decades.
The radical left parties and social movements, in contrast, are hypoth-
esized to be only marginal actors in the debates. The populist radical
right, in contrast, who mobilizes oppositional potentials for cultural rea-
sons, is a new important contender in the debate. They are expected to
side with traditionally protectionist business actors.
Table 2.3 offers an overview over the expectations with regard to the
dimensionality, mainstream formation, and challengers in the public de-
bate on economic liberalization. During the analyses, the neoliberal dom-
inance, labor in decline and protectionism theses are tested in a longitu-
dinal analysis of election campaigns and protest events from the 1970s
until 2007. Moreover, all expectations are explored by comparing the
debates across the six countries under study.
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Table 2.3 Expectations on the Overall Transformation of Conflict
Mainstream
formation
Mainstream party convergence and transnationalization led to a pro-
liberalization mainstream on economic reform.
Challengers Although in decline, the labor movement remains the most important
opponent of economic liberalization, but right-wing populists, small busi-
ness actors, and public welfare organizations are also increasingly fighting
economic liberalization reforms.
Two-
dimensionality
of the debate
Not the left-right dimension, but the separation between struggles for the
internationalization of the economies and the liberalization of domestic
markets structures the debate.
3How Institutional Contexts Relate to Public
Debates
Until now, the broad picture was outlined of how the economic environ-
ment and conflicts on economic liberalization have evolved. Yet, even if
they diagnose a strong convergence among Western European countries
towards a free market model in the early 1990s, Crouch and Streeck
(1997, p. 7) note that “differentiated typologies of market mechanisms”
still lead to varying trajectories among countries. Institutions, broadly
understood as sets of rules or practices with rule-like qualities, con-
strain the room to maneuver for political competitors and thus affect
how much influence different interests have in policy making processes
(North, 1990; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992; O’Reilly, 2005). National pecu-
liarities in debates are thus assumed to persist even under the influence
of strong adaptive pressures like globalization and post-industrialization
(see Pontusson, 2005). More precisely, the institutional contexts “can
be systematically linked to the distribution of power and the type of
interaction” among actors in a specific debate (Adam and Kriesi, 2007,
p. 138).
In general, the relationship between institutions and actors engaged in
debates runs both ways. Institutions structure the articulation of politi-
cal demands, while the actors, in turn, provide the motives for engaging
in the public debate and, ultimately, institutional change (Lieberman,
2002). Actors thus interpret the institutional context in different ways,
which gives rise to contention over the meaning of these institutions and,
ultimately, to their incremental modification (Clemens and Cook, 1999).
By combining approaches from the comparative political economy with
insights a political communication perspective, this chapter elaborates
the theoretical underpinnings of the influence of institutions, i.e., how
the neoliberal dominance on economic liberalization and its challengers
differ by countries and arenas.
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However, institutions do more than constrain actors’ material predis-
positions, they also shape their discursive capabilities. This means that
actors may behave strategically, but their preferences are historically
rooted and rely on contingent interpretations of institutionalized values,
norms, and power configurations (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992; Herrigel
and Wittke, 2005). On the basis of these institutionally shaped prefer-
ences, actors seek to transform institutional settings through their en-
gagement in political conflicts. Although there are for sure radical shifts
in the institutional settings of countries and arenas as the traditional
institutional accounts show, important processes of fundamental insti-
tutional change are incrementally driven by continuous political conflict.
Given that, with respect to economic liberalization, domestic and
transnational veto players are a crucial transmitting point for the dif-
fusion of liberalization reforms, the impact of long-term developments
depends on the strategies of political actors which, in turn, are precon-
ditioned by path dependency, i.e., the actors’ strategies are embedded in
historically grown national political-economic arrangements (Risse et al.,
2001; Brinegar et al., 2004, p. 63f.). Moreover, debates are even more ex-
posed to the influence of institutions than policy decisions, since public
discourse is especially strongly shaped by ideologies and entrenched his-
torical legacies (Ferree et al., 2002; Medrano, 2003).
In sum, the institutionalization of economic liberalization is under-
stood as a dynamic process involving mutual interdependence of politi-
cal conflict and institutions (Jackson, 2010, p. 65). In the following, the
interaction of a specific sphere of political conflict, namely public de-
bates, and the countries’ and arenas’ inherent institutions are discussed.
3.1 Countries: Diverging Institutional Constellations
We begin the discussion on diverging public debates with an overview
of key economic developments in the six countries.More specifically, eco-
nomic flows across borders, tertiarization, and the economic misery index
are analyzed to assess how strongly the countries were affected by global-
ization, post-industrialization and general economic difficulties, respec-
tively. The findings on the trends of the countries’ economic performance
in the last four decades will help to contextualize the expectations on
the debate analysis later on.
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Cross-border economic flows is an index consisting of indicators mea-
suring trade and international financial activities. Tertiarization is a
composite number indicating service sector growth in terms of economic
output and employment. The economic misery index, finally, shows how
the countries were affected by unemployment rates and inflation. All
figures in the table represent the decade averages of the standardized
indices, which take values from 0 to 100. This allows to compare the six
countries directly, but does not allow absolute comparisons with other
economies.
Table 3.1 Globalization, Tertiarization and Economic Misery
A FR DE NL CH UK
Cross-border economic flows
1970 16.1 2.2 2.1 63.8 47.9 38.4
1980 31.7 19.7 11.8 78.7 63.7 51.7
1990 50.6 38.0 29.2 88.4 77.6 57.6
2000 81.3 54.9 54.5 97.0 91.2 64.7
∆ 1970/2000 +65.2 +52.7 +52.4 +33.2 +43.3 +26.3
Tertiarization
1970 29.9 39.2 21.8 68.5 n.a. n.a.
1980 45.5 64.8 49.9 89.2 n.a. 84.6
1990 59.6 80.0 65.0 92.5 72.9 88.0
2000 74.4 86.6 83.0 95.7 79.0 88.5
∆ 1970/2000 +44.5 +47.4 +61.2 +27.2 n.a. n.a.
Economic misery
1970 24.1 42.0 22.8 35.9 14.7 56.9
1980 22.1 54.9 29.5 43.9 9.7 59.3
1990 18.7 40.5 34.6 27.8 15.3 38.4
2000 19.2 33.9 36.5 16.4 11.9 20.1
∆ 1970/2000 –4.9 –8.1 +13.7 –19.5 –2.8 –36.8
Notes: All numbers are decade averages of indices which range from 0 to 100
(for the 2000s, however, only the years up to 2007 were considered); Sources:
KOF (Dreher et al., 2008) and OECD (2010).
The overall trend with respect to cross-border economic flows is very
clear. A strong and continuous increase in transnational trade and finan-
cial activity in every country can be observed. The growth is strongest
in Austria, whose integration into the global markets was quite low in
the 1970s (16.1 index points) but sharply rose by 65.2 index points to
81.3. In fact, after regaining access to the Eastern European markets
during the 1990s, Austria has rapidly caught up with Switzerland’s and
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the Netherlands’ level of trade, although these other two small, conti-
nental countries remain by far the most open economies with an average
of over 90 index points in the 2000s.
Switzerland does not only have an exceptionally high and long-standing
export dependency of 80 percent or more with regard to its most im-
portant industrial sectors, above all the chemical and pharmaceutical
industries, mechanical engineering, and horology. Its financial sector is
also widely outreaching its own economy. The chemical and pharmaceu-
tical industries as well as the financial sector with its center in Amster-
dam are also important drivers of economic openness in the Netherlands,
which is additionally the key transport hub to continental Europe with
its large overseas ports.
The U.K. shows the weakest increase in international economic flows
over time (26.3 index points), which means that France and Germany
have reached similar degrees of economic openness. However, the U.K.
still is the most open country of the three biggest Western European
economies in the 2000s, but its margin is reduced to about ten index
points, while it was clearly ahead with approximately 38 points in the
1970s, compared to 2 in France and Germany. The U.K. thus still profits
from its reputation as a strong center for the financial markets as well as
its pioneering role for the internationalization of industrial production.
Interestingly, Germany and France have developed almost in lockstep,
which hints at their dense economic interdependence that emerged out
of their common role as core economies of the European single market
(Trouille, 2007).
To conclude, integration into the European and global markets re-
mains more important for small Western European countries, although
its impact nowadays is also substantive for big economies. Note that the
timing and speed are highly correlated. The early integrated countries,
i.e., the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the U.K., are affected by much
slower increases of economic cross-border flows than the late ones. Ger-
many, Austria, and France had – in comparison to the other countries
– quite low levels of economic integration but a subsequent period of
internationalization at a high pace. This should have considerably acti-
vated the conflict potentials of the international liberalization dimension
in the public debate.
3.1 Countries: Diverging Institutional Constellations 47
The development of tertiarization shows a similar general trend like
the development of cross-border economic flows. The steepest growth
of tertiarization, however, took place between the 1970s and the 1980s
but not in the 1990s as for economic cross-border activity. The pattern
that all six countries belong to the the group of early deindustrializing
countries corresponds to Iversen and Cusack’s (2000: 342) much more
detailed analysis. In addition, the picture for the single countries also
slightly differs.
As with economic openness, the Netherlands are the most tertiarized
country (95.7 index points), followed by the U.K., France and Germany.
Moreover, Germany exhibits the most impressive growth of the tertiary
sector (+61.2), followed by France (+47.4) and Austria (+44.5). In the
U.K., as far as there are data available, the level of tertiarization re-
mains fairly constant compared to the other countries. It only grows by
3.9 index points. Yet the U.K. already started from a very high level in
the 1980s. The Netherlands and the U.K. have a slightly bigger share
of the tertiary sector than the other countries in the 2000s, yet the dif-
ferences are not so substantial as with regard to international economic
flows. Further, contrasting their high economic openness, Austria and
Switzerland are the least tertiarized countries.
With respect to economic misery, i.e., to the basic economic difficulties
in the six countries, the trends are less uniform. The index of inflation
combined with the unemployment rate shows neither a constant devel-
opment over time nor a simultaneous course among countries. To begin
with Switzerland, it performs best over the four decades by far, display-
ing the lowest degree of economic misery throughout the period studied
and ending up with 11.9 index points.1 Similarly constant, Austria was
stable at a level of about 20 index points. In these two countries, the gen-
eral economic environment did not change substantially in comparison
with the other four countries. Here, the economic context thus seems to
exert about the same pressure for liberalization reforms in all decades,
although it has to be noted that Switzerland and Austria – like other
advanced economies – for sure have lost to emerging markets in terms of
their economic competitiveness. The pressure for reforms in Germany, by
contrast, rose considerably over time as the sharp increase in economic
misery by 13.7 index points indicates. This development, of course, was
1 Contrary to the other indices, a negative direction of the trend of economic
misery of course indicates a positive statement about the state of the economy.
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heavily influenced by the economic burden of the reunification and be-
came mainly evident in the combination of low growth, radically rising
welfare costs, and high unemployment rates (Vail, 2008). In the 2000s,
the misery index for Germany was highest among the countries under
study.
In the Netherlands, the Dutch miracle, a series of incremental social
policy reforms which led to the virtuous cooccurrence of strong growth
and low unemployment from the mid-1990s on, resulted in a cut of the
economic misery index by almost one half from the 1990s to the 2000s
(Visser and Hemerjick, 1997). In a similar vein, the U.K. displays a
continuous and drastic improvement of its general economic situation
after being far behind at the bottom end of the six countries in the
1970s (–36.8 index points). Especially the Conservative government of
John Major and the following third way Labour governments were able
to considerably lower the economic misery from the 1990s onwards. In
France, finally, economic misery could be reduced as well, but not as
substantially as in the U.K. The general economic situation in France
remained almost as dire as in Germany (Vail, 2008).
In sum, except the difference between small and big economies with
regard to economic openness and the high economic misery in France
and Germany, there are no substantial variations among the among the
six countries. But why should the debate on economic liberalization
then run differently across national contexts? Building on the work of
Shonfield (1965) and Zysman (1983), accounts of different institutional
trajectories of political-economic development have sprung up in the
last two decades (e.g., Albert, 1993; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Schmidt,
2009; McCartney, 2009). The basic assumption of this literature is that
capitalist economies differ in terms of how interests are intermediated,
although each system in itself is efficiently organized and leads to a
high performance. This contribution will stick to existing institutional-
ist typologies in full awareness of the flaws associated with them. Yet
to reinvent the wheel with every other analysis blurs the understand-
ing of the essential meaning of specific institutional constellations. A
better solution seems to use renowned typologies but to define the im-
plications and explanatory claims of these typologies in the context of
the own specific research framework. It is thus neither the aim of this
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contribution to present a comprehensive overview of all typologies nor
to review the vast literature that is concerned with one or more typology.
The most influential recent attempt to conceptualize capitalist demo-
cratic regimes probably is the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach
(Hall and Soskice, 2001). The VoC approach is organized around the
employers’ coordination capacities – however defined – as the key dis-
tinguishing feature (Hall and Gingerich, 2009). More precisely, it identi-
fies two diverging patterns of adaptation to economic changes (Hancke´
et al., 2007). Liberal Market Economies (LME), on the one hand, can be
characterized by non-cooperative relations between unions and employ-
ers, a market-driven financial system, and arm’s length relations among
firms. With respect to the country sample of this study, the U.K. most
closely matches the premises of this LME category.
In Coordinated Market Economies (CME), on the other hand, union-
employer relationships are generally perceived as cooperative, industries
traditionally have close ties to banks, and employers are organized in as-
sociations. This means that business in CME is more intensely involved
in processes of interest intermediaton between trade unions, public au-
thorities, professional organizations and employer associations. In LME,
instead, less formal interactions are usually assumed to take place among
the different economic interest groups, leading to a more confrontational
nature of employment relations. From the six countries under study,
Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland can be classified as
CME.
The different composition of such institutional arrangements has
straightforward consequences on how countries react to abrupt economic
upheavals. As Hall and Soskice (2001) argue, firms in LME are quicker
to hire and fire in response to a changing economic environment than
employer in CME. Exogenously induced shocks are thus more directly
passed on to workers. In coordinated economies, labor markets are de-
signed to at least partly withstand the volatility of markets (Hays, 2009,
p. 13). The main strategy are cooperative agreements between employers,
trade unions and the public authorities. Trade unions are more willing
to agree to necessary conditions to endure a crisis like wage moderation
or temporary part-time work. These concessions by the unions, on the
one hand, depend on state guaranties to shore up employment protec-
tion and to supplement income losses. On the other hand, business has
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to make binding commitments to maintain pre-crisis employment and
wage levels.
The parsimony of the VoC dichotomy comes with one major disad-
vantage. It is necessary to define at least one residual category (the
Mixed-Market Economies) for countries that do not consistently fit into
the ideal-type pattern. Unfortunately, very important countries for the
political economy research like Japan or France fall in this category. In
relying on Shonfield’s (1965) differentiation between arm’s length, inter-
ventionist and organized capitalist systems, Schmidt (2009) convincingly
argues that this misconception is due to the neglect of the state as the
central mediating and intervening actor in the economic sphere and ex-
tends the two Varieties of Capitalism to three – Liberal, Coordinated
and State-influenced (SME) Market Economies.
While in LME like the U.K. the influence of the state is limited to
rule setting and conflict settlement, it actively tries to facilitate eco-
nomic activities in CME and SME. However, in CME the state acts as
a co-equal to employers and unions to negotiate employment protection,
to participate in wage bargaining, or to set other economic regulations
(Schmidt, 2009, p. 521). In SME, by contrast, the state often appears as
an entrepreneurial state which actively decides over business activities
(Thibergien, 2007). Such countries traditionally rely on a large public
sector and long-term state-led development strategies. In the context of
this study, France can clearly be defined as a SME.
A second very important conceptualization of institutional patterns
in different countries is the neocorporatist distinction of different types
of labor and employment relations (Schmitter and Lehmbruch, 1979).
In contrast to the employer-centered view of the VoC tradition, neocor-
poratists preferably focus on trade unions. Corporatist regimes rely on
bargaining mechanisms among quite centralized interest groups, while
economic interest groups in general are fragmented in pluralist regimes.
Despite their different exploratory aims, however, the VoC typology and
neocorporatist classification quite nicely coincide. There is congruence
between corporatist regimes and CME, whereas SME and LME are char-
acterized by pluralist interest intermediation, leaving trade unions with
a comparatively weak position in labor relations (Sapir, 2006).
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Among the four corporatist/CME countries of the study, the Nether-
lands and Switzerland can be further separated (Visser and Afonso,
2010). Similar to other continental European economies, the Netherlands
and Switzerland face high wages and fixed labor costs but – as outliers
– did not experience sharply rising unemployment (Iversen and Cusack,
2000). Both countries have relied on a comparatively flexible labor mar-
ket to compensate for economic difficulties by extending part-time and
temporary employment (Visser and Hemerjick, 1997; Bonoli and Mach,
2000). Moreover, in contrast to other CME like Austria, labor move-
ments traditionally play a subordinate role and business interests are
dominated by the large export-oriented companies (Katzenstein, 1985).
It is therefore expected that Switzerland and the Netherlands can be
characterized by liberal-leaning institutional arrangements.
To begin with the more intuitive expectation, institutional settings
shape the degree of national distinctiveness of public conflicts, i.e., how
closed national debates still are for international, European, and foreign
actors in the different countries. The territorial scope of economic policy
making has considerably extended beyond the nation-state, but these
trends are not assumed to uniformly affect all countries in the same
ways. In France, the influential state is expected to keep the debate as
national as possible, since it should be reluctant to give away control
over the economy.
In the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, national net-
works between social partners and administrations should also be an
important barrier to transnationalization. In these cases, however, there
is also a clear trend to Europeanize labor relations (Lehmkuhl, 2006),
which is why the distinctiveness should be lower relative to France but
still moderate. With respect to Switzerland, however, non-EU member-
ship should additionally keep the debate more distinctive. In the U.K.,
finally, labor relations and the influence of national public authorities
are kept at a comparatively low level, which should lead to a less na-
tionally distinct debate. In sum, I assume that among the six countries
studied, the debate is the largely inhabited by national actors in France
and Switzerland, followed by Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands,
whereas in the U.K. international, European and foreign actors will play
a more significant role.
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The second set of hypotheses regarding the influence of the institu-
tional arrangements is related to the overall climate of the debate in
the six countries, i.e., how the policy conflicts are turning out in terms
of overall positions and polarization on the aggregated levels of the na-
tional debates. Quite straightforwardly, the debate should overall be
more supportive of economic liberalization in the U.K. The U.K. has a
deep-rooted legacy as a promoter of free markets due to its role as for-
mer hegemon in and main profiteer of the world trade system (Gifford,
2007, p. 465).
In France, in contrast, the debate is expected to be relatively more
skeptic against economic liberalization. The reason is that economic
modernization strategies have traditionally relied on major industrial
projects with far-reaching state intervention (Maclean, 2002). Addition-
ally, due to their liberal-leaning corporatism and most notably more flex-
ible labor market regulations, the overall climate in Switzerland and the
Netherlands should be more market-friendly than in Austria and Ger-
many. Yet the CME are generally expected to have moderate stances.
On the one hand, the power resource approach holds that social partners
in coordinated economies are expected to have more moderate stances in
decision-making processes in contexts of increasing international compe-
tition (Lange, 1984; Korpi, 2006). On the other hand, the VoC approach
similarly maintains that employers in coordinated market economies are
more in favor of social protection since their comparative advantage lies
in industries where asset-specific skills prevail (Emmenegger and Marx,
2011).
As Hallin and Mancini (2004, p. 66) forcefully argue, the specific fea-
tures of the capitalist democratic systems as discussed are related to
particular media system characteristics, since the political-economic and
media systems developed coherently in lockstep. In the context of this
study, media system features are crucial to identify the intensity of con-
flict in public debates. More precisely, Hallin and Mancini distinguish
between three ideal-typical models of media and politics whose labels
already suggest a close relationship between media and political sys-
tems: liberal, democratic corporatist, and polarized pluralist systems.
Liberal media systems lack extensive press subsidies and put emphasis
on private ownership in media policy. As far as the countries of this
study are concerned, the U.K. comes closest to this model, although the
strong public broadcaster BBC sets it clearly apart from more liberal me-
3.2 Arenas: Structuring Sites of the Policy Process 53
dia systems like the U.S.A. Polarized pluralist countries such as France
have a strongly contrasting development. The history of sharp ideolog-
ical conflict has led to a more confrontational political style, not only
with respect to electoral campaigns, political protests, and labor mar-
ket disputes, but also in the mass mediated public arena (Kriesi et al.,
1995, 2012). Thus, we expect a rather conflictive debate in France, while
the debate is anticipated to be less polarized in the U.K. In Germany,
Austria, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, public debates should thus
be relatively moderate compared to France but more conflictive than in
the U.K.
Finally, the different types of political-economic arrangements should
also create different opportunities for actors participating in political
contention (Hancke´ et al., 2007). This, in turn, leads to distinct debates
regarding who participates how in the six countries under concern. In
terms of the accessibility of debates, pluralist countries like France and
the U.K. can thus be described as systems where reform agendas are
usually decided by a small elite (Lijphart, 1999; Schmidt, 2010, p. 16).
Corporatist countries like Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands and
Austria tend to have a more inclusive debate to reach a broader support
for reforms. It can thus be anticipated that a broader range of actors
engage in public debates in these countries. Additionally, the compre-
hensive direct-democratic institutions in Switzerland should lead to the
most inclusive debate.
3.2 Arenas: Structuring Sites of the Policy Process
Not only the national institutional contexts are interdependent with the
opportunities and constraints of actors, but also the specific arena in
which the debate takes place (Helbling et al., 2012). Arenas can be de-
fined as sites of political contention separated by specific rules and norms
of an either formal or informal nature (see Ferree et al., 2002; Bartolini,
2005, p. 27f.; Kriesi et al., 2011). In this sense, arenas can be perceived
as “structured fields of action” with their own sets of constraints and
opportunities for the actors participating in debates (Crozier and Fried-
berg, 1977) or as “rule systems which affect how individual and collective
actors perceive, define and pursue their interests in complex surround-
ings” (Schneider and Grote, 2006, p. 2, own emphasis).
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The analyses of the public debate are centered on the public arena as
the forum to which all political communication is directed in established
democracies (Ferree et al., 2002). Yet, by paying particular attention to
the arenas from where the actors make their statements, this study will
explore the relationship between these arenas and the public discourse.
As table 4.2 summarizes, we can organize the different arenas according
to their function in the political process (Aberbach et al., 1981, p. 1;
Poggi, 1990; Scharpf, 1999, p. 7-21). In most general terms, the anal-
ysis takes place in the public arena, which is defined by the discursive
strategies of the elites, the journalistic work flow, and the citizens’ pat-
terns of media consumption. Yet, actors enter the public debate from
different phases of the political process. These phases roughly can be
separated into input (governing by the people) and output (governing
for the people) arenas of the political system: First, the input side is the
realm where political potentials are mobilized, political innovations are
brought up and policy options are debated. This refers to the parlia-
mentary, electoral, protest, and direct-democratic arenas – provided the
corresponding institutional procedures exist in a given country. The par-
liamentary arena is marked by the strict rules of debating and decision-
making. Further, the electoral arena is constituted by the rules of party
competition and the casting of votes. Protest politics, on the contrary,
is not characterized by such formal rules, though protests nowadays are
professionalized, ritualized performances to gain public attention (Tar-
row, 1994, 94).
Table 3.2 The Arena Structure of the Debate
Policy process Arenas
Input Parliamentary, electoral, protest, and direct-democratic
arenas
Janus-faced European and international governmental arenas, domestic
executive and judicial arena
Output Arena of interest intermediation, administrative, political ad-
visory, and business arena
The output arenas are the sites where policies are implemented and
evaluated. This includes the following arenas: the arena of interest inter-
mediation with its entrenched regimes of how labor unions, employers,
and professional associations interact with the public authorities; the
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political advisory arena, where policies are criticized and evaluated by
more or less independent experts; and the business arena, where profit-
oriented and entrepreneurial behavior is the distinct characteristic.
In between input and output arenas are governmental and judicial
arenas, which have a janus-faced position (Kriesi, 2007, p. 263). On the
one hand, public authorities heavily interact with the input arenas: they
intervene into the decision-making processes in the parliamentary arena
by providing expertise for new regulations and influence the electoral
and direct-democratic arenas by political campaigning. On the other
hand, they head the administration and moderate negotiations between
social partners in interest intermediation processes. They thus influence
both sides of the policy process. These janus-faced arenas include the
international and supranational state arena as well as the domestic ex-
ecutive and judicial arena. These arenas are defined by the rules and
norms of international relations and the EU’s own institutional proce-
dures, by the rules of executive decision-making and law enforcement,
and by specific legal procedures, respectively.
Due to their inherent institutional patterns, arenas have an impact
on the course of public debates. Overall, debates in the input arenas are
hypothesized to be accessible for the largest number of actors. This is
due to the many channels for participation of the input arenas, most
notably in the protest arena. Since janus-faced arenas are the sites of
decision making, public authorities are crowding out most other actors.
These arenas are thus anticipated to be relatively closed. The output
arenas, finally, are hypothesized to be less inclusive than the input are-
nas, but not as exclusive than janus-faced arenas since at least experts
and economic interest groups are expected to have regular access to the
debate here.
Moreover, it is also anticipated that arenas substantially differ with
respect to their overall climate, i.e., the aggregated policy positions and
polarization. In general, the input arenas are hypothesized to be more
conflictive than the other arenas. First, arenas decisively co-determine
who gets access to the debate and who has how many communicative
resources available. An evident example is the electoral arena, which is
defined by the norms and rules of party competition and vote aggrega-
tion: Party manifestos would not be established and no televised debate
would bring together candidates if there were no election. Moreover, po-
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litical parties are clearly the key actors in the electoral arena, whereas
the field of potential participants is much larger in, for instance, direct-
democratic campaigns (Kriesi et al., 2009).
Intermediary actors like parties and protest movements are struggling
here to mobilize political potentials. Thus, the challengers of the pro-
market mainstream loom highest in input arenas. In the janus-faced
arenas, actors care about the reformulation and implementation of the
policies debated and decided in the input arenas. I therefore suggest
this to be the most cooperative arenas, i.e., polarization should be low-
est here. Furthermore, the mainstream parties in government dominate
these arenas and, therefore, these arenas should be tightly connected
with the mainstream on economic liberalization. In terms of the overall
policy positions, janus-faced arenas are thus anticipated to be the most
liberal arenas.
The output arenas, finally, are expected to occupy a middle ground.
While some actors, such as interest groups, are hypothesized to fiercely
fight about the consequences of policies implemented by the authorities,
other actors are expected to be distinctly mainstream-oriented. Namely
business actors and experts in general are expected to be firm supporters
of neo-liberal dominance, while unions are expected to be prominent
opponents. This should lead to a moderately polarized debate, which is
more conflictive than in the janus-faced arenas but less than in the input
arenas.
3.3 Conclusion
This chapter has been concerned with the expected impact of the insti-
tutional constellations in countries and arenas on the general course of
the public debates. To conclude, table 3.3 summarizes the hypotheses
established in this chapter. First, depending on the strength of the state
in economic policy making, the distinctiveness of the debates, i.e., the
degree with which the debate runs national, is anticipated to vary across
countries. This makes the debate in France the most closed one and the
debate in the U.K. the most open. Switzerland, as a special case, is hy-
pothesized to resemble France with its comparatively distinct debate.
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Table 3.3 Expectations on the Impact of the Institutional Context
Distinctiveness
in countries
The debate in France and Switzerland should be more nationally
driven than the debates in the other countries, while it is expected
to be least centered on domestic actors in the U.K.
Accessibility
in countries
The debate in Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, and especially
in Switzerland is inhabited by a broader variety of actors than in
France and the U.K.
Accessibility
in arenas
Input arenas are anticipated to be the most accessible sites of
the policy process, while the janus-faced arenas are expected to
be most exclusive. Output arenas are hypothesized to take the
middle ground.
Overall
climate in
countries
The U.K. leans towards a liberal position; France is expected to
be more interventionist and protectionist; the other countries are
expected to be in-between, with the Netherlands and Switzerland
closer to the U.K. and Germany and Austria closer to France.
Conflict
intensity in
countries
Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland are hypoth-
esized to be more polarized than the U.K., but less than France.
Overall
climate in
arenas
With regard to the positions, input arenas are the least liberal
ones, whereas the janus-faced arenas are anticipated to be firmly
connected with the pro-market mainstream. The output arenas
should occupy a middle ground with respect to the position and
conflict intensity.
Conflict
intensity in
arenas
The highly conflictive input arenas are separated from the more
consensus-oriented janus-faced arenas.
Second, the range of actors which are able to access the debate is as-
sumed to be a function of the specific country contexts, too. In compar-
ison with the U.K. and France, more actors should be able to engage in
the public debate on economic liberalization in Austria, Germany, the
Netherlands, and especially Switzerland because of its comprehensive
direct democratic institutions. Finally, the capitalist regime type that
characterizes the six countries is assumed to influence the overall cli-
mate of the debate. The U.K. – and to a lesser extent – the Netherlands
and Switzerland should lean towards a liberal position, while France is
expected to be more skeptical regarding economic liberalization. The
remaining two countries, Germany and Austria, are in between these
two extremes. And finally, it is assumed that the debates in corporatist
countries are accessible to a broader range of actors than in the two
pluralist countries France and U.K.
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With regard to arenas, the highly conflictive input arenas were sep-
arated from the more consensus-oriented janus-faced arenas, with the
output arenas taking a middle position. In addition, the positions are
hypothesized to vary in lockstep with the conflict intensity: Whereas
input arenas are the least liberal ones, the janus-faced arenas are firmly
connected with the pro-market mainstream.
So far, the overarching argumentation was stepped through with re-
spect to the overall transformation of conflicts on economic liberalization
in the last chapter and in terms of influence the institutional contexts
in this one. The next chapter will conclude the theoretical outline by
adding the the expectations derived from specific actor characteristics
to the set of hypotheses.
4Debate Coalition Formation: The Actors’
Strategic Repertoire in Public Debates
As outlined in the previous chapters, debates are shaped to a consider-
able extent by long-term transformations and the institutional contexts.
Economic liberalization reforms, in turn, largely depend on the outcome
of dynamic processes in the public debate, which are driven by political
agency. The actors’ crafting of the messages which are mediated to the
public is thus crucial for the prospects of getting their interests respected
in the policy making process, i.e., to get “the audience involved in the
fight” (Schattschneider, 1960, p. 4). The success of actors in debates can
consequentially be conceptualized by discursive strategies by which ac-
tors strive to mobilize supporters or persuade critics (Enyedi, 2005).
In political communication research, discursive strategies have been
traditionally understood as who gets access to the media fora (going
public) and who manages to deliver his own evaluation of policies to
the public better than other contenders (policy position taking) (Downs,
1957; Budge and Farlie, 1983; Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989; Wolfs-
feld, 1997). However, the patterns of interpretation and justification ac-
tors adopt to influence how people perceive specific policy positions, i.e.,
the framing of policy positions, are crucial too (e.g., Pan and Kosicki,
1993, p. 70; Enyedi, 2005). In addition, actors need to be able to engage
in valence campaigning, i.e., direct references to other actors in order to
signal who is a fellow campaigner and who is an opponent in the debate
(Laver and Sergenti, 2011; Zakharov, 2009). These four strategic con-
cepts, as Figure 5.1 illustrates, provide actors with the tools to “actively
construct the meaning of the reality in question” (Kriesi et al., 2009).
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Figure 4.1 The Formation of Debate Coalitions
By means of this strategic repertoire, actors engage in public compe-
tition – or how Schmidt (2010) defines it, in a coordinative discourse
– about the importance of policies, their specific evaluation, and inter-
pretation. This competition “encompasses the wide range of policy ac-
tors engaged in the construction of policy ideas” (Schmidt, 2010, p. 3).
Moreover, most of the time, politically engaged actors cluster together to
pursue their interests (see Cerny, 2009). Hence, explicitly or implicitly,
actors share specific policy positions and general beliefs as well as refer
directly to one another. In the long run, these discursive processes lead
to a constellation of specific coalitions among the actors in the debate.
The processes structuring public debates can thus be perceived as the
formation of debate coalitions. If actors share specific policy positions as
well as values in a specific policy domain and do refer to other actors in
a positive way, they can be regarded as participants of the same debate
coalition. Actors belonging to the same coalition do not necessarily co-
operate with each other in terms of actual policy decisions or explicitly
stated intentions to work together. Hence, they form objective rather
than subjective coalitions, which are traceable to scholars and the audi-
ence but not necessarily intendedly established by the actors themselves
(Kriesi et al., 2012).
Similar to the premises of the renowned advocacy coalition frame-
work, this debate coalition argument thus assumes that policy making is
structured by networks of important policy participants (Weible, 2005).
But debate coalitions are exclusively defined by discursive interactions
while the advocacy coalition framework, in contrast, requires empirical
evidence of “a nontrivial degree of coordination” (Sabatier and Weible,
2007a, p. 196), for example explicit coordination of political campaign
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efforts.
However, before the expectations regarding the strategies of single
actors and the process of coalition formation are elaborated in greater
detail, some attention has to be paid to the clarification of the actor
typology used in this study. This is a crucial step of the debate concep-
tualization, since the classification of the multitude of individuals and
organizations into actor types heavily determines the interpretation of
empirical findings. Table 4.1 lists the actor types and how they will be
used in the analyses. In addition, the tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in the
appendix show how the actors found in the content analyses were aggre-
gated into the corresponding categories.
The classification starts with the very broad distinction between pub-
lic authority actors, intermediary actors, and actors that are – strictly
speaking – external to the political system. This is not to say that the
latter have no role in discursive processes in public debates, but their
involvement in policy making is rather unconventional from a theoretical
point of view, since they mainly operate in the economic (corporations)
or societal realms (experts and public welfare organizations). The pub-
lic authority actors include international governmental organizations like
the World Trade Organization (WTO), European Union actors, foreign
and domestic executive actors, administrative agencies, judiciary actors,
as well as legislative bodies. All these actors somehow have a legitimate
responsibility to provide public goods or regulate. Intermediary actors,
on the other hand, include parties and interest groups, i.e., all organiza-
tion that aggregate societal problems and demands, and translate them
into political claims.
Some of the categories are not mutually exclusive in practice. All
members of parliament in the six countries, for instance, also have a
party affiliation. This overlap is avoided by attaching all statements of
persons with a party membership and a legislative function to the re-
spective party, since party affiliation is assumed to be more important
for the individual preference. The category legislative actors thus entails
only statements where the legislative body as such was mentioned (e.g.,
the German “Bundestag” or the “Lower House” in the U.K.). A similar
intersection holds for governmental actors: party and executive functions
do overlap in practice. In this case, however, the statements were sub-
sumed under the executive category. Party actor statements thus contain
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all observations of their members unless the actor is in government.
Table 4.1 Actor Classification as Used in the Analyses
Basic Main types Further refinement
Categories (14 categories) (30 categories)
Public
IGO actors –
authorities
EU actors –
Foreign Executives from advanced (OECD) economies
executives Executives from emerging markets
National executive –
Public Economic administrations
Administrations General administrations
Judiciary –
Legislative –
Inter-
Business
Chambers of commerce
mediary
associations
Peak, big industry and moneyed interest assoc.
actors
Small and medium-sized business associations
Trade unions
Private sector union
Public sector union
Professional Farmer organizations
organizations White collar organizations
Party
Communists and radical socialists
Families
Greens
Social democrats
Liberals
Christian democrats and conservatives
Radical and populist right
External
Corporations
Global players
actors
Niche businesses
Public enterprises
Experts
Economic research institutes and think tanks
Public advisors and cultural experts
Public welfare Aid organizations and churches
actors Global justice movements
Notes: Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3 in the appendix provide a detailed documentation of the
actor classification.
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Furthermore, the actor categorization should be sensitive to the is-
sue of the debate, since every policy domain entails its own range of
potentially relevant actors. That implies that economically defined cat-
egories will be paid special attention during the analyses. First, foreign
executives are split into executives from advanced economies (defined by
the membership in the OECD) and executives from emerging markets.
As, for example, the negotiations during the WTO Doha round have
shown, governments from emerging market economies often do substan-
tially disagree on specific issues of economic liberalization. With respect
to the public administrations, the category economic administrations –
summarizing administrations responsible for economic, tax, fiscal, and
social policies – is separated from other, general administrative actors.
As for the business associations, they are divided into chambers of
commerce, peak associations, and small business associations. Further,
trade unions from the public and private sector as well as farmer and
white collar professional organizations are disaggregated. With regard
to companies, global players (defined by membership in the list of 2000
biggest companies)1 are distinguished from niche businesses and public
enterprises. Above all, often stated claims that global players have be-
come powerful actor in today’s public conflicts are coming under further
scrutiny with this differentiation. And, finally, public welfare actors are
disaggregated into organizations (e.g., charity organizations or churches)
and the global justice movements, which mainly are built by social move-
ment groups like Attac.
4.1 Going Public: Who Inhabits the Debate on
Economic Liberalization?
To have a voice in public debates is not always easy to achieve, given that
both the media’s and public’s attention is a scarce good (Baumgartner
and Jones, 2002; Burstein and Linton, 2002; Kriesi et al., 2009). But
actors have to reach a certain level of attention by the media because
only then they are enabled to apply further strategies to gain influence
on the course of the debate. In this context, the concept of going public
(see Kernell, 2006), although originally developed in the context of PR
strategies by U.S. presidents, can be used to describe the ability of po-
1 See Tables A.3 and B.1 in the appendix as well as Forbes (2010)
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litical actors to search public attention in general. In contrast to similar
concepts like standing (Ferree et al., 2002), however, going public em-
phasizes the active nature of the competition among actors for public
visibility.
In order to understand the importance of the going public strategies,
it is key to separate two distinct arguments. According to the resource
argument, the visibility of already influential actors, who benefit from
their specific position in the political-economic structure, is enhanced.
Following the mobilization argument, by contrast, challengers may strive
for a stronger media presence because they are otherwise excluded from
the decision making arenas (Kriesi, 2004). The resource argument leads
to the hypothesis that institutionally privileged actors manage to prevail
in the debates, since they dispose of large means and capabilities in pub-
lic relations and receive continuous attention by specialized journalists
(Wolfsfeld, 1997, p. 24).
Yet while resourceful actors already have news value, challengers have
to strive for it. A contrasting point can thus be deduced from the mo-
bilization argument regarding potential challengers in the debate. They
can be expected to extensively turn to going public campaigns precisely
because they are institutionally disadvantaged in the policy making are-
nas. In the case of exclusion from the policy making process, intermedi-
ary actors may use outside lobbying, i.e., the attempt to mobilize public
support for their cause (Kollman, 1998). For challengers of the pro-
market mainstream, going public is thus a survival strategy to influ-
ence decision making by mobilizing public support (Gamson and Meyer,
1996). Mobilization can thus be understood as the other side of the re-
source argument.
The resource argument points to the success of the most powerful
actors in terms of access to a debate. Executives and public administra-
tions can be anticipated to loom high in every country, since they enjoy
a long-standing and extensive relationship with the media. Moreover,
public authorities should play an especially strong role in France. Most
civil society actors and interest groups are only selectively given access
to the centers of power in France, which arguably makes it hard for any-
one except the strong state to develop a substantive standing in public
debates (Kriesi et al., 1995). In Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, and
Switzerland, the resource argument points to a strong presence of both
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public authority actors and social partners, since the interest interme-
diation arena has traditionally been the main realm of most economic
policy decisions (Schmitter and Lehmbruch, 1979).
Horizontal transnationalization, i.e., the increasing influence of foreign
national actors in a country’s debate, probably has increased the chances
of forces pushing for liberal policies to engage in public debates (Koop-
mans and Erbe, 2004). On the one hand, economic interdependence in
terms of mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures, cooperative agreements
and capital participation has grown to a level which suggests a strong
participation of foreign firms in the debates (Trouille, 2007). On the
other hand, the rise of the multi-level polity in Europe had decisive im-
plications for the distribution of political power, “reinforcing some actors
to the detriment of others” (Kriesi et al., 2007). Based on previous work
with respect to European integration (e.g., Koopmans, 2007), it is thus
hypothesized that foreign public authority actors do dispose of large re-
sources to substantially enter national economic debates.
However, economic resources and institutionalized media channels are
not the only factors facilitating access to public debates. As far as par-
ties are concerned, an additional issue ownership argument needs to be
considered (Petrocik, 1996; Walgrave and De Swert, 2007). Issue own-
ership gives a party an advantage on a specific issue if this party has
established a credible record of competence on this issue. With respect
to economic liberalization, Social democrats and liberals should more
forcefully be able enter the debate since they have a long-standing rep-
utation in economic policy debates in general. Economic liberalization
can be regarded as a key issue for these parties, which should therefore
be eager to have their voices heard.
Turning to the mobilization argument, the debate on economic liber-
alization first of all is an opportunity for radical left actors to mobilize
the economic potential in resistance to the perceived neoliberal character
of economic liberalization reforms (De Vries and Edwards, 2009). The
most obvious potential challengers from the radical left are communist
and left socialist parties. Yet their target constituency, the disadvan-
taged in economic terms, are not easy to mobilize (Dolezal et al., 2012).
On the one hand, since the political interest and knowledge generally
low, economically disadvantaged show a disproportionately low inclina-
tion for political participation (Verba et al., 1995). On the other hand,
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the relative losers of the transformation processes in Western Europe
seem to be even more attracted by populist right parties which inter-
pret redistributive conflicts in terms of increasing immigration and a
loss of national sovereignty (Rydgren, 2007; Kriesi et al., 2008; Oesch,
2008). Hence, especially in countries where the populist right-wing par-
ties are deeply integrated into the political system like in Switzerland
(Swiss People’s Party) and Austria (Freedom Party and Alliance for the
Future), radical left parties should have difficulties to articulate the de-
mands of the economically disadvantaged. In sum, although the debate
on economic liberalization basically constitutes a formidable opportu-
nity for radical left parties, they are not expected to be able to seize this
opportunity.
A second left challenger are the trade unions which are anticipated to
take his chances to mobilize against economic liberalization. As a reac-
tion to the long-term trends discussed in chapter 2, trade unions have
increasingly begun to reintroduce more militant strategies in the last
decades (Baccaro et al., 2003; Frege and Kelly, 2003). They more exten-
sively engage in grass-roots politics and public campaigns, which makes
them much more visible. But there are important differences between
countries with respect to the success of this change in the mobilization
strategy. In Anglo-Saxon countries, unionization was exceptionally vul-
nerable in periods of high unemployment and inflation and suffered a
significant decline (Hirsch and Addison, 1986). Thus, trade unions are
unlikely to be major players in economic debates in the U.K. In France,
by contrast, they are expected to be the radical challengers who try to
influence decision making on economic policies from outside the nego-
tiation process. Most notably, their very high readiness for strikes or
demonstrations already points to the validity of the mobilization argu-
ment in France.
The final potential challenger on the radical left are global justice
movements (della Porta, 2007). The turn of the new millennium can be
considered the peak period of the global justice movement. After the
Battle of Seattle in 1999, activists were repeatedly able to galvanize the
global elites with violent protests. In the same year, activists protested
at the IMF and World Bank talks in Washington. Later on, in 2001,
massive protests surrounded the 3rd Summit of the Americas in Que-
bec (talks among leaders from both South and North America held by
the Organization of American States), the European Union summit in
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Gothenburg, and the G8 summit in Genoa. These events led to an up-
swing of research by scholars of social movements that easily gives the
impression that social movements are decisively in advance and would
soon be able to create an overarching global civil society (e.g. Boli and
Thomas, 1999; O’Brien et al., 2000; della Porta, 2007).
Yet although social movements are hypothesized to be important chal-
lengers in the debate, such perceptions can be misleading. As Tarrow
(2001) rightly notes, these conclusions are built on the assumption of a
coherent and rather consistent phenomenon of protest movements which
does not get confirmed in systematically comparative empirical studies
(Hutter, forthcoming). It is thus expected that the global justice move-
ments are only moderately influential for the public debate on economic
liberalization. With respect to country differences, social movement ac-
tors can be expected to more strongly enter the debate in France, since
its tradition of militant trade unionism and radical alter-globalization
movements (e.g., Attac or the Confe´de´ration Paysanne led by Jose´ Bove´)
has made France a center of civil society opposition to the global econ-
omy (Uggla, 2006).
Finally, the other actors from Table 4.1, that is the judiciary, leg-
islatives, mainstream parties, experts and public welfare actors, are not
expected to be affected by either the mobilization or the resource argu-
ment and should thus not especially strongly standing out in the debate.
4.2 Policy Position Taking
After having succeeded to gain access to the debate by means of their
going public strategy, actors, among others, need to present their evalu-
ation of the policies at stake, i.e., they need to make their policy position
visible to the public and the other actors. Furthermore, policy position
taking is a crucial determinant for the actors’ membership in a specific
debate coalition since congruent policy stances mean shared goals with
respect to policy making on economic liberalization.
In line with the dimensionality hypothesis which posits that an inter-
national and a domestic dimension is structuring the debate, we have
to anticipate a more complex positioning of actors than the simple left-
right dichotomy. More specifically, on both the political right and left,
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important actors have shifted their position on economic liberalization.
Moreover, actors who are insufficiently considered by the previous lit-
erature have to be placed into the political space constituted by the
two dimensions of the public debate on economic liberalization. Figure
2 summarizes the expectations regarding the actors’ positions which will
be subsequently discussed in detail.
Figure 4.2 Debate Coalitions in the Policy Space of Economic liber-
alization
The general constellation that emerges from the the actors’ positions on
economic liberalization relies on the assumption that both the traditional
right and left have effectively split into two camps. On the left, third
way actors have shifted towards more liberal positions. On the right,
neomercantilists have distanced themselves from liberal positions on in-
ternational liberalization. These differences within the left and right are
based on the transformation of the structural potentials in consequence
of globalization, post-industrialization, and state transformation.2
With regard to the traditional left-right divide, all of the left actors
were usually expected to have one voice on the left’s core issues like re-
distribution and economic risk hedging. And most notably the workers
are the historically undivided structural potential of this traditional left
position. Yet, the traditional left debate coalition is expected to have
shrunken to the actors indicated in the lower left quadrant of Figure
2 I.e, the long-term trends discussed in chapter 2.
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4.2. Although the workers location still mainly corresponds to the tra-
ditional left on economic issues, many have switched to the right-wing
populist’s constituency during the last decade, weakening the support
for the traditional left. This movement is due to their attitudes on cul-
tural issues like immigration which became increasingly important for
electoral contests (Kriesi et al., 2008).
Trade unions are anticipated to be the main pillar of the traditional
left coalition. Despite the fact that unions have to represent increasingly
heterogeneous interests of their members and are facing continuous pres-
sure to make concessions in light of high unemployment numbers and
increasing welfare costs (Regini, 2003), they have proven astonishingly
resilient to maintain social protection at a fairly high level in most ad-
vanced economies. As far as the differences among the trade unions are
concerned, public sector unions are anticipated to be more radical than
their private sector counterparts since their supporter base was – until
the recent economic crisis – safer from the recent vagaries of market
turmoil and restructuring programs by governments.
The trade unions are assumed to receive support from public welfare
actors such as public interest groups (e.g., charity organizations) and
social movements in the traditional left coalition. The latter mostly op-
pose specific aspects of economic liberalization such as delocalization or
structural adjustment programs but should also generally be very skep-
tic of economic liberalization (Mertes, 2010). The most important of
these alter-globalization movements have their roots in the reaction to
the rising neoliberalism since the 1970s. Their take-off period, however,
is usually seen in the early 1990s as the Bretton Woods Institutions be-
gan to extend their developmental programs for poor countries (Kaldor
et al., 2003).
Decisive for the transformation of the left, however, is the develop-
ment that the societal group of socio-cultural specialists, i.e., high-skilled
workers in interpersonal and mostly sheltered service occupations, has
considerably expanded over time and has become the core constituency
of the third way (Kriesi, 1998; Oesch, 2006; Ha¨usermann, 2010a). In
contrast to most workers, few socio-cultural specialists work in inter-
nationally competitive or for-profit sectors (Kitschelt and Rehm, 2006).
This class is thus likely taking more liberal positions, since it generally
has a comparatively protected occupational status and usually includes
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high-skilled high-earners, hence people who, in principle, are in favor of
liberalization as long as it does not impinge their conception of solidarity
(Kriesi et al., 2012). Although they do not depend much on the welfare
state, socio-cultural specialists prefer what usually is denoted as flexicu-
rity: they want more flexible labor markets and activating employment
policies, but only if a considerable level of social security is assured. In
sum, the socio-cultural specialists are the typical structural potential of
the third way.
The third way position first of all applies to left mainstream parties
with aspirations for governmental responsibility. Established left parties
thus turned from sharp critics of capitalism into actors pursuing similar
or even more vigorous economic reforms than their right counterparts
(Giddens, 2000; Mu¨ller-Rommel and Poguntke, 2002). Examples are the
fundamental restructuring of public services by the Blair government
in the UK in the late 1990s, and Schro¨der’s labor market reforms (the
Agenda 2010) in Germany at the beginning of the 2000s (Ross, 2000).
To win elections, social democrats and greens largely have abandoned
their traditional positions since they had to adapt their political pro-
gram to the austerity constraints induced by growing welfare costs and
slowing economic growth (Kriesi et al., 2008). Further, similar to the
third way parties, state enterprises are also expected to be slightly in
favor of economic liberalization, since they basically are striving for mar-
ket opportunities to increase their performance. Too much liberalization,
however, would introduce unwanted competition into the markets they
dominate or even have monopolized.
The political right, in contrast, is already historically divided into
neomercantilists and internationalists. Domestically oriented small- and
medium-sized industries and low-productive businesses traditionally ask
for state intervention to protect their privileges (see Katzenstein, 1985;
David and Mach, 2006). These actors have an incentive to opt for oligopolis-
tic strategies, keeping profits within the national economy (Roach, 2005,
p. 19). The protectionist faction among business actors is likely to raise
its voice ever more with the ongoing economic integration during the
last decades. Tellingly, in conflicts at the European level, there has been
a significant neomercantilist wing among business actors which opted
for a protected European single market (van Apeldoorn, 2002).
With the emergence of the populist right in Western European poli-
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tics, this position is likely to be reinforced. Although right-wing populists
mainly mobilize on cultural issues like immigration and European inte-
gration, they are expected to widen the division between neoliberals and
protectionists on the political right (Kriesi, 2011).
The positions of the neomercantilist coalition is based on the prefer-
ences of the petty bourgeoisie, i.e., the self-employed and the domestic
market oriented employers. This constituency in general is in favor of a
liberal market design of the economy but prefers strong barriers to the
movement of capital, goods, services, and people across borders. It is
assumed that the small business associations and professional organiza-
tions from sheltered sectors (most of all farmers) and the populist right
represent these neomercantilist interests in the debate.3
As already noted, small business associations and domestically ori-
ented businesses are likely receiving support from the right-wing pop-
ulists, who try to mobilize both the petty bourgeoisie and blue-collar
workers (Oesch, 2006). The central political program of the new populist
right can be understood as an ethno-pluralist doctrine: different ethnic-
ities are not necessarily superior or inferior, but simply different and
thus incompatible. First adopted by the French National Front, ethno-
pluralism has been embedded into the political programs and rhetorical
profiles of most European right-wing populists (Rydgren, 2007). In line
with this ideology, most immigrants are singled out as threatening to
the values of the national community. However, many right-wing pop-
ulists also identify other dangers for the national community, among
which economic globalization and its agents (supranational institutions
and multinational corporations) (Betz and Johnson, 2004).
While most populist right parties supported economic liberalization
during the early 1990s – often manifest in campaigns for radical tax cuts
–, most turned to what may also be labeled as neomercantilist (Zaslove,
2004; Kitschelt, 2007). Accordingly, the most common position of right-
wing populists nowadays is to be supportive of the capitalist system at
the national level, but fiercely protectionist with regard to the access to
the welfare system (Andersen and Bjorklund, 1990; Evans, 2005). The
rationale behind this corresponds to the notion that economic globaliza-
tion and the creation of supranational legal institutions jeopardize the
3 Neomercantilism refers to the idea of a strong state and national competition as
foundations of economic success (see Held and McGrew, 2000)
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nation-state as the main reference of collective identification and well-
being (Mudde, 2007; Kriesi et al., 2008; Berezin, 2009). The defense of
the welfare system thus extends to the protection from all kinds of cross-
border economic activities. One of the most visible moments of this type
of opposition was the 2005 defeat of the French referendum on the con-
stitution of the European Union. Although radical left forces rallied for
a rejection of the constitution too, the mobilization of the Front Na-
tional was decisive for the result of the vote. Moreover, the substantive
electoral gains of the True Finns this year points to the ongoing success
of this neomercantilism.
High-skilled workers with a leadership role in their organizations and
employers from the private industries are assumed to take a liberal stance
on both dimensions, since they are independent from the welfare state
and work in businesses which benefit from international competition
(Kitschelt and Rehm, 2006). Accordingly, they should most clearly lend
support to the bigger group of mainstream actors in the upper right cor-
ner, that is the neoliberal coalition which includes all public authority
actors, chambers of commerce, peak employer associations, liberal par-
ties, christian democrats and conservatives, experts, and global players.
On of the basic assumptions of this study is the fundamental trans-
formation of politics on economic liberalization as a consequence of
globalization and post-industrialization in general, and, among others,
transnationalization in specific. Transnationalization has not only impli-
cations for the overall structure of the public debate but also leads to the
need to consider a new set of actors. To begin with, transnationalization
of course leads to the growing importance of supra- and international
public authority actors, most notably the EU. The EU as the most im-
portant international and increasingly supranational institution derives
its power not from taxation as the traditional Westphalian nation-states
but from the implementation of regulations (Majone, 1996).
As Van Appeldoorn (2002) emphasizes, the EU is dominated by a
compromise between transnational industrial and financial capital. This
neoliberal globalist fraction rivaled with a neomercantilist wing during
the 1980s and 1990s but has prevailed later on. Moreover, international
bodies like the WTO or the IMF complement the EU as driving forces
of the internationalization of economic policy networks (Coleman, 2006,
p. 199). As main actors catalyzing the diffusion of the neoliberal dom-
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inance, EU and IGO actors can – together with national and foreign
executives, administrations, and experts – be expected to be located in
the upper right corner in Figure 3.2 (Simmons et al., 2006; Tarrow and
Caporaso, 2009).
Such processes of vertical transnationalization, however, are not con-
fined to political actors in the narrower sense. Economic integration and
post-industrialization have also profoundly changed the role of multina-
tional corporations for political conflicts (Lehmkuhl, 2006, p. 149). Con-
centration processes have led to the prevalence of multinational compa-
nies in most European industries. The growing internationalization of
their production has reduced their willingness to engage in traditional
national concertation and they increasingly dedicate their resources to
directly influence the public debate (Coen, 1997; Herrigel and Wittke,
2005; Schneider and Grote, 2006, p. 12). Moreover, political integration
has strengthened the access of large firms and the employer associa-
tions representing them to interest intermediation arenas (Eising, 2007).
Global players, along with the usually closely linked chambers of com-
merce and peak employer organizations, are thus hypothesized to join the
neoliberal coalition. Moreover, also liberals, white collar organizations,
and, to a less extent, Christian democrats and conservatives should rep-
resent the interests of big business.
To sum it up, it is expected that a pro-market mainstream consisting
of a third way and a neoliberal coalition dominates the debate. This
mainstream faces two challenging coalitions, the traditional left and the
neomercantilists.
4.3 Valence Campaigning
It is crucially important to explore how actors compete with each other
by advancing rival policy positions, but non-policy related factors clearly
also have an impact on public debates. Such factors include, but are not
confined to the charisma of leaders, the reputation of actors regard-
ing their competence and trustworthiness, and their media performance
(Schofield, 2006; Norris, 2000; Plasser and Plasser, 2002). Quite surpris-
ingly, these non-policy characteristics of public competition have not
been comprehensively conceptualized in the literature on political com-
munication, which lingers between scandalization, political marketing,
negative campaigning, or personalization (Schnur, 2007; Kriesi, 2011,
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p. 184). Following Laver and Segrenti (2011, p. 164), we will use valence
as catch-all term summarizing these aspects, which actors try to manip-
ulate by means of positive or negative campaigning.
The importance of valence in political competition is highlighted by
the literature on the individualization of citizens’ political preference
formation, coming to the forefront in dealignment processes in electoral
contests Dalton et al. (2000)4 as well as declining membership numbers
of interest groups (Wallerstein and Western, 2000). Actors thus increas-
ingly have to present themselves in a good light in order to convince the
public opinion of their good intentions and the validity of their policy
propositions.
Moreover, the importance of valence gets reinforced by the media logic
of producing news in political campaigns (Kriesi, 2011; Mancini and
Swanson, 1996). Personal characteristics have an important news value
for the mass media in their competition for the audience. They are thus
keen to exploit the actors’ struggle for a better evaluation of their va-
lence. This makes valence is a crucial device in the strategic repertoire of
actors who want to make their voices heard by the public. Besides going
public and policy position taking, the analyses will accordingly focus on
the valence campaigning strategies of the actors.
This study focuses on a particular aspect of the competition on va-
lence. Instead of being passive subjects with specific valence attributes,
actors are perceived as active subject trying to influence their own im-
age as well as the non-policy related perception of other actors by the
audience (see Zakharov, 2009). On the one hand, actors try to highlight
personal weaknesses and the professional incompetence of their competi-
tors. In electoral contests, this strategy is usually denoted as negative
campaigning (Plasser and Plasser, 2002). Following the media malaise
argument (Robinson, 1976; Norris, 2000; Shehata, 2010), negative cam-
paigning has become ever more important since non-policy related news
on politics increasingly focusses on scandals and sensational events. The
general expectation on the direction of valence campaigning is thus that
negative statements clearly prevail, i.e., that actors mainly try to attack
4 Although there is very mixed evidence regarding the increasing influence of
valence in electoral contests, it nevertheless is of constant importance (see Kriesi,
2011; Adam and Maier, 2010).
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each others reputation in the public debate.
On the other hand, individuals and organizations of the same actor
type should refer to each other affirmatively in order to foster a positive
evaluation by the public. This has also implications for the conceptual-
ization of debate coalitions: in addition to shared policy positions, actors
can also signal with a positive valence attribution who belongs to the
same coalition. Debate coalitions can thus also be perceived as networks
in which cooperative interactions prevail (Adam and Kriesi, 2007). The
underlying assumption is that actors in a coalition depend on each other
because they rely on each other’s communicative resources to gain influ-
ence on the course of the debate. In sum, the own evaluation and that of
coalition members should overall be more positive in the debate, while
all other actors should be referred to with a more negative connotation.
4.4 Framing
The last element by which the debate and its constituting coalitions are
characterized is framing which in general has become a crucial tool in
social science research to understand public debates (Scheff, 2005). The
term frames refers to the causal interpretations and problem definitions
actors provide to link different policies to shared beliefs (Entman, 1993,
p. 52; Helbling et al., 2011). Conceptually, frames can thus be understood
as “central organizing ideas that provide coherence to a designated set of
idea elements” (Ferree et al., 2002, p. 105). Since much meaning related
to specific policy positions in public debates is “taken for granted and
unamenable to scrutiny as a whole” (Hall, 1993, p. 279)5, frames are
serving as the cognitive cues indicating agreement on basic principles
(Surel, 2000). Applied to the debate on economic liberalization frames
thus reveal how interests are articulated with respect to specific collec-
tive beliefs and values (Bartolini and Mair, 1990, p. 213-220; Enyedi,
2005, p. 699).
Every issue allows for a variety of frames used by the different political
actors, which means that the public is not exposed to just one frame as
it traditionally is assumed in the literature. Rather, individuals are ex-
5 What Hall (1993) calls social paradigms can be perceived as frames, since he
similarly defines social paradigms as interpretative frameworks within which
policy making evolves.
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posed to competing frames and choose the alternative which is congruent
with their own values and norms (Chong and Druckman, 2007, p. 112).
Actors accordingly are trying to influence which frames are used for the
evaluation of specific issues (Kriesi et al., 2009, p. 354). This mechanism
of how the importance of specific interpretations of reality can be manip-
ulated to influence the individuals’ decision making processes is denoted
here as framing but is conceptualized in manifold ways in the literature,
e.g., also as second-order or second-level agenda setting (see Iyengar and
Kinder, 1987, p. 63; Kiousis et al., 2006; Chong and Druckman, 2007,
p. 115). With regard to the success of frames, their resonance with cen-
tral societal themes is decisive. As Entman (2004, p. 14) specifies, the
most successful frames are those “fully congruent with schemas habit-
ually used by most members of society”. Thus, frames that appeal to
widespread stereotypes and the received wisdom in a given society are
very effective means of political competition (Kriesi et al., 2009, p. 357).
To categorize frames for the analyses in this study, a two-stage ap-
proach is applied. First, Habermas’ (1993) three-fold classification to
broadly organize arguments in public discourses is used to make first
distinctions among the many justifications used by the actors in the de-
bate (see table A.4 in the appendix to get a comprehensive overview over
all frames). The classification has proved to be useful for the analysis
of political communication processes in different domains (Trenz, 2005;
Lerch and Schwellnus, 2006; Helbling et al., 2010). As table 4.2 shows,
on the most abstract level, the classification differentiates between util-
itarian, identitarian and moral-universal arguments.6
Utilitarian arguments are used to justify an issue position by its poten-
tial to meet particular aims (Helbling et al., 2012). This kind of problem
definition is thus instrumental and underlines the practical benefits of a
policy. Identity related arguments, on the contrary, justify positions by
referring to ideas and values inherent to particular communities. They
are brought forward if a specific policy position is beneficial for the
actor’s own or any other culturally defined entity. Moral-universalist ar-
guments, finally, refer to general principles and rights that are valid for
6 Habermas’ conceptualization of public arguments has a lot in common with
March and Olson’s (1984) two logics of arguments. The pragmatic argument
corresponds to the logic of consequence, while ethical arguments relate to the
logic of appropriateness, since actors seek to promote the justifications
encapsulated in an identity, a membership in a political community or group
(March and Olsen, 2006).
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everyone regardless of particular interests or cultural identities. Such ar-
guments therefore put policy positions in the context of universal goals
like human rights or abstract values like individual freedom.
Table 4.2 Frame Conceptualization
General Char- School of Debate
acterization thought specific frames Description
Utilitarian
Mercantilism Intervention Need for regulation
Social Demo- Social Redistribution, full em-
cracy protection ployment and social se-
curity
Liberalism Prosperity Innovation, economic
performance and growth
Identitarian Mercantilism Protection Traditional production,
national wealth
Moral-universal
Liberalism Economic Self-fulfillment, indi-
Freedom vidual freedom
Social Demo- Social justice Respect of basic
cracy rights, social justice
Notes: A detailed list containing the classification of the annotated justifications
into the six categories can be found in Table A.4 in the appendix.
The Habermasian three-fold distinction only establishes the general
framework for the development of debate specific frames. With respect
to economic liberalization in Western Europe, these fine-grained frame
categories are most likely in line with the pivotal ideologies that shaped
the political economy since the beginnings of the modern economies
(Surel, 2000, p. 169f.; Gartzke, 2007), or, as Thelen (2010, p. 50) puts
it: “the landscapes of contemporary political economies are littered with
what Barrington Moore once called ’suppressed historical alternatives’
that [...] remain available to actors as they cope with new problems and
challengers.” More specifically, the frame classification used in this anal-
ysis is derived from the three historically dominant schools of economic
thought: social democracy, liberalism, and mercantilism. While social
democratic and liberal frames have already been defined by other stud-
ies of the framing of economic issues (see Chong and Druckman, 2007),
this analysis innovates with the introduction of mercantilist arguments
to cover identitarian and statist justifications, i.e., intervention and pro-
tection frames (see table 4.2).
Systematic accounts of political-economic thought sprung with the
early elaborations by liberal philosophers in the seventeenth and eigh-
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teenth century U.K. (Skousen, 2001). As Tarrow and Caporaso (2009,
p. 595f.) put it, “the growth of a market society in the early nineteenth
century was driven by the ideology of liberalism that found expression
in [...] market discourse as the ’common sense’ of the emerging capital-
ist system.” Two central ideas stand out on classical economic liberal-
ism. On the one hand, the notion of liberty justifies both the emphasis
on property rights and on individual freedom as a basic human need
(Kitschelt, 1994). The category freedom subsumes these aspects of eco-
nomic liberalism. On the other hand, the accumulation of wealth plays a
crucial role in this school of thought. Assumedly, if individuals strive for
their personal success, the whole society profits through the efficient al-
location of resources by market mechanisms. This argument is expressed
in Adam Smith’s famous metaphor of an invisible hand and matches the
prosperity frame category in table 4.2.
The corresponding regulatory program of economic liberalism allowed
for the release of European economies from the formerly prevailing mer-
cantilist structures (Pressman, 2006). In turn, this common sense that
free markets are the natural way of organizing an economy was chal-
lenged by social democratic thoughts. And after the disastrous expe-
riences of the Great Depression in the 1930s, the global economy was
transformed into an embedded liberalism, i.e., the great compromise be-
tween free market ideologies and the social democratic demand for social
security in national welfare systems (Ruggie, 1982).
Liberalism was progressive with respect to the mercantilist paradigm
in pre-industrial Europe (Magnusson, 2003). Mercantilist doctrines started
from the view that trade among nations is a zero-sum game and that
states have to protect the own economy at the expense of others’ (Ekelund
and Tollison, 1982). In the nineteenth century, however, mercantilist the-
ories were modified into comprehensive approaches regarding the role of
the state in the economy. Mercantilism became the theory of state di-
rigism according to which states achieve political power by economic
wealth (Immerwahr, 2009). Mercantilist thinking, for example, is still
influential in regionalist efforts in international politics, such as the com-
mon trade policy for the European Union (Hurrell, 1995; van Apeldoorn,
2002). In sum, the two core beliefs of mercantilism are the national in-
terest (protection) and the need for state intervention (see table 4.2).
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While classical liberalism overcame the mercantilist paradigm, it it-
self was challenged by several influential intellectual movements, ranging
from revolutionary anarchists to moderate socialists (Lichtheim, 1969;
Pressman, 2006). In Western Europe, socialist thinking over time became
embedded into democratic capitalist systems (see Polanyi, 1944). This
became manifest in the postwar compromise between labor and capi-
tal and the development of rigorous econometric models of imperfect
competition – most pronouncedly formulated in Keynes’ (1936) “The
General Theory”. The core beliefs of this social democratic compromise
can be defined as ideas of “social protections created to guard against the
depredations that markets might cause” (Tarrow and Caporaso, 2009,
p. 598). Accordingly,social democratic ideas in Western European aim at
correcting the main weaknesses of liberal capitalism, i.e., social protec-
tion to prevent the most acute hardships of economic deprivation and
the respect of basic human rights regardless of economic imperatives
(social justice in table 4.2) (King, 2003).
The basic expectation regarding the distribution of the frame cate-
gories in the debates is that liberal ideas dominate the debate since they
are preferred by the mainstream. Beyond that, the four debate coali-
tions are hypothesized to emphasize specific frames in accordance with
their deviating core values and norms. Because of their historical legacy,
the two left coalitions (traditional left and third way) should be more
frequently using social democratic frames, although in combination with
different additional frames. Intervention frames are feasible extensions
to the traditional left’s ideological mind-set. In line with its inclination
to preserve the status quo on social protection they are expected to fuse
social democratic with interventionist frames.
The framing strategy of the third way coalition, by contrast, should
lean more towards liberal frames, since this left coalition has a reformist
agenda that tries to reconcile social democracy with economic liberal-
ism. Further, the neoliberal coalition is anticipated to pursue the most
clear-cut framing strategy, which is mainly based on liberal frames. Fi-
nally, not surprisingly, the neomercantilist coalition should use mercan-
tilist frames more often. Especially protectionist arguments should be
brought forward by the neomercantilists, since they lie at the heart of
this coalition’s ideology.
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Besides the policy position related expectations in terms of the influ-
ence of coalition memberships, it is anticipated that the function actors
hold in the policy process also influences their framing patterns. Actors
with actual governmental responsibility should also put more weight on
the frames related to the role of the state in the economy. Especially in-
terventionist frames can be understood as part of the pro-market main-
streams’ strategy, since the dominant forces probably emphasize their
regulative responsibility to govern the liberalization reforms. In sum, it
is thus hypothesized that all executive actors and the mainstream parties
usually forming governments use more mercantilist frames.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter outlined the actor hypotheses. More precisely, the theoret-
ical underpinnings of the formation of debate coalitions were established
using four distinctive discursive strategies actors can apply in public
debates: going public, policy position taking, valence campaigning and
framing. All expectations derived in the previous sections are presented
in a condensed way in table 4.3.
First, with respect to going public, the resource and mobilization ar-
guments as well as issue ownership were used to establish specific hy-
potheses on the importance of different actors. Second, four patterns of
policy position taking on the two anticipated dimensions of the economic
liberalization debate were identified on the basis of a split on both the
political left and right. Third, the theories of valence campaigning and
media malaise enabled the formulation of expectations how the actors
refer to themselves and other actors with respect to non-policy related
aspects. Finally, following Habermas (1993) and the schools of though
that shaped economic policy making in Western Europe, coalition spe-
cific framing strategies were identified.
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Table 4.3 Expectations on the Influence of Discursive strategies
Going public The resource argument points to the strong standing of insti-
tutionally advantaged actors (most of all national executives
and corporations), while the mobilization argument expects chal-
lengers (radical left actors and the populist right) to be strong in
the debate. Moreover, social democrats and liberal parties should
have a significant standing, since economic liberalization belongs
to their core issues.
Policy posi-
tion taking
The actors cluster into four debate coalitions, namely the third
way, traditional left, neoliberals and neomercantilists. The neolib-
erals are expected to be firmly and the third way slightly support-
ing economic liberalization, while the traditional left is hypothe-
sized to be fully in opposition. The neomercantilists, finally, are
expected to form a protectionist coalition.
Valence
campaigning
Actors are in general expected to pursue a more negative cam-
paigning strategy against actors from other policy coalitions. At
the same time, they try to present themselves and fellow cam-
paigners in a relatively more positive light.
Framing Liberal frames should be predominantly used in the debates.
Traditional left actors are emphasizing social democratic frames,
while the third way adherents should prefer a combination of so-
cial democratic with liberal frames. The neoliberals should con-
strain themselves to liberal and the mercantilist to protectionist
frames. In addition, the actors with governmental responsibility
(most of all national executives and mainstream parties)
With this chapter, the theoretical elaboration of the debate analysis is
accomplished. The next chapter will thus discuss the methodological is-
sues to enable the examination of the hypotheses in the second empirical
part of the study.
5Designing the Content Analysis
The basic methodological choice is to explore the debate on economic lib-
eralization by means of an analysis of mass media reports. This requires
justification, since there are various other strategies to analyze political
contestation. For instance, one could rely on other written documents
(e.g., party manifestos), or on expert surveys (see Keman, 2007, p. 77).
However, while these alternative approaches have their merits, they fail
to grasp the whole universe of actors’ preferences. It is nearly impossible
to find a comparative data set which encompasses all relevant actors.
Party manifesto data, for example, are restricted to political parties and
ignore interest associations or actors from the protest arena. The same
usually goes for expert surveys.
A further advantage in our relying on data derived from print media
is that it captures the competition among and confrontation between
actors better than other data (Helbling and Tresch, 2011). The salience
of an issue for a party in an electoral contest, for example, heavily de-
pends on the agenda-setting strategies of other parties, and the actual
salience of this issue can therefore strongly deviate from the one in the
party’s manifesto.
This chapter sets out to outline the content analysis which provides
the data for the analysis of the economic liberalization debate in the
following chapters. It first describes the selection of countries and time
periods and sampling of newspapers, before the identification of the rele-
vant concepts and their aggregation to the units of analysis is discussed.
According to the open access policy of this research, detailed informa-
tion on the data sets, aggregation, and analyses can be found in the
appendices as well as on http://www.bruno-wueest.ch/phd.html.
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5.1 Selection of Countries and Time Periods
The debate on economic liberalization is analyzed in six West European
countries: Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and
the U.K. The political change that took place as a consequence of glob-
alization, post-industrialization, and state transformation depends on a
multitude of contextual factor which differ among these countries, but
all are stable liberal democracies with consolidated political institutions
and an advanced economy.
Other European countries were not considered since the broader so-
cietal context has created different latent potentials for economic con-
flicts and, therefore, the influence of country-specific political-economic
institutions cannot easily be compared. Consequently, East European
countries were excluded since their democratization began just when
contemporary globalization and post-industrialization were accelerating
(Dolezal, 2008, p. 54). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, East Euro-
pean political systems were still in transition, which makes comparison
with established democracies difficult. South European countries, ex-
cept Italy, democratized during the 1970s, again making comparisons
over time problematic. Italy was not included into the sample because
the breakdown of the First Republic during the early 1990s was at-
tributable more to national idiosyncrasies which again would have made
comparisons very difficult (Newell, 2000, p. 177f.). Scandinavian coun-
tries, finally, were not included into the sample because of the lack of
necessary language skills of the researchers involved to gather data from
print media outlets.1
The main aim of this analysis is to get a comprehensive picture of
the debate on economic liberalization in the six countries. The window
of observation is 2004 to 2006, for which the debate data was collected.
While the big liberalization reforms in the 20th century took place in less
contested economic sectors, the debate has turned to very sensitive issues
for Western European countries such as agriculture in the beginning of
the 21st century. Accordingly, the conflict between the forces pushing for
liberalization and the challengers of this forces has become more fierce.
This makes an investigation of the debate structure in the mid-2000s
1 The content analysis data set was established by the author and his collaborators
in the research project “National Political Change in a Globalizing World” (see
Kriesi et al., 2008).
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especially interesting. In order to keep the work load of the content
analysis manageable, the observation period has been limited to the
three years 2004 to 2006 (Dolezal et al., 2012).
5.2 Sampling of Newspapers
The first step of the content analysis is the selection of newspapers. As a
starting point, the largest quality newspaper was chosen for each coun-
try (see Table 5.2). This is Le Monde in France, Die Presse in Austria,
Su¨ddeutsche Zeitung in Germany, NRC Handelsblad in the Netherlands,
Neue Zu¨rcher Zeitung in Switzerland, and The Times in the U.K. This
was a pragmatic decision, due the big effort needed for the content anal-
yses of the debate. Given the fact that only one media title could be
considered, quality newspapers were chosen since they are particularly
suitable to study debates. They remain the leading medium of political
news coverage, because they report in the most detailed manner about
debates and influence the editorial decisions of a wide range of other news
organizations (Reinemann, 2003; Vliegenthart and Walgrave, 2008).
The sampling of the relevant news articles was done in three steps:
First, the relevant events of the debate in each country were identified,
using various yearbooks (Keesing’s World Record of Events, Facts on
File World News Digest Yearbook etc.) as well as the annual reviews of
the newspapers in our sample. Examples for such events are parliamen-
tary debates on liberalization reforms, protest events against globaliza-
tion, or regular meetings like the World Economic Forum. These lists
formed the basis for an extensive keyword list for each country, helping
us to find the articles of interest in electronic newspaper databases. The
advantage of creating such lists is that we knew about the content of
the relevant discussions in each country before we engaged in a keyword
search. We could therefore avoid many false negative selections, i.e., ar-
ticles which should have been found but were not found by our keyword
search. Second, in order to filter the news reporting out of all newspa-
per articles, op-eds and letters to the editor were sorted out. Finally, a
chronological sample of 1’200 articles per country was drawn. This allows
to account for the dynamic of the debate. Time-invariant selection pro-
cedures, such as taking all articles about a political issue published on a
certain weekday, fail to capture differences in the intensity of a debate.
A chronological sampling, by contrast, tracks the frequency distribution
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of relevant articles and therefore captures the peaks and troughs in the
debate.
Given the still time-consuming coding procedure, we did not only have
to rely on a sample of the relevant articles but did also code only spe-
cific sections. For national election articles, we annotated the headline,
the ‘lead’, if available, and the first paragraph of an article. Again, as
tabloid articles are shorter and fewer in numbers, we decided to code
the entire articles. For the debates, we annotated the first twenty core
sentences. This was because the format of the articles (such as the para-
graph structure) is sometimes lost in the electronic articles we relied
on.
5.3 Core Sentence Annotation
The actor positions in the newspaper articles were identified using Core
Sentence Analysis (CSA). This approach is inspired by Wittgenstein
(1921), whose theoretical elaboration of the extraction of the basic mes-
sage of written documents was first translated into practical coding in-
structions by Osgood (1959) and Axelrod (1976). Subsequently, it has
been adapted to analyze party competition and political conflict in gen-
eral (Kriesi et al., 2008; Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings, 2001; Kleinnijen-
huis et al., 1997). The principal aim is to systematically quantify political
statements in written documents. According to the CSA method, if a
relevant actor is found in a text segment, this segment is – if possible
– reduced to its most basic structure (a core sentence), which contains
only the subject (actor), the object (issue) and the polarity of the rela-
tionship between the two.2 This relationship between actor and issue is
always quantified as a polarity using a scale ranging from -1 to +1, where
-1 means opposition and +1 means support, with three intermediary po-
sitions indicating a vague or an ambivalent relation. If, for example, an
actor is only potentially or vaguely in favor of or against a certain issue
or actor, a value of +0.5 or –0.5, respectively, was assigned. Whenever
there was an ambiguous relation, a 0 was coded. The example in Table
6.3 illustrates the coding procedure.
2 The relationship between grammatical and core sentences is not straightforward.
One sentence can include no, one or several core sentences. Additionally, a core
sentence can span over more than one sentence.
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Table 5.1 CSA Coding example
“Mr. Blair has made economic reform the top priority of his presidency,
hoping to make labour markets more flexible in order to tackle record un-
employment and sluggish growth across the continent. However, he is
now likely to face challenges from President Chirac [...].”
(The Times, May 31 2005, Battle for the heart of Europe)
Subject Polarity Object Frames Arena
Blair +1 labor market social protection/ Europ./int.
reform wealth governmental
Chirac −1 Blair n.a. “
The first core sentence refers to Blair’s support of labor market reforms
(actor-issue statement), which is complemented by a social protection
frame (“in order to tackle record unemployment”) as well as a frame
related to wealth (“in order to tackle [...] sluggish growth”). The second
core sentence consists of Chirac’s likely opposition to Blair (actor-actor
statement). For the analysis of debates, two additional attributes are
examined: frames and political arenas (the theoretical basis, analytical
categories, and concepts of arenas and framing are discussed in detail in
Chapter 3). By frames, the problem definition or justification an actor
gives when he takes a position is meant. Since sometimes actors back
their policy positions in public debates with multiple frames (Lerch and
Schwellnus, 2006, p. 307), the coding of up to five frames per core sen-
tence was allowed. The political arena is the general context to which
an issue position refers and in which it is articulated. More specifically,
the arena is defined as the site where the policy process is debated at
the moment the statement leading to a core sentence was made, e.g.,
an election campaign in the electoral arena or a demonstration in the
protest arena.
Summarized over all six countries, the number of core sentences amounts
to 9841 for the debate data. Further, there are a total of 7636 frame and
3697 actor-actor statements in the debate data set. Table 5.3 shows the
key figures of the content analysis data used throughout this study. Since
there are ’genuine’ differences in the number of statements for the dif-
ferent countries that stem from the way newspapers are reporting on
political competition, probability weights are applied during the analy-
ses.
5.3 Core Sentence Annotation 87
Table 5.2 Number of Observations Coded in the Different
Content Analysis Data Sets
Country Debate (issues) Debate (frames) Debate (actors)
France 1847 1521 292
Austria 1927 847 1146
Germany 1621 907 788
Netherlands 896 732 305
Switzerland 2140 2634 452
U.K. 1410 995 714
Overall 9841 7636 3697
5.3.1 Positions, Saliencies and Polarization
A first step in the analyses is to calculate the actors’ issue position as
well as the salience measures with respect to issues, frames, and actors
(see figure 5.1). The average issue position of an actor is calculated by
taking the mean of all the coded polarity values over all core sentences
that contain a relationship between this actor and a given issue (or an-
other actor if actor-actor statements are involved). The range of these
positions spans from -1 to +1. The salience of an issue or frame for a
given actor is the relative frequency with which the actor takes a po-
sition on this issue or frame compared to all statements attributed to
this actor. Additionally actor saliencies, defined as the relative frequency
with which an actor is cited in the debate compared to all actors, are
calculated.
As Figure 5.1 illustrates, by aggregating the actors, issues, frames and
arenas coded from the statements to substantially meaningful categories,
the positions, saliencies, and polarizations within a debate or electoral
campaign can be analyzed. The corresponding actor and issue categories
used in this analysis can be found in Chapter 3 (Tables 3.3, 3.2, and 3.4,
respectively) and the frame categories are listed in Table 4.2. Further,
the aggregation procedures are documented in appendix A.
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Figure 5.1 Annotated Variables and Aggregation into Indicators
It is important to note that positions and saliencies are always cal-
culated using article weights. This accounts for imbalances caused by
the selection of articles. In fact, the CSA data, i.e., core sentence state-
ments derived from newspaper articles, statistically behave like survey
data sampled at two levels, e.g., the country and individual level. In
such data sets, the basic assumption of equal chances for individuals or
statements, respectively, to get into the sample is violated because the
countries have different population sizes and the articles contain different
numbers of core sentences. To illustrate what consequences this might
have, let us assume an actor with ten statements which all stem from
the same article. This is a likely scenario if an article reports in a little
bit more detail about this actor’s position. Let us further assume a sec-
ond actor with ten statements, but this time from ten different articles.
These ten statements should be given more weight since the actor was
covered in very different instances. Thus, the data needs to be aggregated
using probability weights on the level of articles, i.e., every statement
is weighted relative to the total number of statements in the same article.
To assess polarization, a measure based on Taylor and Hermann’s
(1971) index is used. This index was originally designed to measure the
degree of left-right polarization in a party system, but it can also be
applied to examine how strongly actor positions differ on any set of issues
or dimensions (see Dolezal, 2008). It is calculated by taking the sum of
variances of the actors’ positions, again weighted by their saliencies (see
definition in Table B.1 in the appendix). As with the original index, the
range of values taken depends on the scale of the issue categories and
range between 0 and 1. The higher the value, the more polarized an
issue, dimension, or debate.
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5.3.2 Advantages of the CSA Approach
CSA is a versatile instrument to capture the full complexity of political
contestation without imposing too strong theoretical expectations in ad-
vance of the coding (e.g. a priori definitions of classifications). Moreover,
Kriesi et al. (2008), Franzosi (2004), and van Atteveldt (2008) have re-
cently provided theoretical and empirical evidence that such relational
content analysis is a useful device for the social sciences in general. Nei-
ther party manifestos nor expert surveys yield such comprehensive data
on both actors’ positions as used in spatial models (e.g., Downs, 1957;
Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989) and issue salience as employed by
theories of selective emphasis and issue ownership (Budge and Farlie,
1983; Petrocik, 1996).
A severe drawback of manual content analyses – especially of large-
scale applications of the CSA approach like the one described here –
is the large effort it requires (Hillard et al., 2007; Schrodt, 2009). The
dominant approach to overcome this cost problem is the estimation of se-
mantic information in documents by means of statistical procedures (e.g.
Slapin and Proksch, 2008; Hopkins and King, 2010; Laver et al., 2003).
Their common basic procedure is to scale text along one specific vari-
able, be it the left-right dimension, issue categories or ordinal variables.
The statistical procedures either depend on the comparison of relative
word frequencies in texts (Laver et al., 2003; Zuell and Landmann, 2005;
Hillard et al., 2007), the co-occurrence of specific keywords (Ruigrok and
van Atteveldt, 2007), or on dichotomous variables assessing the presence
of word stems (Hopkins and King, 2010). All these approaches need is
a sufficient amount of manually coded reference texts, usually not more
than 100 documents, and they basically handle all kinds of unstructured
texts (Hopkins and King, 2010, p. 4f.). However, this does not hold with-
out restrictions. Changes of vocabulary over time and between different
authors as well as large differences in the length of the documents can
lead to imprecise coding assessments (Hug and Schulz, 2007).
The decisive disadvantage of these methods for the collection of data
on debates from newspaper articles is that these methods lack the recog-
nition of relational data, i.e., relationships between at least two different
concepts like actors and issues. First, they have mainly been used to
code issue positions in party manifestos where the actors are already
pre-defined. Second, some approaches are explicitly not aiming at link-
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ing issues to specific actors since they are designed to classify texts into
thematic categories (Hillard et al., 2007). By contrast, the simultane-
ous coding of actors and issues is precisely the core task of the CSA
approach. Fully automated procedures to recognize such complex rela-
tional data, however, are still in the early stages of development (see
Wueest et al., 2011; van Atteveldt, 2008).
Hence, since the application of statistical techniques was not feasible
in order to collect relational data, the workload was reduced by the sam-
pling strategies as described above and by the application of a software
framework for manual data collection. This coding software consists of
a web-based application which is equipped with an administrative panel
to organize large-scale data collections and allows for the simultaneous
annotation for up to 10 coders. Furthermore, the software includes a
database that is specifically designed to store newspaper articles, the
meta data of the coding process such as the date of publication and
rubric as well as the coded variables. Finally, it comes with an intelli-
gent annotation front end to make the core sentence coding process as
ergonomic as possible.3
A second major challenge of manual content analyses is the difficulty
to assess the quality of the data gathered. Such difficulties are created
by genuine variation in the way newspapers cover political competition.
Comparisons of data generated by the CSA approach with data from
expert judgments, party manifesto codlings, and mass surveys, how-
ever, suggest that the external validity is given. As Helbling and Tresch
(2011) show, the indicators for actor positions are highly correlated in
all countries under study. Low inter-coder reliability is also potentially
hampering the data quality. In a pretest, six coders obtained a coeffi-
cient of reliability of 0.77 for coder agreement on the identification of
core sentences. Inter-coder agreement for the correct annotation of actors
and issues was 0.88 and 0.85, respectively. Given that the typical level
of acceptance is 0.80 (Lombard et al., 2002), the agreement was within
acceptable limits already before the actual data collection started. Ad-
ditional coder training and improved coding instructions were provided
in the following in order to address remaining uncertainties.
3 Most of the programming was done by Stefanie Gerber.
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Some coding instructions were also specifically designed to minimize
unintended influence of the journalistic processing of the actor state-
ments. Only editorial articles, but not paid media content, op-eds and
letters to the editor were considered as data source. Furthermore, no ex-
plicit expressions of opinion by journalists in the editorial articles were
included as core sentences. Moreover, if one uses aggregate measures like
the average position or relative frequencies, as will be done in this book,
the journalistic bias among newspapers carries even less weight.
5.4 Conclusion
This chapter completes the conceptualization of the study by outlin-
ing the distinguishing features of the data collection and aggregation.
The data sets used in the following are based on an extensive content
analysis of newspapers in France, Austria, Germany, the Netherlands,
Switzerland, and the U.K. from 2004 until 2006. Positions are useful to
examine the policy stances as well as valence campaigning. Further, the
actor saliences allow to study the hypotheses on going public, while the
frame saliences will be used to explore the framing of economic liberal-
ization.
In the following chapters, the debate on economic liberalization will
be analyzed. The empirical assessment starts with the structure of the
debate in terms of regulatory levels and dimensions. The focus then turns
to the four discursive strategies that define the public debate. For the
most part, the empirical chapters follow the same research strategy. Each
discursive strategy is explored by countries, arenas, actor characteristics
and debate coalitions.
Part Two
How the Debate on Economic Liberalization
Relates to the Institutional Contexts and the
Actors’ Discursive Strategies
6Mapping the Terrain: The Structure and
Actor Distribution of the Debate on
Economic Liberalization
The empirical analysis starts with the exploration the structure of the
public debate on economic liberalization in the six countries from 2004
to 2006. This entails an analysis of the regulatory levels at which the
debate takes place as well as an assessment of the structure with re-
gards content, i.e., the issues and dimensions of the debate. First, we
study how international the economic liberalization debate runs in the
six countries. Given the significant shifts of regulatory responsibility to
European and international levels (Hooghe and Marks, 2001), it is an
open question how much public discourse remains bound to the national
level.
Second, the expectations with respect to the dimensionality of the
public debate on economic liberalization will be tested. Globalization,
post-industrialization as well as the changing role of the state in the
economy are assumed to have broken up the left-right structure in the
politics on economic liberalization. New divides on both the political
left and right which are connected to the emergence of the third way
on the left and the strengthening of protectionists on the political right
transformed the structure of public debates, which is now anticipated to
be characterized by a two dimensions based on the distinction between
domestic and international liberalization. This expectation will be em-
pirically tested by a factor analysis and shows that the issues of the
debate load on two factors capturing an international and a domestic
dimension.
The focus then turns to the actor going public, the fundamental dis-
cursive strategy that paves the way for their policy position taking,
valence campaigning, and framing. Chapter 4 has established the mo-
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bilization and resource propositions. The resource argument posits that
participants with institutionalized channels and/or large public relation
capacities loom high in debates (Wolfsfeld, 1997; Ferree et al., 2002).
The mobilization argument, by contrast, expects that actors with less
resources and little influence on the policy process in the decision-making
arenas try to compensate their relative disadvantage by striving for a
high public visibility. The results will largely confirm the resource argu-
ment, although some indications for the mobilization argument can be
found as well.
6.1 The Structure of the Debate
6.1.1 The Transnationalization of Political Conflict
The distinctiveness of the debates in the different countries will be as-
sessed with regard to the distribution of the actors’ origins. The key
question is how often actors from the foreign, international and Eu-
ropean levels are intervening in the national debates. Differences with
respect to the salience of such non-national actors reveal how closed pub-
lic debates are. Table 7.1, accordingly, shows the importance of different
regulatory levels for the debate, measured by the share of actors’ level of
origin. To calculate these shares, the relative frequency of the statements
related to the different levels is used. Additionally, probability weights
accounting for the uneven distribution of statements are applied across
articles and – for the overall numbers only – across countries.
Overall, foreign, European, and international actors are responsible for
about one third of all statements. The chi-square at the bottom of the
table shows that there is no significant variation between the countries,
although there are still differences visible. In France and Switzerland,
national actors make up for over 70 percent of all statements. As far
as France is concerned, this corresponds to the expectations. Being a
state-led economy, the French debate was assumed to be more nationally
oriented. Further, it seems that Switzerland with its non-EU member
status is less affected by transnational intervention.
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Table 6.1 Salience of Actor Origins
Level of origin Overall FR A DE NL CH UK
International 16.2 11.3 20.2 18.6 15.6 11.8 20.5
European 11.3 9.2 14.8 7.6 14.3 9.2 12.9
Foreign 8.5 6.4 12.7 6.9 8.8 7.8 8.7
National 64.0 73.2 52.3 67.0 61.3 71.2 57.9
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
N 9480 1754 1931 1605 857 2022 1427
Pearson’s χ2 18.0 n.s. (15 DF)
Notes: All shares in %; Actor and issue statements used; Article weights
applied for all calculations; Country weights applied for overall numbers.
Levels of significance: *≤0.05, **≤0.01, ***≤0.001.
Actors intervening from the international level, mainly IGO actors and
global players (multinational corporations), are more important than
European and foreign actors for the debate in every country. Moreover,
while the salience in Switzerland and France is only 11.8 and 11.3 per-
cent, respectively, international actors account for more than 20 percent
of statements in Austria and the U.K. Similarly, European actors have
a low salience in Switzerland and France, but also in Germany, where
they are least important with a share of 7.6 percent in all statements.
The influence of foreign actors, i.e., actors from other countries that
are neither affiliated with the international or supranational level, does
not vary much among the countries, except for their comparatively high
salience in Austria (12.7 percent).
Austria is the country where transnational actors have the largest in-
fluence (47.7 percent), but also in the Netherlands and the U.K. they
make up for about 40 percent of all statements. However, since the rela-
tionship between the two variables is not significant, the debates in the
different countries are not highly distinct in terms of the involvement of
the different regulatory levels. This means that transnationalization and
the corresponding involvement of European and international public au-
thority actors, foreign executives and multinational corporations affects
all countries similarly.
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6.1.2 The Microstructure of the Economic
Liberalization Debate
The next analyses will focus on the distribution of issues across the six
countries. Besides the actors and frames, the issues of economic liberal-
ization are an essential element of the debate structure. In chapter 2, we
have introduced the separation between issues concerning two criteria.
On the one hand, the issues are separated according to the relation-
ship between the national and the global economy. On the other hand,
regulatory aspects and activating economic policies are separated. This
led to seven distinct issues: retrenchment of restrictions, labor market
deregulation, privatization, economic promotion, international market
deregulation, internationalization, and locational promotion (see table
6.2). As the chi square in table 6.2 indicates, there is a strong relation-
ship between the issue distribution and the countries, which means that
there are significant differences between the countries in terms of which
issues dominate the public debate. Thus, it is worth to first take a closer
look at the importance of the different issues for the debates in the single
countries.
Table 6.2 Issue Salience by Countries
Overall FR A DE NL CH UK
Retrenchment of restrictions 17.5 17.4 6.4 15.4 25.5 14.2 26.0
Labor market deregulation 8.6 11.1 11.1 12.5 6.6 6.5 3.3
Privatization 18.1 22.5 26.7 12.6 15.9 17.9 14.2
Economic promotion 10.7 10.6 10.1 16.4 8.5 9.2 8.7
International market deregulation 13.3 6.7 9.6 13.1 18.4 12.7 19.1
Internationalization 20.8 19.2 24.6 21.1 16.8 23.8 19.1
Locational competition 11.1 12.5 11.6 8.8 8.2 15.7 9.6
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
N 9839 1845 1927 1621 896 1410 2140
Pearson’s χ2 50.5 * (30 DF)
Notes: All shares in %; Only issue statements used; Article weights applied for all calculations;
Country weights applied for overall numbers. Levels of significance: *≤0.05, **≤0.01, ***≤0.001.
In general, three issues seem to be especially important for the economic
liberalization debate: privatization; retrenchment, i.e., the general dereg-
ulation of domestic markets; as well as internationalization, i.e., the pro-
motion of cross-border economic activities. Retrenchment is dominant
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in all countries but Austria. Moreover, it is the most important issue for
the debate in the U.K. and the Netherlands with 26.0 and 25.5 percent,
respectively. In both countries, although labor market deregulation is
not salient, policies concerned with the withdrawal of regulations are at
the center of the debate, since they also exhibit a high share of interna-
tional market deregulation (19.1 and 18.4 percent).
Further, labor market deregulation received considerably more atten-
tion in Germany, France, and Austria. This seems to be a result that
partly depends on the selected time period, at least as far as France
and Germany are concerned. Both countries had fierce debates on far-
reaching labor market reforms (the Agenda 2010 in Germany and the
Contrat Premie`re Embauche in France) during these years. For the three
more liberal countries, by contrast, labor market reforms are less impor-
tant. At least for the U.K. and Switzerland, this has to do with the fact
that labor markets already are comparatively flexible.
The issue privatization is especially salient in Austria and France, the
countries which long had the biggest public sector among continental
Western European economies. These two countries thus struggle most
about the direct involvement of the state in the economy. The conse-
quence of the high salience of privatization in France and Austria is a
relatively low importance of international deregulation.
Confirming the long-standing evidence by Katzenstein’s (1985) anal-
yses, the debate on internationalization is affecting two small countries,
namely Switzerland and Austria, exceptionally strongly. These countries
traditionally have to deal with the benefits and risks of a strong interde-
pendence with global markets. Furthermore, reflecting the importance
of tax competition which is included in locational promotion, this issue
is especially important in Switzerland.
6.1.3 Conflict Dimensions of Economic Liberalization
The debate on economic liberalization is assumed o be structured by
more than one dimension, since different coalitions within both the po-
litical left and right have increasingly drifted apart as a consequence of
globalization and post-industrialization. Especially the growing impor-
tance of protectionist positions on the political right as a reaction of
increasing market volatility should lead to a configuration of the issues
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in the debate that pits international and domestic issues against each
other. In the following, the dimensionality of the public debate in general
will come under further scrutiny. More precisely, we expect the public
debate to be structured along the two dimensions international and do-
mestic liberalization. The factor analysis reported in table 6.4 uses the
weighted policy positions of actors to empirically test this expectation.
Potentially, there are 180 possible actors entering the debates (30 actor
types × 6 countries), but since not all actors appear in every country,
the number of observations is 147.
Table 6.3 Structure of the Debate Space: Factor Analysis
Dom. lib. Int. lib. Uniqueness
Retrenchment of restrictions 0.046 0.587 0.653
Labor market deregulation 0.531 0.214 0.672
Privatization 0.770 –0.148 0.385
Economic promotion 0.689 0.247 0.464
International market deregulation –0.004 0.455 0.793
Internationalization 0.002 0.608 0.630
Locational promotion 0.150 0.542 0.684
Eigenvalue 1.64 1.08
Proportion in % 19.6 19.1
N 147
Likelihooda 35.23* DF=21
Notes: Principal-component factor analysis on the level of actor categories (or-
thogonal varimax rotated solution) based on issue positions weighted by their
salience. Additionally, article weights are applied for the calculations. Labels:
Dom. lib.=Domestic liberalization, Int. lib.=International liberalization. a inde-
pendent vs. saturated model. Levels of significance: *≤0.05, **≤0.01, ***≤0.001.
Only two factors reach an eigenvalue above 1 and all issue categories
clearly load only onto one of the two factors. This adds further evidence
to support the dimensionality hypothesis. The issue of the public debate
on economic liberalization do not align to one dimension and thus the
left-right paradigm is not accurate to describe it. The findings on the di-
mensions thus show that a simple left-right model of political contention
is not accurate to capture the debate on economic liberalization, as much
of the literature on international political economy assumes (see Milner
and Judkins, 2004; Dutt and Mitra, 2005).
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In the following analyses, debates on economic liberalization will thus
often be studied at the disaggregate level of two dimensions which are
constructed in the following way. On the one hand, the loadings of priva-
tization, labor market deregulation and domestic liberalization load al-
most exclusively on the first factor. On the other hand, international lib-
eralization and deregulation clearly belong to the second factor. Hence,
while the first factor measures the national dimension, the second latent
concept represents the international dimension.
Locational promotion, by contrast, loads higher on the second than
on the first factor to which all the domestic issues belong. This result
nevertheless leads to the conclusion that locational promotion is an inter-
national issue. Thus, actors mentioning this issue focus more explicitly
on enhancing national competitiveness vis-a`-vis other economies rather
than being interested in creating a good environment for economic ac-
tivity, e.g., the establishment and maintenance of infrastructure or sup-
portive regulation for business, which would have been the the inter-
pretation related to the domestic dimension. A similar finding can be
observed with respect to the issue “retrenchment of restrictions”. The
results clearly indicate that this issue has more to do with conflicts on
the internationalization of economies.
For the further analyses, “locational promotion” and “retrenchment
of restrictions” are therefore collapsed with the two issues “international
market deregulation” and “internationalization” to the international di-
mension. The three remaining issues, “privatization”, “labor market
deregulation” and “economic promotion” are combined to the domestic
dimension of the public debate on economic liberalization. More specif-
ically, the issue statements are not simply summed up by these dimen-
sions. We will add the factor loadings as additional probability weights
to the calculations whenever indicators are aggregated by dimension.
6.2 Going Public: Who Inhabits the Economic
Liberalization Debate?
Long-term transformations have brought about a pro-market mainstream
and challengers struggling on economic liberalization in a debate which
is divided into an international and a domestic dimension. In this struc-
ture, actors adopt specific discursive strategies to make their positions
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heard. The first one of these strategies that will be considered here is
going public. Going public is the most basic discursive strategy, since
position taking, valence campaigning, and framing obviously depend on
the actors’ ability to enter a public debate at all.
In the following, going public will be explored at the actor level as well
as in interaction with the country and arena context of the debate on
economic liberalization. Moreover, the variation in actor saliencies also
decisively influences the diversity of the six countries and three arena
types. The more different actors have a voice in the countries and arenas,
the more heterogeneous the picture gets with respect to policy positions,
valence campaigning, and frames.
This section thus serves the purpose to analyze the distribution of ac-
tor saliencies. On the one hand, the accessibility of the debate across the
countries and arenas will be explored. On the other hand, the conflicting
expectations derived from the resource and the mobilization arguments
are examined in the second part. As for accessibility, it is hypothesized
that the coordinated market economies (Austria, Germany, the Nether-
lands, and Switzerland) are inhabited by a broader range of different
actors (see chapter 3).
In terms of the resource argument, actors like national executives and
corporations are seen in the advantage since they dispose of large atten-
tion from the mass media, institutionalized channels to get their mes-
sage to the public, and significant abilities to produce and distribute
their messages. Furthermore, social democratic and liberal parties are
anticipated to loom high in the debate since they profit from their issue
ownership on economic liberalization. Second, according to the mobiliza-
tion argument, disadvantaged actors are considered to choose the public
debate as a strategy to gain otherwise denied influence on policy decision
making processes.
To test these expectations, table 7.3 presents the going public with
respect to the basic actor groups (14 categories) by country and arena.
Again, the numbers are calculated using article and country weights.
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Overall, resourceful actors clearly are most visible. As expected by
this line of argument, the two actors with the highest standing are
the national executives (14.9 percent) and corporations (18.6 percent).
Transnational actors also play an important role, as can be seen in the
solid salience of EU actors (9.0 percent) and foreign executives (7.0 per-
cent). However, the exceptionally high salience of corporations is sur-
prising. Not only are they the most important actor in the debate, they
have about three times as many statements as the business associations,
usually seen as their representatives with regard to political processes
and thus the more intuitive voice of business interests in the debate.
Yet it seems that corporations heavily seek to exert direct influence on
the debates and to circumvent the protracted processes of interest inter-
mediation. Other important actors are parties (14.5), trade unions (8.6
percent), and also experts (7.1 percent). The importance of the latter
points to the validity of repeated calls to rigorously include them into
policy process analyses (Sabatier and Weible, 2007b).
As good as the resource argument matches the overall picture, as par-
tial it is able to explain the comparative actor saliencies. The national
executives are most important in France (19.7 percent), which makes
sense given their dominant position here. Business associations perform
best in Austria and Germany, two historically corporatist economies
where interest associations were expected to have a stronger standing.
And trade unions are quite important in two other corporatist coun-
tries, namely Germany (8.5 percent) and the Netherlands (8.3 percent).
Additionally, parties do exceptionally well in Germany (26.6 percent),
were they traditionally are very crucial pillars of the political system
and get fawned over by the media (Ferree et al., 2002). Furthermore,
the national executives are more important in the liberal-leaning coun-
tries than their counterparts in Austria and Germany (17.1 percent in
the U.K., 16.5 percent in Switzerland, and 17.9 percent in the Nether-
lands). The debate in the U.K. with its majoritarian political system
is correspondingly dominated by the executives (Lijphart, 1999). This
becomes even more evident if the exceptionally high salience of the pub-
lic administrations in the U.K. is considered. With 12.8 percent of all
statements they have more than double the importance than in all other
countries. Similarly, the centralized style of corporatist policy making in
the Netherlands (the ‘Polder model’) and the weak role of parties and
the legislature in Switzerland gives public authorities an edge in these
countries (see Woldendorp and Keman, 2007; Kriesi and Trechsel, 2008).
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In the liberal-leaning countries, going public is thus a more important
tool for public authorities to influence the policy process.
However, many actors show a relatively higher salience where they are
institutionally disadvantaged, which lends support to the mobilization
thesis. The results for the trade unions in France (13.3 percent) and
the U.K. (8.5 percent) can be interpreted in this way. In both coun-
tries, unions traditionally have difficulties to access the crucial sites of
political decision making. Their strong standing in the debate can be in-
terpreted as an attempt to influence the political decisions indirectly by
getting the public involved. Finally, corporations are very strong in Aus-
tria (24.4 percent) and Germany (21.0 percent). In these two countries,
the interests of corporations are usually expected to be integrated into
the political realms via business associations. However, it appears that
corporations use their resources much more heavily in these countries
to get their voice heard in the public debate, thus bypassing interest
intermediation in the back rooms of policy making more strongly than
in other countries.
The country context does not only shape the opportunities of specific
actors to access the public debate, also general properties in terms of
the overall actor distribution varies across the national debates. The ac-
cessibility of the Swiss political system is visible in the highest share of
otherwise almost ignored actors. Legislative bodies, experts, public wel-
fare organizations, and IGO actors all perform best in Switzerland. This
points to the openness of public debates in this country. Political out-
siders are enhanced by the direct democratic institutions and the many
informal channels of policy making (Ho¨glinger, 2008).
The U.K. and France (as expected), but also Austria, instead, have
a relatively closed structure of the debate. Public welfare organizations
fare especially badly in France and the U.K., while legislatives are largely
overlooked in the debates in France and Austria. Moreover, judiciary
actors have an exceptionally low standing in the U.K. Yet, the compar-
atively higher openness of the public debate in Germany, the Nether-
lands, and Switzerland confirm the accessibility hypothesis with regard
to countries.
With respect to the actors’ going public in the arenas, it is not clear
that input arenas are better accessible than the janus-faced and output
104 Mapping the Terrain of the Debate on Economic Liberalization
arenas. The public authorities have – with the exception of the legisla-
tives – the highest salience in the janus-faced arenas. IGO and EU actors,
foreign and national executives, administrations, and judiciary actors
use their established channels to communicate here. However, only the
national executives are main players also in both input (13.4 percent)
and the output (8.4 percent) arenas. Thus, they crucially engage in ev-
ery stage of public contention of the policy processes. The other actor
categories with a similar overall importance are parties, which mainly
engage in the input arenas (39.0 percent), and corporations, which have
about 40 percent of all statements made in the output arenas. And only
these three actors are also able to markedly influence the course of the
debate in every arena.
Legislative bodies and public welfare actors are by far most visible
in the input arenas (9.9 and 2.4 percent, respectively), while business
associations are important in the output arena. This could very much
have been expected, since the former are specialized to bring up new
policy demands and the latter focus more on the negotiations during
the implementation phase of policies (Kriesi, 2007). Experts, instead,
have distributed their statements evenly across the arenas. And trade
unions as well as professional organizations have most of the statements
in both the in- and output arenas. This is in line with the theoretical
expectations, too, since they do usually not take part in the policy de-
cisions within the realms of public authorities.
Further important variations with respect to the going public of ac-
tors can only be found by disaggregating the rough actor categories.
Most notably, the expectations regarding the issue ownership of parties
can only be tested with the fine-grained classifications that distinguish
between party families. Accordingly, figure 7.1 shows the success of the
going public strategies for the fine-grained categorization that consists
of 30 actors. The bars indicate the mean predicted numbers of state-
ments made by the actors for both dimensions of the public debate on
economic liberalization. These mean predicted numbers are the results
of count regressions as reported in tables C.1 and C.2 in the appendix.
In contrast to simple frequency tables, a count regression allows to es-
timate the going public of going public of actors in a multivariate model
that includes controls for country and arena effects. Furthermore, the
frequency of statements by actors on the two dimensions of conflict is
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a heavily skewed and overdispersed dependent variable (see figure C.1
and table C.1). Thus, the count models were estimated by negative bi-
nominal regressions (see Long and Freese, 2006). Before the estimation,
the data were first aggregated to the 30 actor categories, 6 countries,
and 3 arenas using article and issue weights – calculated from the factor
loadings to account for the different contribution of the issues to the
dimensions.
On this disaggregated level, it becomes clear that the national exec-
utives are the dominant actor of the debate on both dimensions of eco-
nomic liberalization. With an average number of about 23 statements
on domestic aspects, national executives have clearly a stronger going
public than private sector unions and niche firms who come second and
third, respectively. National executives thus seem to be at the forefront
of neoliberal dominance, since among the seven actors who reach more
than ten statements on one of the dimensions, only the private sector
unions are assumed to be challengers. Although only the next chapter
provide a precise picture on the policy positions of the actors, it seems
neoliberal dominance more forcefully plays out on the international di-
mension. EU actors, foreign executives from advanced economies, na-
tional executives, and global players loom high in the debate related to
this dimension and are also expected to pursue a liberal policy position-
ing strategy. Moreover, the results confirm the resource argument: media
clearly favor actors which have advantages in terms of institutionalized
channels or economic resources, because these advantages give them a
higher status and news value.
The private sector unions are the only hypothesized challenger with an
important stance in the debate with an average of about 11 statements
on international and 14 on domestic liberalization. Notably, they are
the second most important actors with regard to domestic conflicts. All
other challengers, including the right-wing populist parties, are rather
insignificant players in the debate. However, we will see later during
the analysis of policy position taking that there is a considerable protec-
tionist wing that challenges the neoliberal dominance, but the right-wing
populists are not its main advocates.
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Reflecting the overall higher importance of international liberaliza-
tion, most actors speak out more often on this dimension. Yet, many
actors from the political left go more frequently public on the domestic
dimension, namely private and public sector unions, communist and left
socialists, as well as the greens. These left challengers thus engage in
the debate in the context of the policies that mainly remained attached
to the national realm of policy making, while international and Euro-
pean aspects are mainly left to the challengers of the political right and
the liberal mainstream. For obvious reasons, public welfare organiza-
tions and global justice movements are an exception within the camp of
the left challengers. They are mainly focused on international aspects,
which confirms globalization-related issues as their core business. Yet
also public advisory actors refer more strongly to domestic issues. This
seems intuitive for the public advisory actors, since they are especially
tied to the domestic realm with respect to their supportive role for na-
tional executives and public administrations.
The two party families which traditionally alternate in government
or in a leading role in governmental coalitions in Western Europe, the
social democrats as well as the Christian democrats and conservatives,
also dominate the other parties regarding the going public in the debate
on economic liberalization. Further, the stronger stance of the social
democrats in comparison to the Christian democrats and conservatives
points to the validity of the issue ownership thesis for these parties. They
show a stronger going public in the debate on both dimensions, whereas
they won on average only 34.9 percent in the electoral contests which
took place closest to the time period of this debate analysis.1 This is
considerably less than the Christian democrats and conservatives which
gained about 37.2 percent of votes. Also the communists and left social-
ists have much more weight in the debate than in the elections, while the
importance of liberals and right wing populists does not substantively
vary. The radical left is clearly the smallest party family in electoral
contests (3.2 percent), but are responsible for more statements than the
greens in the debate. Since they also mainly mobilize on economic issues
in electoral contests, issue ownership seems to play a substantive role
for the strength of parties in the debate (Kriesi et al., 2008). In sum,
1 The following national parliamentary elections were considered for this
calculation: France=2002, Austria=2002, Germany=2005, the
Netherlands=2003, Switzerland=2003, the U.K.=2005.
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economic liberalization seems to foster the going public of parties from
the political left.
With regard to business interests, big business clearly prevails. Peak
employer associations outperform small business associations and profes-
sional organizations (farmer and white collar organizations). Addition-
ally, with respect to corporations, global players are the most important
actor. But it has to be noted that the categories for corporations do
not include genuinely small companies, since the niche firms mostly are
multinational companies as well. The difference to global players is that
niche firms are not among the biggest 2000 companies worldwide (see
table A.3 and B.1 in the appendix). Thus, small businesses do not have
a direct voice in the mass media at all. Combined with the also low
standing of their interest groups, this is a clear result in favor of the
resourceful and well organized actors in the business realm. Small busi-
nesses, often praised as the pillar of Western European economies, have
almost no voice at all.
6.3 Conclusion
In the beginning, this chapter has shown that one simple left-right di-
mension is not enough to characterize the conflict structure of the public
debate on economic liberalization. As expected, two dimensions were
found which can be ascribed to international and domestic aspects.
These dimensions will be an important aspect of many subsequent anal-
yses, but a first consequence was already evident. The actors responsible
for the neoliberal dominance in the debate firmly hold their ground on
the international aspects of the debate. The issues of the relatively less
important domestic realm of economic liberalization, in contrast, pro-
vide an opportunity for the political left to have a voice.
The remainder of this chapter centered on the analysis of the going
public strategy and its manyfold implications for the actor level. First,
the hypothesis on the distinctiveness of the national debates was as-
sessed. It was confirmed that France and Switzerland deviate from the
other countries with a public debate that is more constrained to national
participants. However, the national differences in terms of the going pub-
lic of actors differentiated by their level of origin were not statistically
significant. The assumption regarding the accessibility of the debates
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was also largely confirmed for the countries. The debate in three of the
four coordinated market economies, namely Germany, the Netherlands,
and Switzerland, is also accessible for comparatively peripheral actors.
As far as the the arenas are concerned, however, the expected differences
did not materialize.
With respect to the actor hypotheses, the resource argument is con-
firmed for the aggregate going public over all countries. Public author-
ities, corporate interests and the established parties clearly have the
biggest weight in the debate. However, when the country context is ad-
ditionally considered, many actors show a comparatively higher salience
where they are institutionally disadvantaged. This also lends some sup-
port to the mobilization thesis. The most notable finding, however, per-
haps is the strong stance of big business actors and their representatives.
This dominance is most problematic for the standing of the small busi-
nesses and not for the trade unions, which also have a considerably strong
voice. Because small businesses play a crucial role for the economic per-
formance in Western Europe, they could also have been expected to
enter more forcefully into the public debates on economic liberalization.
In the following chapters, the expectations regarding the relationship
of country and arena contexts with debates as well as the actor char-
acteristics will be empirically tested for the three remaining discursive
strategies.
7Policy Conflicts in the Economic
Liberalization Debate
Policy position taking is a key element of the actors’ discursive strategic
repertoire after having gained access to the public debate. In the last
chapter, we have seen that the structuring of the debate into an inter-
national and domestic dimension has led to a specific ‘division of labor’:
actors responsible for the dominance of neoliberal positions densely pop-
ulate the international dimension, while many actors from the political
left prefer the domestic aspects of the debate on economic liberalization.
This chapter aims to provide more insights on the policy positions
and conflict intensity of the overall debate and the two dimensions at
the levels of countries, arenas, actors, and debate coalitions. With regard
to countries, the discussion so far repeatedly made suggestions about the
overall climate of countries. Most of all, some countries were perceived as
more liberal-leaning than others. In the first part of this chapter, these
and other expectations concerning the country context of public debates
will be empirically assessed. The results will show that we indeed have
two liberal-leaning countries in terms of the overall political climate,
Switzerland and the U.K. The other countries, especially France, are
more skeptic of economic liberalization. In a similar vein, hypotheses
about the overall climate in the arenas will be tested, i.e., whether there
indeed are systematic variations between the arenas in terms of their
aggregated policy position and their polarization. We will find that ne-
oliberal dominance is most heavily challenged in the input arenas.
The second part of the analyses is dedicated to the actors’ policy
positions and the debate coalition formation as a function of the actors’
going public and policy positions. One set of expectations established in
chapter 4 suggested four debate coalitions with distinct policy positions:
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the traditional left and neomercantilist challengers and the third way
and neoliberal coalitions as camps that reinforce neoliberal dominance.
While this coalitional setting is confirmed, we will see that many third
way actors are actually embracing neomercantilist positions.
7.1 The Countries’ Overall Debate Climate
The debate in the six countries is assumed to be characterized by a dif-
ferent overall climate in terms of the willingness to support the various
aspects of economic liberalization. With respect to the aggregated pol-
icy positions, the expectation refers to the capitalist regime types which
are expected to influence the debate in four distinct directions. First,
France – a state-led market economy (SME) – is expected to be least
in favor of economic liberalization. On the other extreme, the U.K. is
perceived to come closest to a liberal market economy (LME) and most
clearly leans to support of economic liberalization. The four coordinated
market economies (CME) are anticipated to split into the rather liberal-
leaning countries, the Netherlands and Switzerland, as well as Austria
and Germany, which should have a more skeptical debate.
Figure 8.1 shows the positions of countries with regard to economic
liberalization and its two dimensions. The symbols indicate the position,
while the corresponding lines show the 95 percent confidence interval of
these positions. Most importantly, these confidence intervals allow to dis-
cern whether positions are substantially different from each other and
whether they are ambivalent, i.e., if they do not significantly deviate
from zero. Positive scores indicate positions supporting economic liber-
alization, whereas values below zero mean opposition.
The three positions over all countries (overall and on the two dimen-
sions) are very consistent, and they only range from +0.14 to +0.19.
Moreover, the confidence intervals are quite narrow, which means that
the values for the two dimensions do not significantly vary from each
other. Hence, the overall position towards economic liberalization is pre-
dominantly positive, regardless of which realm of the economy is con-
cerned. This might be taken as evidence for the influence of neoliberal
dominance on the public disputes regarding economic liberalization in
Western Europe.
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Moreover, the general distribution of supportive and oppositional state-
ments (results not shown here) lends support to the pro-market main-
stream thesis. Support of economic liberalization sum up to around 60
percent of all statements on both dimensions. Nevertheless, since there is
also considerable opposition on every dimension neither an overwhelm-
ing neoliberal dominance nor a balanced debate characterizes this aggre-
gated picture of the debate. In all countries there is such a substantial
amount of oppositional statements that arguments regarding a hege-
monic pro-liberalization discourse in Western Europe seem overstretched
(van Apeldoorn, 2002).
Figure 7.1 Average Policy Positions on International and Domes-
tic Liberalization by Country
Notes: Average positions and their 95 % confidence intervals. Article weights
applied for all, country weights applied for overall, and issue weights applied for
dimensional calculations.
With respect to the positions by country, there is more variation, which
points to the fact that national institutional settings do indeed matter
for policy positions. Most notably, France stands out as the only country
opposing economic liberalization in general. This negative overall stance
is primarily caused by the opposition towards domestic liberalization
which is not very strong but nevertheless significant (–0.11 in the max-
imum range from 1 to –1).
On the international dimension, France has an ambivalent stance,
since the confidence interval overlaps with zero. However, in line with
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the theoretical expectations, it is still the most negative of all countries.
Only the position of Austria is also ambivalent towards international
liberalization. Similar to France, Austria is a countries where the state
intervenes relatively strongly into the economic affairs. Its public sector
long was the largest of Western European countries. In addition, this
rather skeptical stance corresponds to the fact that the electoral cam-
paign in Austria also became increasingly anti-liberalization over time.
Two countries perceived as rather liberal (the U.K. and Switzerland)
are indeed at the forefront of support of economic liberalization. Switzer-
land shows the most pronounced support with a position of +0.28, but
the U.K. does not significantly differ with +0.25. Moreover, Germany
with +0.22 does not sharply deviate from Switzerland as the confidence
interval shows, but Austria (+0.19) and the Netherlands (+0.17) do so.
According to its political-economic regime type, the latter was expected
to be quite liberal as well. Yet also in terms of the electoral arena, the
Netherlands stood out as being the most skeptical of these three coun-
tries.
However, what all supposedly liberal-leaning countries, i.e., the Nether-
lands, Switzerland, and the U.K., share is the pattern of positions on
domestic and international liberalization. These three countries are the
most liberal ones on the international aspects but are much more reluc-
tant to embrace domestic liberalization. Austria and – to a lower degree
– Germany show exactly the opposite pattern. They are more protective
against the global economy but comparatively liberal when it comes to
domestic issues. The positions in France, finally, do not differ much be-
tween the dimensions.
Not only the aggregate positions, but also the conflict intensity is re-
lated to the political-economic context in the six countries. Table 7.1
shows the polarization index by country and overall. In simple terms,
this index summarizes how strongly actors vary with respect to their
positions on the different issues.To this aim, the quadratic sum of the
deviations of positions from the average position over all actors is calcu-
lated, using weights to account for the actors’ relative frequencies (see
table B.2 in the appendix). Higher values indicate higher polarization.
First, France and Germany, the two countries countries with the most
pressing economic difficulties have the highest conflict intensity in their
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Table 7.1 Polarization by Country and Dimensions
Overall FR A DE NL CH UK
Domestic liberalization 0.19 0.38 0.15 0.32 0.16 0.28 0.13
International liberalization 0.07 0.13 0.16 0.21 0.13 0.14 0.06
Economic liberalization 0.12 0.24 0.16 0.27 0.16 0.20 0.08
Notes: Labels: A=Austria, FR=France, CH=Switzerland, NL=Netherlands, UK=United
Kingdom, DE=Germany. Article weights applied for all, country weights applied for
overall, and issue weights applied for dimensional calculations. See table B.2 in the
appendix for the definition and calculation of the polarization index.
public debates on economic liberalization. Both have the highest level
of economic misery (see section 3.1). Second, comparing the dimensions,
domestic liberalization is far more conflictive. Only in Austria both di-
mensions show about the same level of polarization. Thus, not the is-
sues of internationalization like the WTO Doha Round negotiations are
fiercely disputed, but the nationally regulated policies like labor market
reforms are at the center of struggles. Even though it is clear that this
conclusion can only tentatively be made, globalization seems to have a
the smaller impact on public conflicts on economic liberalization than
domestic long-term transformations. Furthermore, two of the three coun-
tries with a very rapid increase in economic flows during the last decades
– as observed in the analysis of the countries’ economic development in
section 3.1 – have the highest polarization of international liberalization
(France and, although only marginal, Austria).
As expected, the U.K. is the country with the least conflictive debate
on economic liberalization and France has the most polarized debate.
Yet, the latter result could also be explained by time-specific reasons.
The debate in France was dominated by a major labor market reform
which ignited fierce disputes. Furthermore, as already mentioned, France
is the only country where international liberalization clearly is more
heavily disputed. The Netherlands and Austria are quite consensual
countries when it comes to the debate, but total polarization still doubles
in comparison to the U.K. Germany and Switzerland, finally, are similar
in terms of their very high polarization on domestic liberalization. Most
notably in Germany, the debate on domestically oriented policies seems
to be far away from the often noted consensual character of its system
of economic interest intermediation (e.g., Emmenegger and Marx, 2011).
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In sum, the results are mainly confirm the expectations. Yet, as we
will see, some more differences with respect to the countries can be
carved out by including the institutional context of arenas and the actor
characteristics into the analyses of actor positions.
7.2 Positions and Polarization by Arenas
Besides countries, arenas are part of the institutional context of pub-
lic debates. Arenas are the sites where the policy process on specific
aspects of economic liberalization passes through. The specific institu-
tional constellations of arenas influence the course of public debates as
the policy positions on economic liberalization presented in figure 8.2
and polarization indices as indicated in table 8.2 show. In chapter 3 it
was hypothesized that the input arenas are both the most skeptic and
conflictual of the three arenas.
In general, the range of positions has increased compared to the over-
all positions by country. Most notably, there are more clearly negative
positions, although some confidence intervals are considerably larger.
Nevertheless, this points to the fact that arenas add explanatory power
to the country contexts, a so far too rarely considered aspect in analyses
of public debates (Helbling et al., 2012).
As far as the overall positions are concerned, they are again very con-
sistent, i.e., they are located within a small range and have narrow con-
fidence intervals. The difference between these overall positions and the
ones over all countries in figure 8.1 is caused by the lower number of
statements used. Since it was not possible to attach all statements to
an arena, a smaller number of observations could be used for the posi-
tions in Figure 8.2 than in Figure 8.1. Nevertheless, they are intriguing:
while the aggregate climate in Western Europe is favorable to economic
liberalization, this analysis reveals that it does not apply to the input
arenas. The position in the arenas where the different interests feed into
the political system, i.e., the realms of electoral competition, parliamen-
tary debates, political protests, and direct democratic votes, shows that
economic liberalization is not an unchallenged issue.
In contrast to the countries, where the picture was more complex than
anticipated, the main expectations are largely confirmed with regard to
the arenas. With the exception of the Netherlands, the positions in input
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Figure 7.2 Average Policy Positions in Arenas by Country
Notes: Average positions and their 95 % confidence intervals. Article weights
applied for all and country weights applied for overall calculations.
arenas are the most disputed ones with regard to economic liberaliza-
tion. And even in the Netherlands, the position of the input arena is
ambivalent (+0.01) and is not substantially more positive than the out-
put arenas (–0.03). Further, in all countries except the U.K., the position
is at least ambivalent in the input arenas. If economic liberalization is
challenged, it seems to happen mostly in arenas where the articulation
of interests whishing to be included into the political system takes place.
The discrepancy between the opposition-dominated input arena and
the other arenas is especially large in Germany, whose janus-faced and
output arenas are overall the most liberal ones. Moreover, as will be
shown below, the strong articulation of opposition in the input arenas
(positions of –0.31 and –0.25, respectively) is responsible for the high
conflict intensity of the debates in France and Germany. In both coun-
tries but also in Austria, the public debate in the input arena is so
detached from the janus-faced arenas that the demands mobilized by
intermediary actors in the input arenas are largely ignored during the
actual decision making processes. In addition, this pattern shows that
Austria, France and Germany are not overall skeptic towards economic
liberalization, as hypothesized, but only with regard to their input are-
nas.
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Switzerland and the U.K., finally, share the pattern that the aggregate
positions essentially do not differ between the three arenas. Here, every
arena seems to the terrain of neoliberal dominance, although a high vari-
ation in the Swiss input arena is stretching the confidence interval below
zero. As the country analyses already have shown, only these two coun-
tries but not the Netherlands can therefore be labelled as liberal-leaning
political-economic systems in terms of the debate. Moreover, with re-
spect to the confidence intervals, no arena significantly deviates from
the others in the Netherlands, the U.K. and Switzerland, i.e., the three
countries perceived as liberal-leaning. This means that there is no sharp
distance between the different stages of policy making in these countries.
The results for the polarization indices by arenas as shown in Table
7.2 nicely match the findings with respect to the policy positions. The
struggles in the input arenas are most pronounced for both dimensions,
followed by the output arenas. As for the latter, the one on domes-
tic liberalization is especially high polarized. These findings completely
confirm the expectations. And like for the country-specific analyses, the
domestic dimension is clearly more contested, which points to the fact
that the public debate has turned to very conflictual issues like labor
market flexibility with respect to this dimension.
Table 7.2 Polarization by Arena
Dimension Overall Input Janus-faced Output
Economic lib. 0.12 0.24 0.11 0.16
Domestic lib. 0.19 0.31 0.14 0.25
International lib. 0.07 0.16 0.10 0.11
Notes: Article weights applied for all, country weights applied for overall, and
issue weights applied for dimensional calculations. See table B.2 in the appendix
for the definition and calculation of the polarization index.
7.3 Explaining the Actors’ Policy Position Taking
Having explored the impact of the institutional context on the policy po-
sitions and polarization in the public debate on economic liberalization,
the focus in this section turns to the question how the actors’ character-
istics shape their policy position taking. The expectations on how the
actors shape the course of the debate are related to two basic arguments.
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First, the mainstream and challenger hypotheses suggest that the ma-
jority of actors is endorsing pro-liberalization positions, facing opposi-
tion by a few left and right-wing protectionist challengers only, namely
trade unions, social movements, small business actors, and right-wing
populists. Second, a basic conflict constellation of four debate coalitions
located in the two-dimensional debate space is expected. These include
the traditional left, third way, neoliberals and neomercantilists.
Figure 8.3 approaches these hypotheses by presenting the actors’ po-
sitions at the most aggregated level. The dots show the overall policy
positions over all countries for a first general classification of fourteen
actor categories, along with the confidence intervals of these positions.
Eight out of fourteen actors are significantly embracing liberaliza-
tion reforms. IGO and EU actors (+0.53 and +0.38, respectively), na-
tional executives (+0.32), business associations (+0.42), and corpora-
tions (+0.32) decisively so, while experts (+0.22), foreign executives
(+0.19), and legislatives (+0.18) are a bit unassertive but nevertheless
clearly in favor of economic liberalization.
As anticipated, there is thus a clear pro-liberalization majority which
further confirms the pro-market mainstream expectation. For most of
these actors, however, this unanimous position only holds for this highly
aggregated categories. If the actor classification is broken down into more
fine-grained actor categories and countries, the picture looks quite dif-
ferently since some categories are substantially heterogenous (see table
8.3).
There are three actors with ambivalent positions. First, the ambiguity
of political parties (+0.07)1 highlights that the aggregation may cover
a lot of important variation, since there surely is a broad range of po-
sitions among the parties from the various political camps which cancel
each other out. Second, the ambivalence of judiciary actors can also be
interpreted in a straightforward way. Courts mainly have to deal with
economic liberalization when legal conflicts arise, e.g., in the context of
cartel law violations or labor regulation disputes. As arbiters, judiciary
actors need to be ideologically neutral but intervene dependent on the
1 The confidence interval for the parties actually indicates a significant deviation
from zero, i.e., an overall favorable position. Yet the position is so slightly
positive that it is still interpreted as ambiguous.
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Figure 7.3 Policy Positions of Actors on Economic Liberalization
Notes: The points indicate the position, the corresponding lines the 95 %
confidence interval of these positions. Article weights applied.
interpretation of existing law. Public administrations, finally, are also
ambivalent, which may reflect their function as the authorities which
have to balance the different interests of employers and workers during
the implementation of liberalization reforms.
Overall, the majority of actors favoring economic liberalization is chal-
lenged by only three actors on this level of analysis. Two of them, the
trade unions and public welfare groups, can be attached to the political
left and are fiercely fighting economic liberalization (–0.56 and –0.60,
respectively). Yet, there is also evidence for the right challenger hypoth-
esis. The clear opposition from the professional organizations, which are
dominated by the farmer organizations nut also include the white collar
associations, provides a first hint to the existence of a conservative, pro-
tectionist camp in the debate.
As already outlined, the overall positions of actors on a highly aggre-
gated level might well cover much crucial variation among the actors.
More specifically, it is still unclear how the positions of the various actors
differ on the two dimensions and whether the variation across countries
and arenas as found above is still relevant when actor differences are
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taken into account. Table 7.3 reports the results of OLS regressions pre-
dicting the actors’ average positions on the international and domestic
dimension to answer these questions. The fine-grained actor classifica-
tion distinguishing 30 categories, the six countries, and the arenas are
included as independent variables.
One of the main arguments is that actors do not engage in public
debates in an isolated way. In general, they are assumed to be aware
of the shape of the debate in a specific policy subsystem, be it because
they are regularly in interaction with other actors or because they follow
the news coverage of the issues debated in the policy subsystem. This,
in turn, makes it possible for scientific research to identify debate coali-
tions, i.e., actor camps with shared policy positions, in order to better
understand the constellational settings shaping the debate on economic
liberalization.
The dependent variable is defined as the average positions on the two
dimensions by actor types (N=30), countries (N=6) and arenas (N=3).
This amounts to 30 × 6 × 3 =540 potential observations. However, since
not all combinations exist, the real number of observations is obviously
lower. The coefficients for the actors shows by how much their position
differs from the position of the IGO actors. Since IGO actors are the
most liberal actors in the debate (see Figure 7.3), significant coefficients
signal a deviation from the pro-market mainstream. In a similar vein,
the overall most supportive category was chosen with respect to the
countries (Switzerland) and arenas (janus-faced). Significant parameters
thus point to less liberal positions here, too.
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Table 7.3 Determinants of Policy Positions on Domestic and International
Liberalization
International liberalization Domestic liberalization
Std. Std.
Coef. Err. P>t Coef. Err. P>t
Actors (ref=IGO actors)
EU actors -0.233 0.254 n.s. 0.287 0.403 n.s.
For. exec. adv. economies -0.770 0.253 ** -0.279 0.417 n.s.
For. exec. emerging markets -0.343 0.292 n.s. -0.144 0.441 n.s.
National executives -0.449 0.251 n.s. -0.104 0.392 n.s.
Economic administrations -0.854 0.277 ** 0.133 0.432 n.s.
General administrations -1.156 0.285 *** -0.180 0.425 n.s.
Judiciary -0.737 0.329 * -0.306 0.471 n.s.
Legislatives -0.823 0.279 ** 0.070 0.435 n.s.
Chambers of commerce -0.602 0.314 n.s. -0.107 0.543 n.s.
Peak employer assoc. -0.480 0.256 n.s. 0.003 0.402 n.s.
Small business assoc. -0.816 0.273 ** -0.018 0.420 n.s.
Private sector unions -1.138 0.254 *** -1.088 0.392 **
Public sector unions -1.463 0.303 *** -1.158 0.404 **
Farmer organization -0.718 0.314 * -0.634 0.545 n.s.
White collar organizations -1.005 0.302 *** -1.272 0.429 **
Communists/Left socialists -1.404 0.315 *** -1.046 0.448 *
Greens -1.365 0.350 *** -0.509 0.426 n.s.
Social democrats -1.074 0.254 *** -0.364 0.396 n.s.
Liberals -0.482 0.273 n.s. 0.002 0.420 n.s.
Christ. dem./conservatives -0.147 0.260 n.s. -0.306 0.402 n.s.
Right-wing populists -1.491 0.303 *** -0.465 0.457 n.s.
Global players -0.440 0.253 n.s. -0.052 0.405 n.s.
Niche firms -0.913 0.251 *** -0.369 0.394 n.s.
Public enterprises -0.948 0.286 *** -0.392 0.397 n.s.
Econ. think tanks -0.923 0.301 ** -1.145 0.545 *
Publ. advisory actors -0.481 0.256 n.s. -0.136 0.403 n.s.
Publ. welfare org. -1.290 0.302 *** -0.960 0.443 *
Publ. welfare mov. -1.515 0.304 *** -1.445 0.611 *
Countries (ref=Switzerland)
Austria -0.251 0.118 * -0.048 0.139 n.s.
France -0.483 0.116 *** -0.127 0.140 n.s.
Germany -0.304 0.123 * 0.047 0.140 n.s.
Netherlands -0.274 0.123 * -0.157 0.162 n.s.
U.K. -0.064 0.121 n.s. -0.208 0.148 n.s.
Arenas (ref=Janus-faced)
Input 0.036 0.089 n.s. 0.098 0.104 n.s.
Output 0.080 0.086 n.s. -0.040 0.105 n.s.
Constant 1.013 0.220 *** 0.419 0.365 n.s.
N 333 286
Adjusted R2 0.26 0.21
F statistics
Overall model 4.32 *** 3.15 ***
Actors 4.52 *** 3.85 ***
Countries 4.35 *** 0.87 n.s.
Arenas 0.44 n.s. 0.84 n.s.
Notes: Unstandardized coefficients, standard errors and levels of significance from OLS regres-
sion on the level of actors. Levels of significance: *≤0.05, **≤0.01, ***≤0.001.
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First of all, table 8.3 allows for a test of whether institutional contexts,
actor characteristics or both have an impact on the policy position tak-
ing. As the significant F statistics for the actor and country variables
show, both are important to explain the policy position taking on eco-
nomic liberalization in the model. The arena variables, however, are not
significantly explaining parts of the variation in positions on both inter-
national and domestic liberalization if we control for country and actor
effects. Nevertheless, a combination of actor-specific characteristics and
the institutional context seems suitable to predict the outcome of public
debates in terms of policy position taking. This reflects the initial con-
ceptualization as suggested by the heuristic model outlined in chapter 1,
which assumes a joint impact of institutional varieties and actor strate-
gies.
With respect to the actor variables, there are basically three distinct
groups which can be matched with the expected debate coalitions: the
pro-market mainstream, the neomercantilists, and the traditional left.
First, some actors do not significantly differ from the IGO actors in
terms of their positioning on both dimensions. Thus, the following ac-
tors can be perceived as affiliated to the mainstream: EU actors, foreign
executives from emerging markets of which the governments of China
and India are typical examples, national executives, chambers of com-
merce, peak employer associations, liberals, Christian democratic and
conservative parties, global players, i.e., companies from the top 2000
corporations worldwide, and public advisory actors. All these actors were
expected to be members of the pro-market mainstream and, accordingly,
the third-way or neoliberal coalition.
A second camp of actors is substantially opposing liberalization on
both dimensions. Private and public sector unions, communists and left
socialists, as well as public welfare organizations and movements do as
expected adhere to the traditional left coalition that fiercely fights both
aspects of economic liberalization. Rather puzzling, however, is the same
finding for the white collar organizations which were hypothesized to be-
long to the third way coalition and the economic think tanks, suggested
adherents of the neoliberal coalition. Yet, as a matter of fact, white collar
organizations are, on the one hand, dominated by the French umbrella
organization for white collar workers and engineers (UNSA), which is
traditionally skeptical of liberalization reforms. On the other hand, the
Marburger Bund, Europe’s biggest medical association, which went sev-
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eral times on strike against the new collective wage agreement for the
public services in Germany in the second half of 2006 plays an impor-
tant role in this category as well. These two actors alone made up for
more than one third of all statements, which substantively pulls the po-
sition towards refusal of economic liberalization. And with respect to
economic think tanks, organizations which among others provide exper-
tise to trade unions like the Dutch Centraal Planbureau are among the
most prominent.
The neomercantilist group of actors which are supportive of domes-
tic liberalization but opt for protectionism is larger than expected. Not
only, as hypothesized, the right wing populists, farmer organizations,
and small business organizations, but also foreign executives from ad-
vanced economies, both categories of public administrations, judiciary
actors which earlier were found to be ambivalent regarding overall eco-
nomic liberalization, legislatives, niche and public enterprises, experts,
and the mainstream left parties (greens and social democrats) belong to
this coalition.
First, this means that there is exceptionally strong opposition to the
neoliberal dominance on the international liberalization dimension. Sec-
ond, it points to the fact that many actors who were suggested to form
the third way did actually only move on the domestic dimension towards
more liberal positions and did not fully approach the mainstream. And
third, a quite large group of actors, namely the foreign executives from
advanced economies, public administrations, experts, niche firms, judi-
ciary actors, and legislatives do not actually reinforce the mainstream,
as was expected by the hypotheses. Their policy positions are protec-
tionist. Thus, in terms of actor categories, the neomercantilist coalition
has the majority in the debate. This, in turn, means that the pro-market
mainstream is so strong that the position in the five of six countries is
liberal-leaning only because the most successful actors in terms of going
public – the national executives, global players, and EU actors – adhere
to it (see chapter 6).
With respect to countries, all except the U.K. are less liberal than
Switzerland on the international dimension. On the domestic dimension,
by contrast, there is no substantial deviation among the countries. This
means that, ceteris paribus, the most important result with respect to
the countries is the comparatively weaker embracement of internation-
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alization in France, Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands, while the
six countries do not significantly differ in their overall climate towards
domestic aspects. As for the arenas, there are no differences between
the output arenas and the other two sites of political structuring with
regard to both aspects of liberalization when controlling for actors and
countries. The institutional context of arenas thus matters much less
than countries.
7.4 The Coalitional Settings in the Six Countries
We have seen that there is a divide into a liberal mainstream, a tradi-
tional left coalition, and neomercantilists with respect to the policy po-
sition taking in the public debate on economic liberalization over all six
countries. While the main hypothesis concerning neoliberal dominance
is thus largely met on this aggregate level of analysis, the evidence will
have to be modified when the debate coalitions are examined for the
single countries. This corresponds to one of the main purposes of this
study, namely to examine how the general trend towards liberalization
in Western Europe is reintegrated into the national spheres of publicly
debating economic liberalization.
The following analyses as presented by Figure 8.4 start with the ex-
amination of the actors’ policy position taking by country. The centers
of the grey circles indicate the respective actors’ position on the two
dimensions weighted by issue importance and the distribution of state-
ments across articles, while the size of the circles show the salience of
actors, i.e., the relative frequency of statements made by the respective
actors, which sum up to 100 percent for each country. Finally, the dashed
circles present the debate coalitions as found by a cluster analysis of the
salience weighted positions.
The number of clusters was previously determined using an improved
kmeans cluster analysis. The approach tackles two unfortunate proper-
ties of the ordinary kmeans clustering algorithm. First, the definition of a
starting configuration is needed, which then is subject to a confirmatory
analysis. If no starting configuration is given, kmeans randomly defines
cluster centers. This, however, returns unstable and often suboptimal
results, both statistically and substantively. Since the actors used in this
analysis are too heterogeneous to suggest a starting configuration, this
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is a major difficulty. To fix this problem, we apply an algorithm called
kmeans++ as proposed by Arthur and Vassilvitskii (2007). Kmeans++
calculates optimal cluster centers by minimizing the average squared
distances for all data points to the cluster centers before the actual clus-
tering is started. This leads to stable clustering solutions.
The second hurdle of ordinary kmeans clustering is the fact that it re-
quires the a priori definition of the number of clusters. Usually researcher
speculate about the numbers of clusters. Yet in this case, this number
is less clear. For example, it not evident whether we will find a third
way coalition in every country or whether the pro-liberalization forces
form one coalition. To determine the most adequate number of clusters
more solidly, we compare different cluster solutions by their ranking on
the Dunn index, a measure suggested by Dunn (1974).2 The DUnn in-
dex indicates the ratio between the smallest distance between actors of
different clusters and the biggest distance between actors of the same
cluster (see definition in table B.1. and the documentation in tables C.3
and C.4 in the appendix). These calculations yielded four clusters in the
case of France, Germany, and the Netherlands, three for the U.K. and
Austria as well as two in the case of Switzerland.
There are significant idiosyncrasies in the patterns of the debates
across the single countries. First of all, in all countries except France,
the upper right corner of the debate space – the area of support for both
aspects of liberalization – is most densely populated. In the U.K., the
lower half of the debate space even is almost deserted. There is no sig-
nificant opposition to international liberalization here and actors thus
mainly differ with respect to their positions on the domestic dimension.
2 In R, the Dunn index calculation calculation is implemented in the package
clvalid.
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Figure 7.4 How Debate Coalitions Form from the Actors’ Going Public
and Policy Position Taking by Country
Notes: Article and issue weights applied; Actors with less than 5 statements not
included; Labels: adm.=General administrations, adm.eco.=Economic administrations,
chris.con.=Christian democrats and conservatives, eco.think=Economic think-tanks, EU=
EU actors, for.adv.=Foreign executives advanced economies, for.em.=Foreign execu-
tives emerging markets, glob.play.=global players, IGO=IGO actors, judic.=Judiciary
actors, nat.ex.=National executives, niche=Niche firms, peak=Peak employer associa-
tions, pop.right=Populist right parties, pub.adv=Public advisory actors, pub.ent.=Public
enterprises, pub.union=Public sectors unions, priv.union=Private sector unions,
sm.bus.=Small business associations, soc.dem.=Social democrats, welf.mov=Public wel-
fare movements, welf.org=Public welfare organizations, white-col.=White collar organi-
zations.
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We proceed with the presentation of each actor’s importance and pol-
icy stance across the countries. In the general scheme over all countries,
the most important actors for the pro-market mainstream are the na-
tional executives, the EU actors, and the global players. Moreover, these
actors in general are located close to each other in terms of their posi-
tions. However, there is also considerable variation with regard to these
actors’ positions across the six countries, which also allows to explain
the country differences.
National executives are fully supporting liberalization in the coordi-
nated market economies, i.e., in Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and
Switzerland. In the U.K., national executives are ambivalent towards do-
mestic liberalization. As it turns out, this can be attributed to the U.K.
government’s outspoken disapproval of the privatization of the Royal
Mail, which was debated for years before being approved in 2010. An
idiosyncrasy of the German debate is the strong salience of the parties.
Both the social democrats and the Christian democrats and conserva-
tives (the Union) are among the most important actors. This is an even
more astonishing result given that party affiliated actors that have an
executive function are not included in these party categories.
In France, national executives are ambivalent on the international di-
mension, mainly because they frequently argue in favor of the creation
of “national champions”, corporations created above all in the energy
and pharmaceutical sectors for the purpose of being competitive on the
global markets. This confirms earlier accounts of a state entrepreneuri-
alism in France (Schmidt, 2009), i.e., that the French public authorities
deviate from their counterparts in the other countries because they more
explicitly strive to maintain control over their national economic affairs.
Additionally, global players are adding to the heterogenous picture.
They mostly embrace economic liberalization. However, in the Nether-
lands, they are ambivalent, and in the U.K. oppositional with respect
to domestic issues. These stances mainly stem from the global players
opposition to liberalization measures in the energy market in the case
of the Netherlands and the support of bailouts in the case of the U.K.
With respect to the EU actors, only their involvement in the Austrian
debate is ambivalent on the international dimension.
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The peak employer associations, chambers of commerce, as well as
the christian democrats and conservatives are also rallying behind the
pro-liberalization mainstream. Moreover, the christian democratic and
conservative parties are the only actor type which is distinctly pro-
liberalization in all six countries. As with regard to national execu-
tives, peak employer associations instead are ambivalent towards do-
mestic liberalization in the U.K. because they were reluctant to support
the privatization of the Royal Mail as well. Niche corporations are pro-
liberalization in Austria, the U.K., and Germany. Yet, in Switzerland
and France, they are actually slightly opposing domestic liberalization,
while they are clearly protectionist in the Netherlands and ambivalent
towards international liberalization in France.
Liberal parties, which were expected to be a firm pro-liberalization
force, are surprisingly heterogenous in their positioning across the coun-
tries. In the U.K. and France, they are slightly opposed to international
liberalization, but in Germany, they are fiercely speaking out against
domestic liberalization. This position results from oppositional state-
ments regarding privatization. Legislative bodies, as they are present in
public debates detached from specific party affiliations, only play an im-
portant role in Switzerland, were they considerably enforce the liberal
mainstream.
Public advisory actors are, as expected, members of the camp fully
supporting liberalization in Austria, the U.K., and Switzerland. In Ger-
many and France, however, they are ambivalent or in opposition of in-
ternational liberalization. Here, public advisory actors are criticizing the
lack of regulation in the financial markets and of democratic control over
globalization in general. In the Netherlands, by contrast, public advi-
sory actors are opposing domestic liberalization, mainly because they
are against liberalization in research and education. Finally, adminis-
trations are surprisingly skeptical of international liberalization, only in
Switzerland and the U.K., they are in favor of this aspect.
Foreign executive and international actors do not exhibit a clear pat-
tern, since their positions are rather scattered over the debate space.
Executives from developing countries are as expected mainly pushing
for liberalization reforms, reflecting the increasing demands of emerg-
ing markets for entry into Western European markets, especially in the
agricultural sector. Only in Germany they intervene against domestic
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liberalization. The latter is similar to the position of most foreign ex-
ecutives from advanced economies: in Austria, the U.K., and Germany
they are not protectionist but object several deregulation programs on
the domestic dimension, e.g., with respect to air traffic control. Finally,
IGO actors are, as anticipated, mostly affiliated to liberal positions, with
the exception of the Austrian debate, where they have an interventionist
stance.
The populist right plays an important role only in Switzerland and
Austria. Yet, as suggested by the neomercantilist hypothesis, they take
protectionist stances and promote domestic liberalization at the same
time. In France and the Netherlands, the other countries with an impor-
tant right-wing populist movement, they abstain from the debate, which
points to the fact that not economic issues but immigration and Euro-
pean integration are at the core of their political programs. In contrast to
theoretical expectations, small business associations and farmers’ orga-
nizations are liberal on both dimensions in Austria, the U.K., Germany,
and Switzerland. The French farmers, however, in line with the expec-
tations, follow the neomercantilist approach of opposing globalization
while being pro-liberalization in domestic aspects. Rather surprisingly,
the public welfare organizations, are also mainly protectionist, at least in
Austria and Switzerland, two of the three countries where they actually
have a voice in the debate at all. In these two countries, they join the
neomercantilists. In addition, state enterprises, as expected, frequently
disapprove of liberalization reforms. They oppose liberalization on do-
mestic issues in Austria, the U.K., France, and the Netherlands, while
they are hostile towards internationalization in Germany and Switzer-
land.
With regard to the social democrats, governmental responsibility is
key to explain the country differences. In the U.K. during the whole pe-
riod under study and in Germany during most of it, the social democrats
were in office, which is reflected by their distinctly liberal positions on
domestic liberalization. In Germany, social democrats are even clearly
in favor of both aspects of liberalization. In all other countries, social
democrats are fiercely opposing domestic liberalization reforms. Thus,
contrary to the expectations, the majority of the social democrats did
not shift towards the liberal right corner of the debate. Especially in
France, but also in Austria and Switzerland, they enforce the traditional
left position.
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As expected, both private and public sector unions are rather consis-
tent in their full opposition to economic liberalization in most countries.
Only in the U.K. and Switzerland private sector unions are not oppos-
ing international liberalization. Where present, the communists and left
socialists (France, the Netherlands, and Switzerland), white-collar pro-
fessional organizations (Austria, U.K., France, Germany) as well as the
public welfare movements (only Switzerland) are joining trade unions in
terms of their policy positions.
Additionally, there is a number of less important actors in terms of
their going public which additionally have no consistent position. The
greens only enter the debate in Germany, where they are neomercan-
tilists, and Switzerland, where they join the radical left. Judiciary actors
are protectionist in Austria and the Netherlands, but distinctly interna-
tionalist in Switzerland. Further, the German judiciary actors promote
the side of the full challengers. Economic think tanks, finally, are protec-
tionist in Austria, interventionist in Germany, full challengers in France,
and liberal on both dimensions in the Netherlands and Switzerland.
However, the many actor positions as such do not tell us much about
the potentials for policy changes in the individual countries. To this aim,
we have to consider how the actors’ policy position taking plays out in
terms of the constellations among the positions. Which debate coalitions
do the actors establish in the policy subsystem of economic liberaliza-
tion? To get a more condensed idea of the multitude of actor positions,
a cluster analysis was performed to reveal how the diverse positions ag-
gregate into more concise debate coalitions. As already mentioned, this
is indicated by the dashed circles in figure 8.4. Additionally, figure 8.5
shows the average policy position and salience by coalition. All coalitions
are labeled on the basis of their policy stances on the two dimensions
and in accordance with the expectations formulated in chapter 4.
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Figure 7.5 Policy Positions and Salience of Debate Coalitions by Coun-
try and Dimension
Notes: Average positions and 95 % confidence intervals; Article weights applied for all
calculations.
Since the coalitions are inductively generated, an additional coalition
not anticipated by the expectations in chapter 4, the interventionists,
has to be introduced. The interventionist coalitions are opposing domes-
tic liberalization but are in support of international liberalization. The
interventionist coalitions are theoretically unexpected, but this should
not be over-interpreted since they have a very low salience in the three
countries they appear (7.8 percent in the Netherlands, 9.0 percent in
Germany, and 12.5 percent in Austria). With regard to the mainstream
coalitions, all coalitions with moderate positions (between 0 and 0.5) are
defined as third way coalitions, whereas coalitions with a more radical
stance are labeled as neoliberals.
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The reason for the relatively strong anti-liberalization attitudes in
France is now explicit, especially in terms of the general protectionist
climate. Here, we do not only find no neoliberal coalition, but also all
coalitions except the third way decidedly oppose international liberal-
ization. Moreover, the salience of the mainstream coalition is the lowest
of all countries. Overall, there thus does not seem to be a clear majority
in favor of international liberalization reform here.
In each country except France the mainstream consisting of the third
way coalition and the neoliberals clearly prevails with an overwhelming
share in salience. This dominance of the mainstream is remarkable in
Switzerland and the U.K., where its relative frequency exceeds 80 per-
cent (83.2 and 91.6 percent, respectively). In Switzerland, the traditional
left coalition is responsible for only 16.8 percent of the statements. And
although the overall policy position in the U.K. was not most liberal,
it can be described as such on the basis of this analysis, since the op-
positional traditional left coalition in the U.K. is only slightly opposing
international liberalization reforms and accounts for only 8.4 percent of
the public debate. Thus, it becomes clear that the potential for pro-
market reforms is highest in these two countries.
Austria and the Netherlands (here with two liberal mainstream coali-
tions), in contrast, have a dominant mainstream of about 75 percent
(78.8 and 74.6 percent). The main difference between the two pro-liberaliza-
tion coalitions in the Netherlands is the radical support of liberalism by
the smaller neoliberal coalition and the only moderate support of the
third way. Together with the neoliberal coalition from Germany and the
French neomercantilists, the Dutch neoliberal coalition shows the most
radical support of domestic liberalization.
In Germany, finally, we find a more complex coalitional setting. Be-
sides a comparatively weak neoliberal coalition with 66.9 percent, the
traditional left coalition in Germany exhibits a very pronounced stance
against both aspects of economic liberalization. This, of course, is part
of the explanation why Germany has the second highest polarization in
its public debate. In addition, Germany has the largest neomercantilist
coalition. As we have seen, protectionist actors are present in the de-
bate in all countries, but there they mostly integrate into the traditional
left or third way coalition. It thus seems that, except in Germany and
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France, protectionists are important actors in the debates but do mostly
not succeed in forming actual debate coalitions.
7.5 Conclusion
This chapter set out to explore the policy position taking of all actors
participating in the public debate on economic liberalization on different
levels. With respect to countries, it was first revealed that the debates
in the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the U.K. are especially support-
ive of international liberalization. The Netherlands, however, cannot be
counted as liberal-leaning, since its overall position is more negative than
in Austria and Germany. Switzerland and the U.K., instead, show in-
deed very pro-market debates since their mainstream coalitions gains
over four-fifths of all policy statements.
France, finally, stands out in its opposition of economic liberalization
in general. The French reluctance to liberalize suggests that this coun-
try’s character of a state-led economy imposes a considerable obstacle
for neoliberal dominance. Especially with regard to the aspects of inter-
national liberalization, the French are rather skeptic with respect to a
further opening of the economy. Moreover, the public debates in France
and Germany, the two countries with the biggest economic problems dur-
ing the observation period of this debate analysis, are most polarized.
This was expected at least for France with its polarized pluralist me-
dia system (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). Also notable is the high conflict
intensity of the debate in Austria and the Netherlands. In these coordi-
nated market economies, the public debate thus seems to constitute a
valve contrasting the otherwise rather consensual economic interest in-
termediation: by going public, the actors involved in the debates attempt
to pressure their opponents and thus influence the bargaining processes.
in the U.K., finally, public debates are least polarized, since – at least
on the international dimension – no significant challengers are present.
The findings from the analysis of the influence of arenas completely
confirm the expectations, although the distinction in specific sites of
the policy process does not that strongly shape the debate compared to
the influence of countries and actor characteristics. The majority of the
challengers of economic liberalization policies enters the public debates
in the input arenas, where the overall policy positions are most skepti-
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cal and also polarization is highest. In Austria, France, and Germany,
there further is a large discrepancy between a highly skeptical climate
in input arenas and a much more liberal context in the janus-faced and
output arenas. In these countries, the articulation of opposition in the
input arenas does not seem to resonate with the decision making on and
implementation of policies in the other arenas, which poses a problem
with regard to input legitimacy (Scharpf, 1999).
Turning to the actors policy position taking, it stands out that the
results of the overall debate and the single countries rather contrast
each other. The dominance of pro-liberalization stances was confirmed
several times. Most of all the EU actors, national executives and global
players reinforce the pro-market mainstream. Additionally, as expected,
the trade unions lead the traditional left coalition by most clearly op-
posing economic liberalization. With regard to the main forces on the
neomercantilist right, niche firms and farmer associations seem to be as
important as populist right parties, which only play an important role
in Switzerland and Austria. Moreover, not only a rightist protection-
ism camp exists. Also the third way actors, most notably the green and
social democratic parties, are opposing international but not domestic
liberalization. This might be caused by their strive for an extension of
the welfare system at the European level. The lack of a comprehensive
social security framework at the European level is a constant concern
for mainstream left actors (Helbling et al., 2010).
As far as the differences between the overall and country level analyses
are concerned, we found the expected three-fold constellation of a pro-
market mainstream as well as the neomercantilist and traditional left
challengers when studying the debates from the six countries combined.
On the country level, however, a new coalition in the form of the inter-
ventionists emerged in the public debates in Germany, the Netherlands,
and Austria. In general, however, opposition mainly arises in the form of
the traditional left and neomercantilists also on the country level. In the
two countries U.K. and Switzerland, we only find the traditional left that
is pitted against the liberal mainstream. Furthermore, in Germany and
the Netherlands, a neomercantilist coalition reinforces the opposition.
In short, conflicts across Western Europe mainly focus on international-
ization, even they are differently reintegrated into public disputes of the
single countries.
8Valence Campaigning: The Logic of Actor
References
So far, the analyses of the discursive strategies have been dealing with
the going public and policy position taking of the actors engaging in
the economic liberalization debate. This chapter will take on the third
strategy. Actors not only campaign to make their policy positions heard,
they also try to change their valence, i.e., their reputation and credibility
in the public debate (Laver and Sergenti, 2011). However, actors only
succeed in influencing the policy process via the public arena if they are
credible contestants in the respective policy subsystem. Thus, besides
their policy position taking, the actors’ valence in terms of credibility
and perceived competence is key for actors to successfully articulate
their interest. This is especially important since mass media filter the
access to the debate according to the news value of actors, which in-
creasingly depends on their reputation independent from the policy in
question. Actors therefore have to engage in valence campaigning to en-
hance their own valence and, in turn, need to influence the valence of
other actors.
More precisely, this chapter is concerned with how actors address each
other by direct references. After a general overview of valence campaign-
ing across countries and arenas, the analysis will proceed with the va-
lence campaigning by the individual actors. The major expectation in
this regard is that negative references prevail in the public debate on
economic liberalization. And we will indeed find that that actors mainly
keep themselves busy with the attempt to decrease the valence of their
competitors.
After the presentation of the actor references in general, the chapter
will subsequently turn to a network analysis in order to examine the va-
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lence campaigning strategies in detail. We thus assume that the valence
campaigning by all actors sums up to a directed network of positive and
negative statements. This analysis not only reveals which actors are es-
pecially important in terms of actor-specific references, but also who is
more often the sender and who more frequently figures as the addressee
in the valence network. The chapter concludes with a study that shows
how consistently the logic of valence campaigning corresponds to the
coalitional setting as identified with regard to policy position taking in
chapter 8.
8.1 Valence Campaigning by Countries and Arenas
A first general expectation with respect to valence campaigning refers to
the increasing mediatization of politics. More specifically, it is suggested
that negative campaigning has become the prevailing mode of actor-
specific interaction in public debates (e.g., Norris, 2000). Beyond that,
the analysis of valence campaigning allows an additional assessment of
the debate’s conflict intensity in the single countries and arenas. Indeed,
negative actor references can be understood as a sign of an aggressive
climate with regard to the interactions in the public debate. Accord-
ingly, table 9.1 shows the average values of valence campaigning, i.e.,
the aggregated actor references by country and arenas.
Table 8.1 Valence Campaigning by Countries and Arenas
Overall FR A DE NL CH UK
Input –0.46 –0.64 –0.44 –0.46 –0.17 –0.46 –0.58
Janus–faced –0.36 –0.74 –0.14 –0.09 –0.61 –0.09 –0.41
Output –0.14 –0.14 +0.20 –0.26 –0.38 –0.14 –0.20
Overall –0.32 –0.48 –0.03 –0.23 –0.51 –0.19 –0.34
N 1554 90 538 339 144 154 356
Notes: Average positions of actor-actor statements; Article weights applied for
all calculations; Country weights applied for overall calculations.
The most notable result is the strong tendency of negative campaign-
ing in almost all arenas and in all countries. In Austria, Germany, and
Switzerland, however, this negativity of the public debate is less pro-
nounced (–0.03, –0.19, and –0.23). Furthermore, the only substantial
exception to the prevailing negative campaigning are the output arenas
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in Austria, where the actors apparently interact decisively positively
with each other (valence of +0.20). With regard to the output arenas in
the other coordinated market economies (CME), however, two of them
actually are the most conflict-laden ones (in Germany with –0.26 and in
the Netherlands with –0.38). Thus, while France again turns out to be a
high conflict country, especially Austria shows a much more restrained
debate. Notably, three countries with a democratic corporatist tradition
(Austria, Germany, and Switzerland) have a comparatively moderate
debate. The exception of the Dutch debate can be explained by the time
specific influence of the referendum on the European constitution (see
below). The U.K., which was the least conflictual country in terms of
issue polarization, shows a rather aggressive debate climate with respect
to valence campaigning.
As far as the overall results are concerned, the findings from the anal-
ysis of polarization are only partly confirmed. The input arenas again
are the most conflict-intense arenas (–0.46). Yet the janus-faced arenas,
in contrast to the expectations on conflict intensity and results on polar-
ization, are not the least conflict intense arenas. This deviating result,
however, is mainly due to the exceptionally negative valence positions
in the janus-faced arenas of France (–0.74) and the Netherlands (–0.61).
Actually, the French and Dutch janus-faced arenas are generally the
most negative ones, and the reason for this is most likely time specific:
Both France and the Netherlands had a direct democratic vote on the
European Constitution during the time period of this study. As will
be shown in the context of the network analysis of the actors’ valence
campaigning, a strong blame shifting from national public authorities
which wanted to distract from their responsibility to the international
and European actors took place in these countries. This mechanism thus
likely caused the exceptionally negative position, since the janus-faced
arenas are heavily populated by national public authorities.
8.2 How Actors Engage in Valence Campaigning
Let us now turn to the question how valence campaigning plays out ac-
cording to specific actor characteristics. On the one hand, we want to
know which actors are the strongest negative campaigners and which are
the more consensual forces in the debate. On the other hand, we suggest
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that actors try to enhance their own valence in the debate while striving
to reduce the valence of their competitors. In other words, we expect the
self-references to be more positive than references to other actors.
Figure 8.2 shows the average valence positions of the references to
other actors as well as self-references only (references within the same
actor category) for the basic actor categorizations. Additionally, the con-
sistence of these positions in terms of the deviations from zero and each
other is indicated by the 95 percent confidence intervals. As with coun-
tries and arenas, the strong tendency towards negativity is the most
obvious feature of valence campaigning, since the density of positions is
higher on the left-hand side.
Figure 8.1 Overall and Self-Referred Valence Campaigning
Notes: Average positions and 95% confidence intervals: Article and
country weights applied for all calculations; Positions from actors with
less than 5 statements are not considered for the calculations.
As expected, most actors pass more criticism on other actors than on
representatives of their own actor category. For four of the 14 cate-
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gories (IGO actors, national executives, judiciary, and legislatives), self-
references needed to be excluded because they have less than five state-
ments. These public authority actors thus seem to be less inclined to
campaign for their own valence in the debate.
Nevertheless, seven out of the remaining ten actors show a much
more positive stance towards themselves. With regard to EU actors,
parties and public welfare groups, this difference between overall and
self-references is most substantial, but also trade unions, experts, corpo-
rations, and business associations significantly intervene more negatively
into the debate when they do not refer to themselves.
Only foreign executives, public administrations, and professional orga-
nizations are more heavily attacking members of their own actor group
than all other actors. However, this is not surprising. All three categories
consist of a considerably heterogenous set of actors. Professional orga-
nizations include a broad range of interest associations, e.g., farmer and
white-collar organizations, which are regularly divided over economic
liberalization policies. In a similar vein, the different branches of pub-
lic administrations, e.g., the departments of trade and social affairs, are
probably defending very different interests and are thus at odds with
each other. Foreign executives, finally, are obviously a fragmented cate-
gory as well. The interests of a multitude of variously oriented govern-
ments from all over the world are represented here.
Interestingly, the national executives and corporations, who are the
two most important drivers of the pro-market mainstream, are the only
actors which overall apply a positive campaigning strategy. Although
these valence positions are only slightly positive and do not significantly
deviate from an ambivalent stance, all other actors are markedly more
inclined to use negative campaigning. Negative campaigning is thus not
only the generally preferred strategy in the debate on economic liberal-
ization, but also much more often applied by challengers of the neoliberal
dominance as well as less important actors in terms of their going public.
8.3 Valence Campaigning Networks
As already outlined, the statements related to the valence campaigning
of actors can be perceived as directed relationships in a debate net-
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work. Consequently, the actors responsible for the statements can be
seen as vertices (or knots) in the network of the public debate on eco-
nomic liberalization. They are either the sender, if they are the subject
in actor-actor statements, or the addressee, if they are the object. This
allows us to empirically test two aspects. First, the findings regarding
the resource argument for the actors’ general going public can be tested,
i.e. whether the same actors loom high in terms of their going public
and valence campaigning. And second, we are able to study the role of
the fine-grained actor categories as senders and addressees of actor ref-
erences.
Figure 9.1 indicates the actors’ closeness centrality, a common measure
of the importance of vertices in networks. Closeness centrality measures
the mean geodesic distance (i.e., the shortest path) from a specific actor
to all other actors in the network (Bonacich and Paulette, 2001; Csardi,
2008). This means that actors with a short geodesic distance to other ac-
tors have a high centrality (see definition in Table B.1. in the appendix).
The actor-actor statements allow for the calculation of three different
types of the closeness centrality of actors, because an actor can be im-
portant as speaker, namely as the subject of the core sentences, or as
addressee of the statements. Thus, the actors’ importance as subjects
and objects was calculated separately, but also the overall closeness cen-
trality was determined. The size of the pie charts in figure 9.1 thus
indicates the overall closeness centrality of an actor in the network of
actor references. As shown in table C.5 in the appendix, closeness cen-
trality equals percentage points and runs from 53.8 (farmer associations)
to the maximum centrality of 100 percent (foreign executives from ad-
vanced economies). Thus, the more central an actor is in the network,
the bigger the pie chart. In addition, the pie charts show the ratio be-
tween the closeness centrality as addressee (light gray) and the centrality
as sender (dark gray), i.e. whether an actor was more often the subject
or the object of the actor-specific statements.
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Figure 8.2 The Importance of Actors in Valence Cam-
paigning Networks
Notes: Closeness centrality, overall and by subject or object status; A
detailed description of the calculation of closeness centrality is provided
in section 5.4; The exact results are listed in table C.5 in the appendix.
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Valence campaigning reveals a different distribution of importance
in comparison to the going public (see section 7.3). Closeness central-
ity is highest for the foreign executives from advanced economies (100
percent), and also niche firms are very important in the network (96.6
percent). On the contrary, the most important actors in terms of going
public, national executives and global players, only come second and
third in terms of their closeness centrality (96.6 and 87.5 percent). Fur-
thermore, the ratio between the subject- and object-related closeness
centrality illustrates why niche corporations and foreign executives are
so central to the valence networks. They are much more frequently the
addressee of other actors’ statements. Thus, they are not important be-
cause they actively direct a lot of statements to competitors but because
they are major targets of the other actors’ campaigning efforts.
As in terms of the overall going public, the two mainstream party fam-
ilies, i.e., the social democrats as well as the Christian democrats and
conservatives, are the dominant parties (closeness centrality of 77.8 and
82.4 percent, respectively). However, given that the Christian democrats
and conservatives are more important here than the social democrats,
issue ownership does not influence the parties’ importance in the debate
with regard to valence campaigning. This also holds for the liberal par-
ties which are substantially more peripheral in terms of their closeness
centrality than with respect to their going public.
In comparison with their overall salience in the debate on economic lib-
eralization, peak employer associations, private sector unions and public
advisory actors are also considerably important in the valence networks
(73.3, 80.0 and 77.8 percent, respectively). This also confirms the insights
from the analysis of the going public with regard to the left challengers:
the private sector unions are the only notable actor from the traditional
left coalition.
Most actors exhibit a balanced ratio between subject- and object-
related statements. However, EU and IGO actors, public administra-
tions, legislatives, communists and left socialists, right-wing populists
as well as global players are more often the addressee than the sender.
Since foreign executives from advanced economies and emerging markets
as well as IGO and EU actors are more likely to be blamed than they
attribute responsibility to other actors, it seems that the transnational
level is especially heavy under criticism. Moreover, the radical parties
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on both the political left and right are also preferably used as scapegoat
by other actors.
Tellingly, national executives are very important as blamers in the
valence networks. Similarly, all interest associations as well as the main-
stream right parties (liberals and Christian democrats and conserva-
tives) show a stronger inclination for negative campaigning than being
the target of it. The valence positions for all actors as listed in table C.6
in the appendix show that the EU and foreign executives from advanced
countries on the one hand, and the fringe parties on the other hand, are
heavily criticized by these actors. In sum, this dynamic resembles the no-
tions of blame shifting in European politics (see Moravcsik, 1994; Zu¨rn,
2006). National public authorities and the the mainstream right parties
try to assign the blame for unpopular consequences of policy making on
economic liberalization to the international and European level and –
on a smaller scale but nevertheless visible – to the communists and left
socialists as well as the populist right.
8.4 Coalition-Specific Valence Campaigning
As for the other discursive strategies, the analysis of the debate coalition
formation is a major research goal also in terms of valence campaigning.
In this context, it is of course of interest whether the coalitions found in
terms of policy position taking and going public correspond to the expec-
tations of valence campaigning strategies. The aim of the final analysis
in this chapter is thus to find out whether the debate coalitions identified
in chapter 7 are important for the explanation of the actors’ valence po-
sitions. Figure 8.3 shows the average of the valence positions and their 95
percent confidence intervals with respect to statements within each coali-
tion and across coalitional borders. The coalitional memberships are the
same as established in the analyses over all countries section 7.3. More
precisely, we distinguish three coalitions: a pro-market mainstream, a
traditional left coalition and a neomercantilist camp.
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Figure 8.3 Coalition-Specific Valence Campaigning
Notes: Average positions and 95% confidence intervals; Article
and country weights applied for all calculations.
It was expected that the actors use less negative campaigning strate-
gies with regard to their fellow campaigners in the same coalition. This
is the case for the mainstream and especially the members of the tradi-
tional left coalition, which shows a sharply negative stance while being
consensual to actors affiliated to the same coalition. Both of these coali-
tions indeed seem to apply a coherent valence campaigning strategy,
since it corresponds to their policy positions. The counterfactual re-
sult for the neomercantilists – the position for statements made within
the coalition is slightly more negative than the position regarding other
coalitions – may be due to the very heterogenous composition of this
coalition. It entail actors as diverse as mainstream left parties and right
wing populists, which certainly have no interest to campaign in favor
of each other. Even if they share the policy position on economic liber-
alization, they deviate on other high-profile issues like immigration or
European integration (Kriesi et al., 2012). If there are polarized conflicts
on other issues, cooperation in a debate coalition thus seems difficult.
8.5 Conclusion
This chapter has considered how actors compete in the public debate in
terms of valence campaigning. The first notable result is the strong ten-
dency of negative campaigning in almost all arenas and in all countries.
Offensive strategies to reduce the valence of competitors prevail, espe-
cially in the input arenas. With regard to the country differences, the
results only partly corroborate the evidence found with respect to the
conflict intensity. France and the U.K. are countries with a high negativ-
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ity in their public debates on economic liberalization. The coordinated
market economies, by contrast, have a rather consensual overall climate
in terms of valence campaigning. As for arenas, however, the results
match the the evidence from the study of policy positions in chapter
7. Input areas tend to be the most conflict-laden with regards to both
indicators.
Due to the strong trend of negative campaigning, it is not even the case
that all actors refer to their own category in a positive way. The most im-
portant actors of the mainstream, however, accomplish to present them-
selves in a good light. Furthermore, as expected, most actors criticize
other actors more than the representatives of their own actor category.
This also holds with respect to the debate coalitions, since the majority
of actors uses a less aggressive campaigning strategy towards their fellow
campaigners than against the members of other coalitions.
An intriguing result is the blame shifting found in the network anal-
ysis. National public authorities and the mainstream right parties try
to shift the blame for the consequences of policy making on economic
liberalization to the international and European levels, niche firms, and
the communists and left socialists as well as the populist right. The
actors mostly responsible for economic policy making supposedly thus
attempt to blame the international and European actors for unpopu-
lar measures, corporations for misled liberalization reforms, and radical
parties for politically unsuccessful reform proposals.
9How the Public Debate is Perceived:
Framing Economic Liberalization
The positioning on specific policies and with regard to valence only
partly reveal the complexity of public debates. Only frames, under-
stood as justifications of policy statements that cue the public to the
basic values and norms of the actors, can grasp the full meaning of con-
flict in a public debate (Enyedi, 2005; Surel, 2000; Hoeglinger et al.,
2012). The empirical chapters of this study are thus concluded by the
analysis of the framing of the debate on economic liberalization. More
precisely, the distribution of frames is studied across countries, arenas,
actor characteristics, and coalitional constellations. Since frames are con-
structed according to their resonance with central societal themes (Kriesi
et al., 2009), they were conceptualized in chapter 4 as sets of justifica-
tions reflecting values and norms that belong to three distinct schools of
political-economic thought: liberal, social democratic, and mercantilist
frames. Corresponding to the findings on the neoliberal dominance so
far, we expect liberal frames to prevail in the debate. Further, it will be
revealed in this chapter that the framing patterns are inversely related
to the overall climate in terms of policy positions across the countries
and arenas. We thus find less liberal frames in pro-market countries and
arenas.
This chapter will also explore whether the actors employ framing
strategies which are consistent with their policy positions. The analysis
of policy position taking has identified a coalitional constellation consist-
ing of mainstream adherents, traditional left challengers, and neomer-
cantilists. Consequently, we expect members of these coalitions to show
a distinct framing strategy which is in line with the coalitional orienta-
tion. We hypothesize that traditional left actors are emphasizing social
democratic frames, while members of the pro-market mainstream should
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limit themselves mainly to liberal frames. Neomercantilists, finally, are
obviously expected to resort more heavily to mercantilist frames. The
analyses will again begin with the effect of countries and arenas on the
framing of economic liberalization, before the actors and coalitions come
under further scrutiny.
9.1 Framing by Country
How are ideological beliefs distributed across the six countries? Figure
10.1 presents the three basic frame categories (liberal, mercantilist, and
social democratic) as they are used in the different countries to jus-
tify statements on economic liberalization. It is anticipated that liberal
frames are the most often used frames in all countries, especially in the
U.K., the Netherlands, and Switzerland which should be more liberal-
leaning also in terms of their framing pattern. In France, however, jus-
tifications related to intervention and protection should be relatively
frequent as well, reflecting its opposition towards economic liberaliza-
tion. Therefore, the bars in figure 10.1 additionally distinguish between
frames used in the context of supporting and opposing statements.
The expectation that liberal frames are predominant is largely met.
Overall, this framing strategy makes up for 44.3 percent of all frames,
and has a share of more than 50 percent of the frames used to justify
supporting positions. However, with regard to the opposition to eco-
nomic liberalization, the distribution of the three frame categories is
balanced and social democratic framing is even slightly more important
than liberal frames. Thus, especially when it comes to the pursuit of eco-
nomic liberalization, the majority of statements are justified with liberal
frames. This reflects the consistency of framing with the neoliberal domi-
nance in the public debate on economic liberalization. In addition, social
democratic frames are clearly more often used in relationship with oppo-
sition to economic liberalization. In all countries except the Netherlands
and the U.K., they make up for more than one third of all statements
for the opposition.
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Figure 9.1 Framing of Economic Liberalization by Country
Notes: Article weights applied for all calculations; Country weights applied for
overall numbers; –=opposition, +=support.
Turning to the framing by country, however, quite the opposite than
what was expected is to be the case. The U.K., Switzerland, and also
the Netherlands all have significantly lower shares of liberal frames for
both oppositional and supportive statements than the countries per-
ceived as less liberal (Germany, Austria, France). Moreover, Germany
is the most liberal country in terms of the frame pattern in both types
of statements. Further, mercantilist frames are more important in the
Netherlands, Switzerland and the U.K. to underline support of liber-
alization reforms than in the other three countries. It thus seems that
exactly in those countries which traditionally have less interventionist
and protectionist policies (the liberal-leaning countries), actors seem to
highlight the corresponding mercantilist values comparatively more of-
ten.
In sum, as far as framing is concerned, there is a much less frequent
use of liberal frames in the countries which are liberal-leaning in terms
of policy positions and their coalitional setting. This therefore suggests a
complementary role of frames in the debate: a pro-market policy climate
is more heavily shaped by social democratic and mercantilist frames.
In other words, were the neoliberal dominance is especially strong, the
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framing is more heterogenous and dissenting ideas are more often raised.
These findings can be enriched by the examination using the fine-
grained frame categorization. The analysis is shown in table 10.1 along
with a chi-square test indicating whether the differences with respect
to the framing strategies across the countries are significant. The high
significance of the chi-square value indeed reveals that the differences
among the countries are substantial. This points to the fact that there
are strongly diverse debate cultures. Thus, although liberal frames over-
all are most important in all countries, there seems to be no distinct
congruence with respect to the distribution of core beliefs across coun-
tries. Moreover, this points to the validity of the accounts on persisting
divergent paths among Western European countries (Kitschelt, 1999).
The numbers in table 10.1 show that not the moral universalist (eco-
nomic freedom and social justice) and identitarian (protectionist) as-
pects, but the utilitarian justifications are intensely used. Prosperity is
the most applied justification (32.4 percent), followed with a considerable
distance by social protection (18.4 percent) and interventionist frames
(16.1 percent). In general, the debate on economic liberalization is thus
driven by very pragmatic and instrumental beliefs. Within the domi-
nant liberal category, prosperity-related arguments are more important
than economic freedom frames. Especially in Austria (38.5 percent) and
the Netherlands (36.7 percent), these patterns of justifications clearly
prevail in the debate. Furthermore, economic freedom is only shaping
the German debate in a substantive way. Similarly to the Netherlands,
only liberal frames have a share of more than 20 percent in Germany.
This makes these two coordinated market economies the most influenced
countries in terms of liberal thinking at the beginning of the 21st cen-
tury, a result that was rather expected for the U.K. and Switzerland.
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Table 9.1 Framing Economic Liberalization by Countries
Overall FR A DE NL CH UK
Liberal Prosperity 32.4 31.1 38.5 33.7 36.7 25.4 29.2
Economic freedom 11.9 9.7 8.5 22.8 10.1 10.1 9.9
Social Social protection 18.4 27.9 20.7 17.7 11.1 16.1 15.9
democratic Social justice 8.9 5.1 9.8 10.2 13.2 8.1 7.0
Mercantilist Interventionist 16.1 12.1 11.1 9.1 12.8 26.9 25.2
Protectionist 12.3 14.1 11.4 6.5 16.1 13.4 12.8
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
N 7156 1472 805 879 648 2441 920
Pearson’s χ2 52.15 *** (25 DF)
Notes: All shares in %; Article weights applied for all calculations; Country weights applied
for overall calculations. Levels of significance: *≤0.05, **≤0.01, ***≤0.001.
Yet, Switzerland and the U.K. show a very similar pattern, which
again sets these countries apart just like with respect to the policy posi-
tions and debate coalitions. On the one hand, they have a considerable
share of interventionist frames (26.9 percent and 25.2 percent). Com-
bined with the similarly high number of prosperity frames, these two
countries rather astonishingly show a distribution which could have been
expected for the French debate: interventionism paired with the empha-
sis of economic growth. As already mentioned, however, the framing on
the level of countries seems to run contrary to the policy positions. In
short, the core beliefs in liberal-leaning countries are centered on in-
terventionist growth. In these countries, mercantilist frames are thus
combined with liberal ones to an argument of economic promotion.
Finally, the pragmatic aspects of the social democratic frame cate-
gory (social protection) are most heavily used in France and Austria
(20.7 and 27.9 percent). Both countries thus show a combination that
resembles a third way strategy: prosperity is linked to social security.
Moreover, although protectionist frames make up the second highest
share in France, the two mercantilist categories are not most important
in the two countries which traditionally have the strongest state with
respect to economic policy making. Nevertheless, the label social market
economy seems to resonate best with regard to the ideological climate
in France and Austria.
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9.2 How Frames Differ across Arenas
Countries are only one part of the institutional context and arenas, i.e.,
the sites structuring the policy process with their specific sets of insti-
tutional norms and rules, are shaping the course of debates on economic
liberalization as well. As with regard to the country analyses, the first fig-
ure (10.2) illustrates the aggregated frame categories by opposition and
support. We assume the social democratic frames to be more closely
connected to the opposition, while mercantilist and liberal frames are
related to the support of economic liberalization policies.
Figure 9.2 Framing by Arenas as well as Support and Opposition
Notes: Article and country weights have been applied.
The graphs indicate that the importance of liberal frames does not vary
much as a function of the arena, but – as found before – is mainly a
function of the position, i.e., if the support or the opposition of eco-
nomic liberalization is the subject of framing. Proponents of economic
liberalization heavily underline the need for economic liberalization in
every arena with liberal justifications. This stands in contrast to the op-
position which brings up about 10 percentage points less liberal frames.
In line with the theoretical expectations, social democratic frames are
most often used in input arenas, and especially in combination with op-
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positional statements. Finally, mercantilist frames, as anticipated, are
most important for the janus-faced arenas, since these arenas by defi-
nition are the sites of state intervention. Both opposition and support
are more intensely justified by mercantilist frames than in other arenas.
However, the actors engaged in the debate in the janus-faced arenas,
mainly public authorities, are more likely to refer to intervention and
the national interest when opposing liberalization.
Turning to the framing patterns by arenas for the fine-grained level in
table 10.2, the insignificant chi-square value confirms that, in contrast
to the country context, arenas overall do not significantly influence the
choice of framing. Hence, while the institutional context of arenas signif-
icantly determines the going public and valence campaigning strategies,
the sites where the policy process takes place have no substantial rela-
tionship with policy position taking and the distribution of ideological
beliefs.
Nevertheless, there are still notable differences between single cat-
egories. The input arenas stand out in their higher share of moral-
universal frames. More precisely, economic freedom and social justice are
more frequently used in this arena (14.6 percent and 10.9 percent). This
means that the input arenas are rather the realm of normative conflicts
over fundamental values regarding the nature of democratic capitalism,
while there is more pragmatism in the other arenas. This nicely matches
the results from the polarization analysis, which revealed that conflicts
are more intense in the input arenas. We thus add that that conflicts
not only more polarized, but also more normative in the input arenas.
The janus-faced arenas show a higher share of protectionist frames than
the other arenas (14.6 percent). These patterns of justifications are re-
flecting the interests of both national public authorities and suprana-
tional public authorities, which can be assumed to be keen to refer to
the regional or national interest. In a similar vein, interventionist frames
are most important for the janus-faced arenas (20 percent) which cor-
responds to the institutional character of the janus-faced arenas. Policy
decisions are taken at this stage of the policy process, which increases
the use of frames related to the role of government. The output are-
nas, finally, are dominated by prosperity arguments (36.8 percent). This
is not surprising, given that corporations are very much pursuing their
business logic in this site of the public debate.
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Table 9.2 Framing Economic Liberalization by Arenas
Overalla Input Janus-f. Output
Liberal Prosperity 31.6 26.6 30.3 36.8
Economic freedom 11.7 14.6 11.1 10.4
Social Social protection 19.3 24.9 15.2 20.2
democratic Social justice 8.1 10.9 8.6 5.4
Mercantilist Interventionist 17.7 15.8 20.0 16.1
Protectionist 11.6 7.2 14.7 11.1
Total 100 100 100 100
N 4805 1163 1984 1658
Pearson’s χ2 11.07 n.s. (10 DF)
Notes: a The difference in the overall figures compared to the table showing the
framing by countries (table 10.1) stems from missings, i.e., the arena affiliation could
not be observed for all statements. All shares in %; Article and country weights
applied for all calculations. Levels of significance: *≤0.05, **≤0.01, ***≤0.001.
9.3 How the Debate is Perceived by Actors
Let us turn the focus to the actors and how they differ in terms of their
framing strategy. First and foremost, we are interested in the actors’
motives to participate in debates, i.e., in their underlying values driving
their engagement in the public debate. As with countries and arenas, we
assume that the pro-market mainstream pursues a mainly liberal fram-
ing strategy, while the traditional left challengers are assumed to more
frequently use social democratic frames. The neomercantilists should
exceptionally often employ protectionist frames, while we expect public
authorities to resort comparatively often to interventionist frames. Ta-
ble 10.3 presents the actors’ use of the six fine-grained frame categories.
More specifically, the numbers are relative frequencies which were cal-
culated using country and article weights. In fact there is substantially
more variation in the argumentative patterns of the individual actors
than with regard to countries and arenas, as the highly significant chi-
square value indicates. Actor characteristics are thus so far the most
important factor relating to the distribution of framing strategies in the
debate on economic liberalization.
First, there are many actors with a strong liberal framing. In the case
of IGO actors, business associations, professional organizations, and cor-
porations, these frames even exceed 50 percent of all frames. Addition-
ally, EU actors, public administrations, and experts have a combined
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share of over 45 percent with respect to the two liberal frame categories.
And except of professional organizations, these actors also have a solid
pro-liberalization policy stance and are thus applying a framing strategy
that is consistent with their affiliation to the mainstream.
More specifically, actors with an exceptionally high share of prosper-
ity frames can especially be highlighted. This applies to IGO and EU
actors, public administrations and corporations, which all have a share
of prosperity frames which is higher than 40 percent. Additionally, pro-
fessional organizations use 45.6 percent of all their frames for economic
freedom, which reflects the high number of organizations representing
the high-skilled self-employed in this category.
However, mainstream actors also show considerable heterogeneity with
regard to other than liberal frames. The public authority actors in the
upper half of table 10.2 strongly resort to interventionist justifications
as well, insisting on their importance in regulating the economy. The
exception are foreign executives who apply a less interventionist fram-
ing strategy. Additionally, in the lower half of the table, professional
organizations and parties also have a comparatively high share of inter-
ventionist justifications. In sum, however, not only the adherence to a
coalition therefore is correlated with a specific framing, but also the role
of the actors in the policy process. Public authorities, which are at the
center of decision making processes, also justify their positions dispro-
portionally often with an interventionist argumentation.
In addition, public administrations almost never resort to moral and
identitarian frames: protectionism, economic freedom, and social justice
make up for only 20.4 percent of all frames used by them. This is also
the case for the judiciary actors, which – besides some few mentions of
social justice frames – completely stay away from moral and identitarian
frames. According to their institutional role, both actors thus try to
intervene only very pragmatically into the debates.
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A second pattern is observable for the foreign and national executives
as well as the business associations. These actors combine an excep-
tionally high share of prosperity frames with a relatively rare use of
protectionist frames. As a matter of fact, they emphasize the need for
regulating cross-border economic activities to gain national or regional
wealth. Furthermore, business associations, not surprisingly, add a lot
of economic freedom justifications, and, as already mentioned, national
executives additionally point to their role as regulators by emphasizing
interventionist frames.
Even on this aggregated level of actor categories, two challenging ac-
tor types can be identified through their heavily use of social democratic
frames. These are the trade unions and public welfare groups. Over 60
percent of their frames relate to social democratic justifications. How-
ever, the two actors exhibit different preferences to use the two social
democratic frame categories. While trade unions strongly rely on the
pragmatic arguments of social protection, public welfare groups high-
light the moral aspects, i.e., social justice frames.
The remaining two actors, i.e., the parties and experts, pursue a very
balanced framing strategy. Although experts have a relatively high share
of prosperity arguments and parties use social protection frames more
often, the differences between specific frame categories are not as clear-
cut as for other actors. The parties show an even more even distribution
of justifications: the pragmatic arguments all make up for around 20
percent and the moral-universalist and identitarian frames amount to
around 10 percent each. Most of all, this indicates that these actor cat-
egories are very heterogeneous, which makes a follow-up analysis neces-
sary that applies more fine-grained actor classifications in order to reveal
more variation connected to actor characteristics.
The more detailed analysis is presented in figure 10.3. The graphs are
based on count model regressions on the frame usage by actors, control-
ling for the effects of countries and arenas. More specifically, the bars
indicate the average of the predicted number of frames, which allows for
a direct comparison across the actor as well as frame categories.
Table C.8 in the appendix reports the corresponding coefficients, stan-
dard errors, and levels of significance, while table C.7 presents the di-
agnostics for the choice of the specific count model used for the single
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frame categories. Further, the theoretically possible number of observa-
tions would be 1080, since the number of frames used was calculated for
the two sub-categories of each frame, the usual thirty actors, all six coun-
tries, and the three arenas (2 × 30 × 6 × 3=1080). However, because
not all combinations exist in the data, the actual number of observations
is between 260 and 316.
For two simple reasons, count models perform well for this kind of
analyses. The dependent variable, i.e. the frequency of frame usage by
actors, is heavily skewed. There are many actors who never or only
rarely mention a specific frame and few actors with a very high number
of mentions. Figure C.2 in the appendix clearly shows the skewness of
the independent frame variables. This disqualifies an OLS regression
model (Long, 1997). In addition, an alpha dispersion parameter test is
necessary to define the most feasible count model. This test allows to
discern between the two common count regression models – poisson and
negative binominal regressions. If alpha is significant, the dependent
variable is overdispersed and a negative binominal regression is more
appropriate than a poisson model (Long and Freese, 2006).
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To begin with, the fine-grained public authority actor categories mainly
show a more heterogenous framing pattern as with respect to the ag-
gregate classification. In four cases, liberal frames are most often used,
followed by mercantilist frames, and social democratic frames only come
third. Besides the foreign executives from advanced economies, economic
administrations, and judiciaries, this also applies to the, in terms of their
going public, very important EU actors. Furthermore, the use of liberal
frames of the EU actors and national executives is most distinctive to-
gether with the global players. All exhibit an average of about 10 or
more with respect to the predicted liberal framing strategy. As already
show before, this means that the pro-market arguments have profoundly
affected the public authorities in all countries.
Yet also the function of public authorities as regulators is heavily
shaping their use of patterns of justification, as the importance of the
mercantilist frames for these actors shows. These frames are most im-
portant for the IGO actors, foreign executives from emerging markets,
national executives and legislatives. The case of the national executives is
telling, since these are the main responsible actors for reforms regarding
economic liberalization. Thus, they are especially called upon to justify
that the state is able to make a difference in economic policy making.
Another deviating pattern of justifications is found for the non-economic
administrations, which emphasize social democratic frames most. How-
ever, these actors are only marginally relevant for the frame usage in
general, as their low average numbers of predicted frames show. This,
of course, has to do with their low going public in the debate, but does
additionally mean that they are reluctant to engage in the framing con-
tests in specific.
With respect to the interest associations, as anticipated, a clear dis-
tinction of the trade unions’ framing strategy and frame usage by the
business interest associations can be made. The differentiation into peak
employer and small business associations as well as chambers of com-
merce reveals that the peak employer associations are also frequently
picking up mercantilist frames, while the chambers of commerce often
employ a social democratic framing strategy. Small business associations,
by contrast, only very rarely use other frames than liberal ones. Further,
the farmer and white collar organizations affiliate with the business inter-
est associations in their emphasis of liberal frames. This sets them apart
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from the public and private sector unions which both predominantly use
social democratic frames. Therefore, along with the communist and left
socialist party family, they seem to be the most consistent actors for the
traditional left, since they not only oppose the pro-market mainstream
with respect to policy positions and valence campaigning, but also pur-
sue a compatible framing strategy. Moreover, the private sector unions
and the most important single actor category for this kind of justifica-
tion.
Turning to the parties, which were previously found to be a very bal-
anced actor in terms of the values they raise to justify policy positions,
a considerable variation within this category is now indeed observable.
The two dominating party families, the social democrats and the Chris-
tian democrats and conservatives, are important actors for the use of all
frames. Yet, the social democrats, not surprisingly use social democratic
frames clearly more often than the other justifications, while the Chris-
tian democratic and conservatives mainly employ a pro-market framing
strategy.
The green parties are the only party family which prevailingly empha-
sizes mercantilist frames, but also social democrats employ this framing
strategy more often. This may be explained by their membership of the
two mainstream left parties in the neomercantilist coalition. As we have
seen with respect to their policy position taking, they are against inter-
national liberalization but support domestic liberalization. Their strive
against a neoliberal European and international order thus also entails
a protectionist framing strategy. As for the smaller parties, the commu-
nists and left socialists show a clear pursuit of social democratic frames
in the debate. The liberals and right-wing populists, by contrast, clearly
use liberal frames most frequently and thus join the pro-market main-
stream. As for the latter, this is inconsistent to their policy position
taking, since they clearly take neomercantilist positions.
The final group of actors are the ones external to the political system
in a narrower sense. The various types of companies do not substantially
differ from each other, except that global players emphasize mercan-
tilist justifications comparatively more often. The biggest corporations
and not the public enterprises, thus emphasize the role of the state in
the economy. Economic think tanks are more balanced in their framing
than public advisory actors. More precisely, they use social democratic
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frames similarly often than the other two patterns of justification. This
contradicts the theoretical expectation that the former are much more
partisan to the mainstream than the latter, but confirms the results from
the analyses of policy positions, where economic think tanks were clear
opponents of economic liberalization.
As for public welfare actors, finally, they show a deviating framing
pattern. While liberal frames are slightly more important than social
democratic ones for the public welfare organizations, i.e., charity orga-
nizations and churches, mercantilist ones are most frequently used by
the public welfare movements. Neither category uses social democratic
frames most, which would correspond to the hypothesis. These two ac-
tors therefore are not able to pursue their supposedly preferred framing
strategy.
9.4 Core Beliefs of the Debate Coalitions
So far, we have seen how the framing on economic liberalization is shaped
by the countries’ and arenas’ institutional contexts as well as the specific
actor characteristics. The following examination of the debate coalitions’
framing completes the analysis. More precisely, this analysis will reveal
whether coalitions as previously found on the basis of the actors’ going
public and policy positioning strategies as well as confirmed in terms
of valence campaigning also share the same ideologies in the debate.
If this is the case, the existence of specific coalitional constellations in
the debate on economic liberalization is confirmed for all four discursive
strategies. To this purpose, table 10.4 reports the distribution of frames
across the three main coalitions as established in chapter 8.
The mainstream shows a consistent framing strategy and, quite plau-
sibly, it is the coalition most often resorting to prosperity frames (36.9
percent). Yet it also uses more interventionist and protectionist frames
than the other coalitions, which points to the importance of public au-
thority actors for this coalition, most notably the EU actors and national
executives. With regard to the traditional left coalition, its framing strat-
egy differs as anticipated from the mainstream in two crucial aspects.
On the one hand, it uses much less frequently liberal justifications and,
on the other hand, it strongly emphasizes both categories of the social
democratic ideology. Further in line with the theoretical expectations,
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Table 9.4 Framing by Coalitions
Mainstream Traditional left Neomercantilist
Liberal Prosperity 36.9 16.8 31.4
Economic Freedom 10.9 9.0 15.0
Social Social protection 12.8 40.8 18.2
protection Social justice 8.3 16.2 6.7
Mercantilist Interventionist 16.3 11.3 17.9
Protectionist 14.8 5.9 10.8
Total 100 100 100
N 3943 985 2227
Pearson’s χ2 37.87 *** (10 DF)
Notes: All shares in %; article and country weights applied for all calculations. Levels of
significance: *≤0.05, **≤0.01, ***≤0.001.
the traditional left also employs mercantilist frames less often than the
other two coalitions.
Furthermore, and contrary to the hypothesis on the consistency of po-
sitions and frames, neomercantilists use less protectionist frames. Hence,
they do not seem to be able to pursue their preferred framing strategy
and it seems that the mainstream coalition is successfully imposing its
dominant framing on them. This is further evidence for the inconsis-
tency of the neomercantilist coalition, since we have already seen that
the neomercantilist coalition does not pursue a concise valence campaign.
All coalitions, finally, consistently emphasize the pragmatic frame cat-
egories more pronouncedly. This points to the fact that, in contrast to
debates on cultural issues like immigration or political issues like Eu-
ropean integration, economic liberalization is rather disputed in a com-
paratively more technical and instrumental way.
9.5 Conclusion
This chapter provided a comprehensive assessment of the importance of
framing strategies in the public debate on economic liberalization. As a
matter of fact, the actors, coalitions, and countries, but not the arenas,
significantly relate to some of the variance regarding the framing strate-
gies. With some few but important exceptions, the ideological landscape
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of the debate matches the findings on going public, policy position tak-
ing, and valence campaigning.
In line with the neoliberal dominance in the policy making on eco-
nomic liberalization, liberal framing os the preferred strategy. In partic-
ular, members of the pro-market mainstream also apply a solid framing
strategy which is consistent with their policy position taking. With re-
spect to the opposition against economic liberalization, especially the
traditional left, such justifications related to prosperity and economic
freedom are less important. Challengers of neoliberal dominance from
the traditional left prefer social democratic frames. This most forcefully
plays out in the input arenas. Reflecting their status as the major chal-
lengers in the debate, the most important actors with respect to this
framing strategy are the trade unions.
Protectionist frames, contrary to the expectations, are not the pre-
ferred framing strategy of the neomercantilist coalition. As with inter-
ventionist frames, the use of protectionist justifications relates more to
the involvement into decision making processes, since public authority
actors frequently use them. Interventionist and protectionist frames are
therefore most closely connected with the mainstream, which empha-
sizes its actual governance responsibility. Moreover, mercantilist frames
are most important for the janus-faced arenas, i.e., the sites were policy
decisions are made.
Although the overall distribution of frames is not significantly related
to the arena structure of the public debate, the high salience of norma-
tive conflict in the input arenas point to the high polarization found in
the analyses on policy positions. With respect to the countries, an un-
expected mechanism regarding the relationship between country char-
acteristics and the public debate seems to be at work for the framing
of economic liberalization. More precisely, there is a complementarity,
since the usage of pro-market frames is higher in countries which are less
liberal-leaning in terms of policy positions and their coalitional setting.
The U.K. and Switzerland, the countries which have a pro-market cli-
mate of the debate, exhibit a high share of interventionist frames. While
liberal justification clearly prevail in Germany and the Netherlands, so-
cial democratic frames add to liberal frames in France and Austria. This
leads to a pattern which may be described as third way.
10
Conclusion: The Strength and Limits of
Neoliberal Dominance
This study took care of the public debate on economic liberalization.
First and foremost, it has been shown that a public debate is more than
a background noise for the more institutionalized debates in parliaments
and decision making processes by the public authorities. In other words,
the role of public discourse for the politics of economic liberalization was
empirically explored and not left to bold and oversimplifying specula-
tion (see Schmidt). On the one hand, a public debate can systematically
be linked to the institutional context and the particular interests of the
participating actors. On the other hand, public discourse is organized
discourse, since specific debate coalitions are at work which clash over
the scope and meaning of economic liberalization reforms. Thus, the
study enhanced our knowledge on public discourse as motor of change
in a specific policy subsystem and has shown that it is necessary to
include all arenas of policy processes and all actors into consideration.
This is an often made but rarely implemented demand in comparative
research (Bartolini, 2005; Sabatier and Weible, 2007b).
More precisely, the analyses were sensitive to the regulatory, organi-
zational, and communicative scope of the public debate. A restriction of
the regulatory scope of conflicts to the national level, for instance, would
have led to the neglect of transnationalization, i.e., the conflicts on the in-
ternational dimension of economic liberalization and the important role
supra- and international actors have in todays policy making processes
on economic liberalization. By consistently considering transnational-
ization, the analyses have avoided the methodological nationalism often
found in comparative political science (Beck and Grande, 2007). And
a restriction of the organizational scope of conflict to the political are-
nas, in contrast, would have left business actors and their exceptionally
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important role for opinion making processes aside. Solid empirical evi-
dence on how business publicly tries to influence policy making processes
is rare. The communicative scope of what debate analyses usually cover,
finally, was extended by the concept of valence campaigning. Actors do
not only try to get access to debates (going public), make their demands
(policy positions taking) and try to manipulate the second-order aspects
of these demands (framing), they also engage in public debates to en-
hance their ascribed competence and reputation in the particular policy
subsystem.
In most general terms, the findings point the considerable neoliberal
dominance in the economic liberalization debate, which has been found
in terms of all four discursive elements. Nevertheless, the basic story
on the nature of the economic liberalization debate is one of conflict.
The public debate is the forum for the articulation of a broad range of
interests and neoliberal dominance is thus not hegemonial in the sense
that there is a widespread consensus among the actors (see van Apel-
doorn, 2002). Neoliberal dominance is challenged by two debate coali-
tions, which articulate their demands sometimes quite consistent and
strong. Further, the strength of neoliberal dominance depends on the
institutional context. Most notably in France and input arenas, the op-
position is fiercer.
This study has quarried insights on the structure of the public debate
and the how the four discursive strategies are related to the institutional
context of countries and arenas as well as actors and coalitions. Regard-
ing structure, the three characteristics transnationalization, accessibility
and dimensionality were explored in chapter 6. In terms of transnation-
alization we found that it affects all countries similarly strong with a
salience of international, supranational, and foreign actors of about 30
to 50 percent. Thus, less than two thirds of statements made in the
public debate on economic liberalization originate at the national level.
As expected, France and Switzerland show a debate that takes place
considerably more often at the domestic level. The state-led economy
(France) and non-EU member state (Switzerland) are thus less affected
by transnational participation in the debates.
The accessibility hypothesis could be largely confirmed as well. Three
of the four coordinated market economies included into the study have
lower entry barriers to the debate, since a broader variety of actors is
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successful with their going public strategy. Switzerland with its partic-
ipatory institutional design is the prime example of accessibility. The
direct democratic institutions and informal decision making processes
should thus be mentioned in the same breath as easy access to debates.
Moreover, this refers to a general characteristic of coordinated market
economies, since the higher accessibility in the economic liberalization
debate confirms results already found for public debates on abortion
and European integration(Ferree et al., 2002; Helbling et al., 2012). The
comparatively more consensus-oriented policy processes in these coun-
tries usually entail the strive for a broader backing of decisions, which
also fosters the going public of actors at the fringe of the polical system.
As suggested in the historical outline of chapter 2, the findings on the
dimensions show that a simple left-right model of political contention
is not accurate to capture the debate on economic liberalization (see
Milner and Judkins, 2004; Dutt and Mitra, 2005). In consequence of the
internationalization of the economies and the corresponding transnation-
alization of conflicts as well as the continuing structuring capacity of the
class divide, the debate is structured into two dimensions. We found that
state intervention to ensure social security (domestic liberalization) and
state intervention to protect national sovereignty (international liberal-
ization) are two different aspects of economic liberalization. This struc-
turing is mainly due to the still virulent opposition of the traditional
left on both aspects of liberalization and the surprisingly forceful resis-
tance of neomercantilists against international liberalization. In terms of
the link to the existing research, this gives credit to the welfare litera-
ture which emphasizes the domestic origins of the debate as well as the
globalization literature that highlights the internationalization of public
conflicts.
Chapter 6 also covered the analyses on going public. Overall, resource-
ful actors in terms of institutionalized channels or public relation capac-
ity clearly are more visible. As expected by the resource argument, the
two actors with the highest standing are the national executives and
corporations. Moreover, in the U.K., Switzerland, and the Netherlands,
going public is thus a more important tool for public authorities to in-
fluence the policy process. As for the U.K., this is due to its majoritar-
ian political system (Lijphart, 1999). Similarly, the centralized style of
corporatist policy making in the Netherlands and the weak role of par-
ties and the legislature in Switzerland gives public authorities a central
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role in the debates in these countries (Woldendorp and Keman, 2007;
Kriesi and Trechsel, 2008). With regard to business interests, big busi-
ness clearly prevails and small businesses, often praised as the pillar of
Western European economies, have almost no voice at all.
There are, however, also dynamics which can be interpreted accord-
ing to the mobilization thesis, according to which institutionally disad-
vantaged actors attempt to influence the political decisions indirectly
by getting the public involved (Wolfsfeld, 1997). Unions are especially
strong in the U.K. and France, where they traditionally have difficulties
to access the crucial sites of political decision making. And corporations
do well in Austria and Germany, where their interests are usually ex-
pected to be integrated into the political realms via business associations.
Furthermore, issue ownership seems to play an important role for the
strength of parties in the debate. More precisely, the going public of
social democrats and the radical left parties is fostered by economic lib-
eralization. Compared to their electoral success, these parties are con-
siderably stronger in the public debate. Social democrats and the radical
left try to be especially visible on the domestic dimension, which pits
proponents and opponents of state intervention to protect the welfare
state against each other.
The general notion of neoliberal dominance is corroborated in the
analyses of policy position taking in chapter 7. The overall position in the
public disputes regarding economic liberalization in Western Europe is
predominantly positive. Especially the U.K. and Switzerland have quite
strongly pro-market leaning overall climate of their debates. However,
there is such a substantial opposition in every country that arguments
regarding a hegemonic pro-liberalization discourse in Western Europe
seem overstretched. Most notably, France stands out as the only coun-
try opposing economic liberalization in general. The remaining coun-
tries lie between the two extremes, but show a moderately pro-market
overall position. In sum, the configuration of countries established by
the averages of policy stances confirms expectations derived from the
comparative political economy literature on varieties of capitalism and
neocorporatist systems of interest intermediation (Hall and Gingerich,
2009; Schmidt, 2009; Visser and Afonso, 2010).
Yet not only country differences with respect to political-economic in-
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stitutional settings were explored in chapter 7. The propositions taken
from media system theories regarding the conflict intensity came un-
der scrutiny, too (see Hallin and Mancini, 2004). Matching the expec-
tations, the debate in the U.K. is the least conflictive, while France has
the most polarized debate on economic liberalization. The high polar-
ization found in the Netherlands conflicts the hypothesis, yet it can be
explained by reason that the Dutch voted on the referendum for the
European Constitution during the time period selected for the debate
analysis. The three remaining corporatist democratic countries (Austria,
Germany, and Switzerland) have a more moderate debate.
The central finding with regard the arenas is that the overall climate
in the janus-faced and output arenas is favorable to economic liberal-
ization. But this does not apply to the input arenas. Neoliberal dom-
inance thus gets strongly challenged in the realms of electoral compe-
tition, parliamentary debates, political protests, and direct democratic
votes. Moreover, the strong articulation of opposition in their input are-
nas is responsible for the high conflict intensity of the debates in France
and Germany.
On the level of actors, the empirically found debate coalitions largely
reflect the theoretically expected constellation between a pro-market
mainstream (consisting of third way and neoliberal actors) and neomer-
cantilist and traditional left challengers. The mainstream is reinforced
by the IGO and EU actors, foreign executives from emerging markets,
national executives, chambers of commerce, peak employer associations,
liberals, Christian democratic and conservative parties, global players,
and public advisory actors. Although there are country specific devia-
tions, all these actors show pro-market positions on both dimensions in
the calculations over all six countries. Private sector unions are the pillar
of the traditional left coalition which struggles against economic liberal-
ization on both the international and domestic divide. They are joined
by public sector unions, communists and left socialists, public welfare
organizations, and, surprisingly, the white collar organizations and the
economic think tanks.
The neomercantilist coalition, which is supportive of domestic liber-
alization but opts for protectionism, is stronger than expected. Here, a
closing of ranks from mainstream left actors, public authority actors, and
some actors from the political right is observable. Not only, as hypothe-
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sized, the right wing populists, farmer organizations, and small business
organizations, but also foreign executives from advanced economies, both
categories of public administrations, judiciary actors, legislatives, niche
and public enterprises, experts, and the mainstream left parties (greens
and social democrats) belong to this coalition. This coalition is quite
salient and thus a forceful challenger of neoliberal dominance, but it is
very inconsistent in terms of valence campaigning and framing. How the
formation of this coalition is playing out, i.e., whether this coalition be-
comes better organized or again falls apart, remains an open question
for further research.
In sum, based on propositions grounded in a historical elaboration of
the debate, a combination of actor-specific characteristics and the in-
stitutional context seems suitable to predict the outcome of the public
debate on economic liberalization. This reflects the initial conceptual-
ization as suggested by the heuristic model outlined in chapter 1. We
not only identified idiosyncrasies of country and arena that were largely
consistent across the four discursive strategies, but also the existence of
specific coalitional constellations in the debate on economic liberaliza-
tion is confirmed for all four discursive strategies.
Appendix A
Classifications
A.1 Actor Classifications
Table A.1 Aggregation of Organizations to Actor Types: General List of
Affiliations
IGO
Annual Summits (G-7, G-8, G-10, G-20); Bank for International Settlements; European Fair Trade
Association; International Air Transport Association; International Labour Organization; Interna-
tional Monetary Fund; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; World
bank; World Trade Organization; World Health Organization.
EU actors
Council of the EU, European Commission, European Council (Ecofin, Gaerc, Epsco etc.).
Foreign executivesa
Advanced economies: Australia; Belgium; Canada; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia;
Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Ireland; Italy; Japan; Latvia; Lithuania; Luxemburg;
Malta; Netherlands; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Slovakia; Slovenia; South Korea; Spain; Sweden;
Switzerland; U.K.; U.S.A.
Emerging markets: Argentina; Benin; Bolivia; Brazil; Burkina Faso; Chile; China; Croatia; Cuba;
Egypt; Guatemala; Hong Kong; India; Indonesia; Iran; Israel; Malaysia; Mauritius; Mexico; Mon-
tenegro; Nigeria; Pakistan; Paraguay; Philippines; Romania; Russia; Senegal; Serbia; Singapore;
South Africa; Sri Lanka; Syria; Taiwan; Tanzania; Thailand; Turkey; Uruguay; Venezuela; Vietnam;
Zambia.
National executives
National, regional and local executives (names not specified) and associations of municipalities
and regions, examples: the “o¨sterreichische Gemeindebund” (A), “interkantonale Konferenz” (CH),
“Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten” (NL).
(continued on next page)
Notes: Parties are listed separately in Table A.2, companies in Table A.3. This is an inductive
list and only actors which were annotated by the content analysis are indicated. Sometimes, this
of course leads to slight overlaps of the categories. Since the single statements and not the actors
listed here are the basic units of the calculations used throughout the book, this list serves only
the purpose of a proper documentation. The Actors named by unspecific terms in the newspaper
documents, e.g., “developing countries” for foreign executives, although coded and aggregated, are
not indicated here. aIn their own country, public authority actors were of course coded as national
executives.
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Aggregation of Organizations to Actor Types (continued).
Public administrations
Economic administrations (central banks, business development, competition, finance and
revenue authorities): O¨sterreichische Nationalbank (A); O¨sterreichische U¨bernahmekommission
(A); O¨sterreichische Industrieholding (A); Austrian Business Agency (A); Finanzmarktaufsicht
(A); U¨bernahmekommission des Bundes (CH); Bundesamt fu¨r Privatversicherungen (CH); Eid-
geno¨ssische Bankenkommission (CH); Eidgeno¨ssische Steuerverwaltung (CH); Finanzkommission
(CH); Greater Zurich Area (CH); Staatssekretariat fu¨r Wirtschaft (CH); Bundesanstalt fu¨r Fi-
nanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (D); Bundeskartellamt (D); Bundeswettbewerbsbeho¨rde (D); Deutsche
Bundesbank (D); Kommission zur Ermittlung der Konzentration im Medienbereich (D); Conseil
Economique et Social (F); Algemene Rekenkamer (NL); Autoriteit Financiele Markten (NL); Ned-
erlandse Mededingingsautoriteit (NL); Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (UK); Bank
of England (UK); Competition Commission (UK); Financial Services Authority (UK); UK Trade
& Investment (UK); HM Revenue & Customs (UK) ; Federal Reserve; Federal Trade Commission;
Internal Revenue Service; Bank of Italy; European Central Bank.
General administrations (infrastructure, social welfare, education and consumer protection
authorities): Energie-Control (A); Forschungsfo¨rderungsgesellschaft (A); Marktamt Wien (A);
Wiener Pa¨dak (A); Bundesamt fu¨r Kommunikation (CH); Bundesamt fu¨r Raumentwicklung (CH);
Bundesamt fu¨r Umwelt (CH); Bundesamt fu¨r Verkehr (CH); Preisu¨berwacher (CH); Bundesagen-
tur fu¨r Arbeit (D); Bundesnetzagentur (D); Stadtwerke Mu¨nchen (D); Comisio´n Nacional de En-
erg´ıa (ES); Agence Franc¸aise de De´veloppement (F); Agence Nationale Pour l’Emploi (F); Au-
torite´ de Re´gulation des Te´le´communications (F); Commissariat a` l’Energie Atomique (F); College
Bescherming Persoonsgegevens (NL); College ter Beoordeling van Geneesmiddelen (NL); Prorail
(NL); Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service (UK); Civil Aviation Authority
(UK); NHS Foundation Trust (UK); Office of Communications (UK); Office of Fair Trading (UK);
Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (UK); Pension Protection Fund (UK); Pensions Regula-
tor (UK); Strategic Rail Authority (UK); European Aviation Safety Agency; European Research
Council; European Space Agency; Police departments in Austria, UK.
Judiciary
O¨sterreichischer Verwaltungsgerichtshof (A); Verfassungsdienst im Bundeskanzleramt (A); Bundes-
gericht (CH); Bundesarbeitsgericht (D); Bundesgerichtshof (D); Bundessozialgericht (D); Conseil
d’E´tat (FR); Lords of Appeal in Ordinary (UK); European Court of Justice.
Legislative
Nationalrat and Bundesrat (A); Nationalrat and Sta¨nderat (CH); Bundestag and Bundesrat (D);
Assemble´e nationale (F); Staten-Generaal (NL); House of Lords and House of Commons (UK). Leg-
islatives from other countries: Chambre des De´pute´s (LUX); Duma (R); Congress (USA). Regional
and local legislatives: Burgenla¨ndischer Landtag (A); Freiburger Kantonsrat (CH); Mu¨nchner Stad-
trat (D). Commissions: Kommission fu¨r Umwelt, Raumplanung und Energie (CH); Parlamen-
tarische Untersuchungskommission (CH); Verkehrskommission (CH); Vermittlungsausschuss (D);
All-Party Parliamentary Beer Group (UK); Commons Health Select Committee and Commons
Trade and Industry Select Committee (UK); Parliamentary Ombudsman (UK).
Interest groups
Chambers of commerce: Bundesverband des Deutschen Gross- und Aussenhandels (D);
Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskammertag (D); Bundesverband Deutscher Buch-, Zeitungs- und
Zeitschriften-Grossisten (D); Bundesverband des Deutschen Textilhandels (D); British Chamber of
Commerce (UK); Eurocommerce.
Peak, big industry and moneyed interest associations: Arbeitgebervertreter des Sparkassenver-
bandes (A); Automotive Cluster Vienna Region (A); Industriellenvereinigung (A); Institute of
International Finance (A); Verband O¨sterreichischer Banken & Bankiers (A); Wirtschafskam-
mer O¨sterreich (A); Astag Nutzfahrzeugverband (CH); Economiesuisse (CH); Schweizerische
Bankiervereinigung (CH); Schweizerischer Anlagefondsverband (CH); Schweizerischer Arbeitge-
berverband (CH); Schweizerischer Baumeisterverband (CH); Suisseporc (CH); Verband Schweizer
Presse (CH); Vereinigung der privaten Aktiengesellschaften (CH); Vereinigung Schweizerischer
Privatbanquiers (CH); Arbeitsgemeinschaft Partnerschaft in der Wirtschaft (D); Bundesverband
der Deutschen Industrie (D); Bundesverband Deutscher Leasing-Unternehmen (D); Bundesvereini-
gung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverba¨nde (D); Gesamtmetall (D); Gesamtverband der Deutschen
Versicherungswirtschaft (D); Schutzgemeinschaft der Kapitalanleger (D); Telekommunikation und
neue Medien (D); Verband der Bahnindustrie (D); Verband der Deutschen Automatenindustrie
(D); Verband der Verbundunternehmen und Regionalen Energieversorger (D); Zentraler Immo-
bilien Ausschuss (D); Association des Actionnaires Minoritaires (F); Association de la Transfor-
mation Laitie`re Franc¸aise (F); Croissance Plus (F); Groupement Industriel des Constructions et
Armements Navals (F); Mouvement des Entreprises de France (F); UNETEL-RST (Telecom, F);
Dutch Fund and Asset Management Association (NL); Nederlandse Vereniging van Banken (NL);
Nederlandse Vereniging van de Research-georie¨nteerde Farmaceutische Industrie (NL); Vereniging
van Effectenbezitters (NL); Vereniging van Nederlandse kabelbedrijven (NL); VNO-NCW (Verbond
van Nederlandse Ondernemingen and Nederlands Christelijk Werkgeversverbond, (NL); Associa-
tion of British Insurers (UK); Association of Private Client Investment Managers and Stockbrokers
(UK); Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (UK); British Bankers’ Association (UK);
British Energy (UK); British Venture Capital Association (UK); Bundesverband deutscher Banken
(UK); Bundesverband Informationswirtschaft (UK); Confederation of British Industry (UK); Insti-
tute of Directors (UK); London Investment Bank Association (UK); Publishers Association (UK);
Associazione Bancaria Italiana; Cefic (European Chemical Industry Council); European Automo-
bile Manufacturers’ Association; European Information and Communications Technology Industry
Association; European Metalworkers’ Federation; GSM Europe; International Federation of the
Phonographic Industry; Union of Industrial and Employer Confederations of Europe.
(continued on next page)
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Aggregation of Organizations to Actor Types (continued).
Interest groups
Small business associations: Gru¨ne Wirtschaft (A); O¨sterreichische Hoteliervereinigung (A);
Ring Freiheitlicher Wirtschaftstreibender (A); Bu¨ndner Bergbahnen (CH); City-Vereinigung (CH);
Fe´de´ration des syndicats hoˆteliers de Haute-Savoie (F); Gastro Suisse (CH); Hotelleriesuisse
(CH); Luzern Tourismus (CH); Schweizerischer Gewerbeverband (CH); Schweizerischer Touris-
musverband (CH); Swiss Retail Federation (CH); Unternehmer-Vereinigung Wetzikon (CH);
Verband o¨ffentlicher Verkehr (CH); Verband Schweizerischer Gemu¨seproduzenten (CH); Vere-
inigung Bahnhofstrasse (CH); Centre des Jeunes Dirigeants d’Entreprise (F); Comite´ Riche-
lieu (F); Confe´de´ration Ge´ne´rale du Patronat des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises (F); Union
franc¸aise des industries textiles (F); Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft der Mittel- und Grossbetriebe des
Einzelhandels (D); Interessenverband Deutscher Zeitarbeitsunternehmen (D); Deutscher Hotel-
und Gaststa¨ttenverband (D); Tarifgemeinschaft deutscher La¨nder (D); Verein kommunaler Un-
ternehmen (D); Zentralverband des Deutschen Handwerks (D); Zentralverband Deutscher Schorn-
steinfeger (D); Bescherming Rechten Entertainment Industrie Nederland (NL); Bouwend Nederland
(NL); Federation of Small Businesses (UK); Interprovinciaal Werkgeversverband (NL); Koninklijke
Vereniging MKB-Nederland (NL); Association of Convenience Stores (UK); Association of Inde-
pendent Music (UK); Forum of Private Business (UK); Usability Professionals’ Association (UK);
International Visual Communications Association.
Private sector unions and umbrella associations: Arbeiterkammern (A); AUA Bordbetriebsrat
(A); Christgewerkschaft (A); Gewerkschaft der Privatangestellten (A); Gewerkschaft Hotel, Gast-
gewerbe, Perso¨nlicher Dienst (A); Gewerkschaft Metall-Textil-Nahrung (A); O¨sterreichischer Gew-
erkschaftsbund (A); Comedia (CH); Personal Union SAir Holding (CH); Schweizerischer Gew-
erkschaftsbund (CH); Travail Suisse (CH); UNIA (CH); Confe´de´ration Franc¸aise De´mocratique
du Travail (F); Confe´de´ration ge´ne´rale du Travail (F); Confe´de´ration Franc¸aise des Travailleurs
Chre´tiens (F); Loysel (F); Sud (Solidaires Unitaires De´mocratiques, F); Syndicat des Travailleurs
Corses (F); Syndicat Interprofessionnel de Travailleuses et Travailleurs (F); Union Nationale des
Syndicats Autonomes (F); Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (D); Betriebsra¨te (Daimler-Chrysler,
Siemens, Continental, D); IG Bergbau, Chemie, Energie (D); IG Metall (D); SPD-Gewerkschaftsrat
(D); Verdi (Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft, D); Alternatief voor Vakbond (NL); Christelijk
Nationaal Vakverbond (NL); Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging (NL); Amicus (UK); Broadcast-
ing, Entertainment, Cinematograph and Theatre Union (UK); Britain’s General Union (UK); Na-
tional Union of Journalists (UK); Prospect (UK); Public and Commercial Services Union (UK);
Rail, Maritime and Transport Union (UK); Scottish Trades Union Congress (UK); Trades Union
Congress (UK); Transport and General Workers’ Union (UK); Union of Shop, Distributive and
Allied Workers (UK); European Trade Union Confederation; Fe´de´ration des Travailleurs et Tra-
vailleuses du Que´bec; Union Network International.
Public sector unions: Gewerkschaft der Eisenbahner (A); Gewerkschaft fu¨r Post- und Fernmeldebe-
dienstete (A); Aktion Gsundi Gsundheitspolitik (CH); Dachverband Schweizer Lehrerinnen und
Lehrer (CH); Gewerkschaft Kommunikation (CH); Personalverband des Bundes (CH); Schweiz-
erischer Eisenbahn- und Verkehrspersonal-Verband (CH); Schweizerische Verband des Personals
o¨ffentlicher Dienste (CH); Swisspersona (CH); Verband Schweizerischer Polizei-Beamter (CH);
Betriebsra¨te Landesentwicklungsgesellschaften (D); Gewerkschaft Deutscher Bundesbahnbeamten
und Anwa¨rter (D); Transnet (D); Fe´de´ration Inde´pendante et De´mocratique Lyce´enne (F);
Fe´de´ration Syndicale Unitaire (F); Syndicat National des Personnels de Direction de l’E´ducation
Nationale (F); Algemene Bond Van Ambtenaren and Katholieke Bond van Overheidspersoneel
(NL); Vakcentrale voor middengroepen en hoger personeel (NL); VVMC Vakbond voor Rijdend
Personeel (NL); Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (UK); Communication
Workers Union (UK); Jennie Lee Students’ Association (UK); Unison (UK).
Farmer associations: Landwirtschaftskammer O¨sterreich (A); Schweizerischer Bauernverband
(CH); Arbeitskreis Deutsche Grenzlandwirte (D); Badischer Landwirtschaftlicher Hauptverband
(D); Deutscher Bauernverband (D); Confe´de´ration paysanne (F); Coordination rurale (F); Jeunes
Agriculteurs (F); European Farmers (COPA-COGECA).
White collar associations: Bundeskammer der Architekten und Ingenieurkonsulenten (A); Recht-
sanwaltskammer O¨sterreich (A); Vereinigung o¨sterreichischer Staatsanwa¨ltinnen und Staatsanwa¨lte
(A); Federatio Medicorum Helveticorum (CH); Kaufma¨nnischer Verband (CH); Apothekerkammer
(D); Berufsverband selbsta¨ndiger Buchhalter und Bilanzbuchhalter (D); Marburger Bund (D);
Confe´de´ration Franc¸aise de l’Encadrement - Confe´de´ration Ge´ne´rale des Cadres (F); Fe´de´ration
Hospitalie`re de France (F); Syndicat national unifie´ des impoˆts (F); Landelijke Huisartsen Verenig-
ing (NL); Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (UK); British Medical Association (UK);
Family Law Bar Association (UK); General Council of the Bar (UK); Law Society (UK); Union
des Syndicats et Associations Professionnelles Inde´pendants Europe´ens.
(continued on next page)
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Aggregation of Organizations to Actor Types (continued).
Experts
Economic research institutes and think tanks: BAK Basel Economics (CH); International Institute
for Management Development (CH); Institut Constant de Rebecque (CH); Ifo Institute for Eco-
nomic Research (D); Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Ko¨ln (D); Institut fu¨r Makroo¨konomie und
Konjunkturforschung (D); Wirtschaftsforschungsinstitut (D); Zentrum fu¨r europa¨ische Wirtschafts-
forschung (D); Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (F); Centre lillois
d’e´tudes et de recherches sociologiques et e´conomiques (F); Institute nationale de la statistique
et des e´tudes e´conomiques (F); Observatoire franc¸ais des conjonctures e´conomiques (F); Centraal
Planbureau (NL); Bruegel (Think tank); Centre for European Policy Studies; Centre for European
Reform; World Economic Forum.
Public advisory and research insitutes and cultural experts: Rat fu¨r Forschung und Technologieen-
twicklung (A); Akademien der Wissenschaften (D); Arbeitsgemeinschaft der o¨ffentlich-rechtlichen
Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (D); Institut fu¨r Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufs-
forschung (D); Acade´mie des sciences (F); Confe´rence des Pre´sidents d’Universite´ (F); Institut
National Agronomique (F); Institut National de la sante´ et de la recherche me´dicale (F); Uni-
versite´ Claude-Bernard Lyon I (F); Expertenkommission fu¨r eine Elektrizita¨tswirtschaftsordnung
(CH); ETH Lausanne (CH); Institut fu¨r Publizistikwissenschaften und Medienforschung UZH
(CH); Schauspielhaus Zu¨rich (CH); Schweizerische Vereinigung fu¨r Landesplanung (CH); Vet-
erina¨rmedizinische Fakulta¨t Zu¨rich (CH); Adviesraad voor Internationale Vraagstukken (NL); Al-
gemene Energieraad (NL); Instituut voor Verantwoord Medicijngebruik (NL); Hanzehogeschool
Groningen (NL); Raad voor Verkeer en Waterstaat (NL); Stuurgroep Sectorplan Wetenschap Tech-
nologie (NL); Vereniging van Universiteiten (NL); Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regerings-
beleid (NL); Royal Commission of Lord Sutherland (UK); the Scotsman (UK).
Public welfare organizations
Aid organizations and churches: O¨kosoziales Forum (A); Behindertenzentrum Wabe (CH); Brot
fu¨r alle (CH); Caritas (CH); Evangelisch-reformierte Kirche (CH); Kulturstadt Jetzt (CH); Schweiz-
erisches Arbeiterhilfswerk (CH); Schweizer Tierschutz (CH); Stiftung fu¨r ganzheitliche Betreuung
(CH); Stiftung St. Martin (CH); Deutscher Mieterbund (D); Evangelische Kirche (D); Mieterforum
Ruhr (D); Komitee fu¨r eine sichere Spitalversorgung (D); Volksinitiative fu¨r sichere Wohnungen
und Arbeitspla¨tze (D); Emmaus (F); Maison de la Jeunesse et de la Culture Chamonix (F); Com-
mission Tabaksblat (NL); Nederlandse Patienten en Consumenten Federatie (NL); British Council
(UK); Campaign for Real Ale (UK); Church of England (UK); Oxfam (UK); Save the children
(UK); UnLtd (UK); Which? (UK); Harvard Foundation; Rockefeller Foundation; Transfair; Green-
peace; WWF.
Global justice movements: Aktionskomitee Galmiz (CH); Attac; Basel Action Network (NL); Das
andere Davos (CH); Ecology & Development (D); Mexiko-Plattform (A); Via Campesina; World
Social Forum; World Economy.
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Table A.2 Aggregation of Party Actors to Party Families
Country/
Parties Level
Communists and radical socialists
KPO¨ (Communist Party of Austria) A
PCF (French Communist Party), Force Ouvrie`re (Workers’ Force) F
Die Linke (The Left), DKP (German Communist Party) D
Socialistische Partij (Socialist Party) NL
AL (Alternative List), Solidarite´s (Solitarities) CH
Greens
Die Gru¨nen (The Greens) A
Les Verts (The Greens) F
Bu¨ndnis 90/Die Gru¨nen (Alliance 90/The Greens) D
GroenLinks (Green Left) NL
Green Party UK
Gru¨ne Partei (Green Party) CH
European Greens EP
Social democrats
SPO¨ (Social Democratic Party of Austria) A
PS (Socialist party) F
SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany) D
PvdA (Labor Party) NL
Labour Party, Scottish National Party UK
SPS (Social Democratic Party of Switzerland) CH
Party of European Socialists EP
Liberals
Liberales Forum (Liberal Forum) A
UDF (Union for French Democracy) F
FDP (Free Democratic Party) D
D66 (Democrats 66), VVD (People ’s Party for Freedom and Democracy) NL
Liberal Democratic Party UK
Die Liberalen (The Liberals), GLP (Green Liberal Party) CH
Alliance of Liberals & Democrats for Europe EP
Christian democrats and conservatives
O¨VP (Austrian People ’s Party) A
UMP (Union for a Popular Movement) F
CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic/Christian Social Union) D
CDA (Christian Democratic Appeal) NL
Conservative Party UK
CVP (Christian Democratic People ’s Party), EVP (Evangelical People’s Party),
CSP (Christian Social Party)
CH
European People’s Party EP
Radical and populist right
FPO¨ (Freedom Party), BZO¨ (Alliance for the Future of Austria) A
Front National (National Front), MPF (Movement for France) F
Lijst Pim Fortuyn (List Pim Fortuyn) NL
United Kingdom Independence Party UK
SVP (Swiss People ’s Party), Lega (League of Ticinesi), SD (Swiss Democrats),
EDU (Federal Democratic Union)
CH
Notes: Only parties that were annotated in the content analysis are included in the classification.
Only one small party, the Frysk Nasjonale Partij (Frisian National Party), could not be classified. It
is characterized by a distinct regionalist ideology that does not match the more general categories
defined here. However, this exclusion should not affect the results since there are only very few
statements of this party in the data set. Labels: A=Austria, F= France, D=Germany, NL=the
Nethelands, UK=United Kingdom, CH=Switzerland, EP=European Parliament.
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Table A.3 Classification of Companies
Finance-law-IT
Global: ABN Amro; Accenture; AGF; AIG; Allianz; Aon Consulting; AVIVA; AXA; Banca Popo-
lare Italiana; Bank Austria; Barclays; BNP Paribas; Buck Consultants; Credit Suisse; Delta Lloyd;
Deutsche Bo¨rse; Deutsche Bank; Dexia; DWS; Electronic Data Systems; Ernst & Young; Erste
Bank; Erste Sparinvest; Euronext; EVN; FBD; Fortis; Friends Provident; Gagfah; GE Money Bank;
Goldman Sachs; Grant Thornton; HSBC; HypoVereinsbank; IBM; Immofinanz; ING; KPMG; Land
Securities; Legal & General; Lehman Brothers; Lincoln Financial Group; Lloyds Banking Group;
London Stock Exchange; Man Group; Microsoft; Morgan Stanley; Morley Fund Management; Na-
tional Australia Bank; Postfinance; PricewaterhouseCoopers; Prudential; Rabobank; Raiffeisen-
bank; Royal Bank of Scotland; Salomon Oppenheim.
Niche: 3i; ABP; Addleshaw Goddard; Allen Overy; Annington; AT Kearney; Atradius; AWS; Bank
Burgenland; BAWAG; BDO Stoy Howard; Blackstone; Bysoft; Capital Regional; Casino Austria;
CDC-Ixis; Centaurus; Cesmo consulting; Collins Steward Tullet; CSC; Eversheds; Fortress; Grazer
Wechselseitige; Hammerson; Hellman Friedman; Hypo Alpe Adria Bank; IBA Health; Kathrein-
bank; Kohlberg Kravis Roberts; LAC London Asia Capital; Liberata; Macfarlanes; Maxdata; Meinl
Bank; Messe Frankfurt; Montagu Private Equity; Oxford Innovation; Partouche; Partygaming;
Paulson; Permira; PGGM; Porr-Solutions; Proxinvest.
State: Landesbank Berlin.
Retail-tourism
Global: Aldi; ASDA; IKEA; Interio; KarstadtQuelle; Kaufhof; Marks & Spencer; Metro; Morrisons;
REWE.
Niche: AVA-Edeka; Boden; BQ; Citydisc; Dawsons; Denner; DM Drogerie; Gate Gourmet; John
Lewis; Kuoni.
Social services
Niche: Birmingham University; Evangelischer Sozialkonzern Augustinum; Rho¨n-Klinikum; Yale
Foundation.
State: Fachhochschule Steyr; Universita¨tsspital Bern; Schweizerische Unfallversicherungsanstalt;
Capital City Academy.
Transport-commmunication
Global: Ae´roports de Paris; Abertis; Air France; Alitalia; Alltel; AUA; Axel Springer; BBA Avia-
tion; Bertelsmann; BMG; British Airways; British Telecom; Continental; Delta; Deutsche Post;
Deutsche Telekom; DHL; Faurecia; France Te´le´com; Frankfurt Airport; KPN; Lufthansa; Mo-
bilkom; News Corporation; One; Orange; Rail Cargo Austria; Reuters.
Niche: AZ-Medien-Gruppe; BLS Cargo; Casema; Chiltern; Competence Call Center; Copenhagen
Aitport; Easy Jet; Eurotunnel; Future; IPA plus; Kabel1; Lenzerheide Bergbahnen; Ma¨rkische
Allgemeine; N 24; ProSieben Sat1 Media; Railtrack; Redmail.
State: BBC; British Airports Authority; Connexxion; Deutsche Bahn; O¨BB; O¨sterreichische Post;
La Poste; London Underground; Nederlandse Spoorwegen; Network Rail; ORF; RATP; Rotter-
damse Elektr. Tram; Royal Mail; Swiss Post; Vienna International Airport.
Chemistry
Global: Akzo Nobel; Amgen; Aventis; BP; British Plaster Board; Celgene; Ciba; Clariant; Dow
Chemical; DSM; Eastman Kodak; ENI; Gas Natural; GlaxoSmithKline; Henkel; Lafarge; L’Ore´al;
Novartis; OMV; Roche.
Niche: Altana; Amag; ATS; Filtrona; Ipsen; KCW; Kollo Silicium Carbide; Lenzing; Medicom;
RHI.
State: Gaz de France; Gazprom; Rosneft.
Electricity-construction
Global: Areva; Bilfinger Berger; Centrica; E.ON; Endesa; Essent; Hochtief; Holcim; Iberdrola; Na-
tional Grid; Power-One.
Niche: Eneco; Heijmans; Nuon.
State: Ele´ctricite´ de France; Enel.
(continued on next page)
Notes: All classifications are based on the situation in time period from 2004 to 2006. The list
indicates all firms annotated by their proper names and not by collective terms, e.g., “watch
industry” or “pharmaceutical sector”. For the sector classification of companies which are active
in more than one sector, only the main line of business was considered. Labels: Global=Global
player, Niche=Company operating in a niche market or domestic-oriented business, State=Largely
state-owned, see Table B.1 for an explanation of the categories. Since the single statements and not
the corporations listed here are the basic units of the calculations used throughout the book, this list
only serves the purpose of a proper documentation.
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Classification of Companies (continued)
Food-textile-wood
Global: Altadis; Associated British Foods; Austria Tabak; British American Tabacco; Cadburry
Schweppes; Danone; Heineken; LU; Nestle´.
Niche: Amer Sports; Bata; DIM; Emmi; Francas; Gelco; Heindl; Isosport; Palmers; Panzani; Pfan-
ner; San Carlo.
Metal-machinery
Global: AEG; Airbus; Alcan Pechiney; Alcoa; Arcelor; Bo¨hler-Uddeholm; BAE Systems; BenQ;
Black und Decker; Boeing; Bombardier; Bosch; Corus; Daimler-Chrysler; EADS; Electrolux; Ford;
General Motors; Givaudan; Hewlett-Packard; Jaguar; Lada; Land Rover Jaguar; Magna; MG Rover;
Mittal Steel; Motorola; Norsk Hydro; Peugeot; Philips; PSA Peugeot-Citroeˆn; Renault; Rolls Royce.
Niche: Aldel; DCN; Fendt; Grillo-Werke; Imerys; Leoni; Lexmark; Marconi; Mayflower; Novomatic.
State: Nanjing Automobiles.
Agriculture-mining
Niche: RAG.
A.2 Classification of Frames and Issues 177
A.2 Classification of Frames and Issues
Table A.4 Allocation of Justifications to Frame Categories
Intervention
Market failure; fiscal policy; bureaucracy; political efficiency; international relations; public goods
(education, infrastructure etc.); interventionism in general; economic delinquency (clandestine em-
ployment, black market etc.); delinquency in general; security in general; corruption; political
stability; inflation policy.
Social protection
Employment protection; labor disputes and strikes; reducing unemployment; job quality; occupa-
tional health; social dumping; stakeholder interests; social security in general; consumer protection;
individual well-being in general; labor relations and union agreements.
Prosperity
Innovation; economic prosperity in general (of individuals, companies or sectors); wealth in general;
free trade; liberalization; globalization; investments; profits; corporate management; competitive-
ness; research and development; economic progress.
Protection
Protectionism; relocation abroad and foreign take-overs; loss of traditions; answer to globalization;
benefit for domestic or local business; national identity; nationalism; national autonomy; national
sovereignty; national interest in general; xenophobia; immigration.
Social justice
Human dignity; democratic and participatory principles; equality of opportunity; poverty relief (as
a moral duty); cultural diversity; gender equality; minority rights; exploitation; peace; solidarity
with developing countries; public welfare; noncommercial values; humanitarian law; social justice
in general; socialist ideology.
Economic freedom
Economic self-interest; entrepreneurial success; blessing of capitalism and free markets; freedom of
economic activity in general; neo-liberal ideology; individual responsibility; entrepreneurial free-
dom; freedom of choice.
Notes: Contrary to the issues and actors, the frame annotation relied on closed categories, i.e.
a general classification system was established before the coding. For the analyses, however, the
classification was regrouped into the categories shown here.
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Table A.5 Classification of Issues
International deregulation in general
International deregulation in general: coordination of the European Single Market (e.g., Stabil-
ity and Growth Pact); European Constitution; global economic policy fora and critics (e.g., WEF,
open forum davos, World Social Fora); international authorities (WTO, IMF, G-8 etc.); more social
European Union (Social Charter); more social globalization (fair trade); politically or democrati-
cally controlled economic globalization; re-regulation of policies on the European or international
level; regulation of international issues (patent laws, genetic engineering, copyright, energy secu-
rity, terrorism); stability of the global economy; third way (bringing globalization and welfare in
line).
Trade and international labor market deregulation: Cassis de Dijon principle (free movement of
goods); coordination of labor regulation at the European and international level; deepening the
European Single Market; employment protection of temporary foreign workers and other foreigners;
EU directives (e.g., regarding working time); import quota or other import restrictions; priority
for natives regarding employment standards, wages etc.; regulation related to free trade and tariff
agreements (bilateral and multilateral); subsidy programs; WTO regulations.
Financial market deregulation and flexible tax regimes: banking secrecy; banking supervision;
central bank issues (independence and international cooperation); European Monetary Union; fis-
cal reforms in general and regarding business taxes in specific; interest, monetary, and exchange
rate policies; measures against financial crises; private finance initiatives; protection of investors;
regulation enhancing competitiveness of financial centers and stock exchanges; regulation of credit
business; regulation of financial markets in general; regulation of hedge funds and private equity
funds or other institutional investors; regulation of insurances; sales taxes; tax amnesties; tax com-
petition; tax cooperation on the European or international level; tax fraud; tax regulation with
regard to all kinds of financial products.
Internationalization
Economic globalization in general: adaption to globalization pressures; export risk insurances; ex-
port subsidies; inducement of competition in general; international expansion of public enterprises;
internationalization and Europeanization of production; internationalization of companies or whole
industries (e.g., loans to produce in China); neo-liberal world order (in an economic sense); offshore
outsourcing; relocation.
Liberalization of trade and free movement of labor : cutbacks of agricultural subsidies (also with
respect to the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union); decreasing border controls;
deepening of the European Single Market; enhancement of trade relations (e.g., via multilateral
or bilateral free trade agreements); establishment of free trade zones; free movement of persons in
general and the establishment or extensions of agreements (e.g., the Schengen agreement); higher
participation of foreigners (e.g., high-skilled or low wage workers); immigration policies; liberal-
ization of the European service sector (e.g., Bolkestein directive); lowering costs for international
trade (e.g., lowering fees on parallel imports); opening of national markets for trade in general and
specifically (e.g., airline); priority for natives regarding employment opportunities; reduction of
tariff and non-tariff barriers in general and specifically (e.g., on textiles or agricultural products);
WTO negotiations and disputes.
Opposition to the sheltering of national economies: defense against foreign take-overs in general;
Golden or majority share for national shareholders or the government; market access for foreign
business; “national” or “European champions” (state-led mergers to prevent foreign takeovers);
priority for domestic businesses in public contracts; state subsidies for strategic industries and
companies (e.g., defense or aircraft industry); transfer of property to foreigners.
Locational promotion
Enhancing tax competition and free capital movements: against double taxation; attracting for-
eign investments and liberalization of capital movements; coordination of regional and local tax
regimes; degressive taxes; ethical or ecological considerations concerning taxation; flat-rate tax
regimes; promoting tax competition in general; reduction of stamp taxes and taxes on capital
gains and property; reduction of top income tax rates; tax arbitrage policies; tax cuts and reforms
in general; tax exemption for specific activities (e.g., public trusts and non-profit associations);
taxes on business in general and specific (e.g., taxes for small and medium-sized businesses, multi-
national corporations, or services).
Locational promotion in general: advancing prestigious projects; cutting prices (road pricing,
roaming etc.); development of specific regions in general; enhancing competitiveness (of countries,
regions, or cities); fostering educational elites; image campaigns; improving transport and other
infrastructure; Lissabon Agenda (EU innovation reform programs); promoting research and devel-
opment (public and private, e.g., biotechnology, pharmaceutics, or alternative energies); promoting
special economic areas; promoting specific industries overseas (e.g., tourism); provide new jobs at
specific locations.
(continued on next page)
Notes: This is an inductive list and only issues which were annotated by the content analysis are
indicated. Sometimes, this of course leads to a slightly overlapping categorizations. Since the single
statements and not the issues listed here are the basic units of the calculations used throughout the
book, this list only serves the purpose of a proper documentation. The direction of the single policy
positions was adapted so that a positive polarity always means a pro-liberalization position.
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Classification of Issues (continued)
Privatization
Austerity programs; better collaboration between research insitutes or public administrations and
private businesses; compensation and health insurances; downsizing of the public sector in general;
e.g., in health care; end of public monopolies (e.g., railways or gambling); energy and tourist in-
frastructure; energy or telecommunication businesses; full or partial privatization of media (press,
television, radio); health care; initial public offerings or sale of public entreprises (or parts of them);
nationalization of companies or industries (e.g., in the energy business or area of education); po-
lice departments; police tasks; postal services; postal services and armament industries; public
administration in general; public housing; public-private-partnerships; reduction of subsidies by
the state in general; reforms of public services for more efficiency; regulation of privatized busi-
nesses; restructuring of public entreprises; state banks; telecommunication industries; transport
infrastructure (highways, railways, airports etc.); universities; waste management.
Domestic liberalization
Liberalization of national markets in general: fostering entrepreneurial responsibility; inducing
more competitiveness; liberalization of markets in general; liberalization of whole industries or
sectors (e.g., the gambling industry); market mechanisms as a general principle.
Flexible wage and pension regimes: demands for higher wages (sectors, industries, or individual
corporations); early retirement (for the whole economy, sectors, industries or single corporations);
incentive wage; income equality (regarding gender, sectoral, or age disparities); low wage jobs;
lowering retirement age; minimum wages; more decentralized and flexible wage setting; pay freezes;
pension protection schemes (insurances or funds); state subsidies of wages (e.g., for part-time
employment); unemployment benefits; wage bargaining in general; wage restraints in hard times.
Industry support: bailouts of industries; encouraging start-ups and other financial incentives to
employers; fostering of investments; rescue of production sites; state support in bankruptcy pro-
cesses; support of sectors, industries, and companies in crises (e.g., airlines, farmers, craftsmen,
small and medium-sized businesses).
Labor market deregulation
anti-discrimination regulations (for foreigners, non-residents and disabled persons as well as re-
garding gender equality or age); dismissal protection; flexible working time legislation in general;
general labor market reforms; maternity and fraternity leave; night work; occupational disability
guidelines; opening hours of retail businesses and gastronomy (e.g., Sunday or evening shopping
times); paid vacations (e.g., new public holiday or minimum paid holidays); reduction of admin-
istrative costs with respect to labor regulations; reduction of working time in general; regulation
of apprentice and other on-the job training; regulations regarding the work week (40 hours, 35
hours etc.); temporary and part-time work; worker protection from health risks (e.g., prevention
of accidents or ban on smoking).
Retrenchment of restrictions in general
Deregulation of national markets in general: complementary regulations to liberalization and pri-
vatization projects; corporate governance codes of conduct in general; exorbitant manager salaries;
less red tape in general; less state interventions in general; social and ethical values as corporate
guidelines; transparency and sustainability of management decisions.
Opposition to social partnership and job security: bans on recruitment; bipartite or tripartite
negotiations; co-determination rights (of single workers or work councils); corporatism in general;
government job guarantee; international collaboration of unions; job cuts; job security in general;
labor peace and social partnership in general; reinstatements; reorganization of companies; right
to strike; sectoral agreements (on multi-sectoral, national, or plant level); severance payments or
other compensation; social plans in case of dismissals; special employment services and professional
training for laid-off employees; strikes or other coordinated campaigns by unions.
Loosening competition restrictions: antitrust laws and measures (concerning the whole economy,
sectors, industries or single companies); distortion of competition; price controls; mergers (only of
national companies); sale of business units; take-overs (hostile and friendly).
Appendix B
Additional Classifications and Formal
Definitions of Indices
Table B.1 Definition of Levels of Origin and Company Types
Level of origin
National All statements from actors of the country under consider-
ation which are not affiliated with either the European or
international level.
Foreign Horizontal transnationalism: an actor’s statement is clas-
sified as foreign, if the actor is from another country than
the one under consideration.
European Vertical transnationalism I: statements from actors affili-
ated to the European Union (mostly public authorities, but
also European parties, interest groups and think tanks.)
International Vertical transnationalism II: statements from actors af-
filiated to international organizations and multinational
corporations.
Company typea
Global (global player) The firm is among the top 2000 public companies of the
world according to the Forbes magazine or private compa-
nies with an economic strength comparable to the ranking.
The ranking is based on the performance of the companies
on the four metrics sales, profit, assets and market value.
State (state-owned) State-owned enterprises (at least to a substantial degree).
Niche (niche-domes-
tic)
Mostly domestically or regionally oriented businesses or
firms operating in smaller market niches.
Notes: aSource: Forbes (2010) and own inquiries.
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Table B.2 Index Definitions: Polarization, Dunn index, Kmeans++ Weighting, and
Closeness Centrality
Index Definition Description
Polarization P =
k∑
k=1
ωk(χk − χ¯)2 ωk is the salience of actor k, χk is the position of
actor k on the issue, and χ¯ is the weighted aver-
age position of all actors on this scale, where the
weights are again provided by the actor-specific
salience.
Dunn index D = dmin
dmax
dmin denotes the smallest distance between two
actors from different clusters, and dmax the largest
distance of two actors from the same cluster.
Kmeans++
weighting
K = D(x
′)2∑
xχ
D(x)2
K is the probability that we choose a center x′
that is proportional to the overall potential of this
center. Since D(x) is the shortest distance from a
data point x to the closest center already defined,
the selection of x′ with K is closer to the optimal
clustering solution than an a priori selected cluster
center.
Closeness cen-
trality
C = |V |−1∑
iv
dvi
C is defined by the inverse of the average length
of the shortest paths d to and from all the other
vertices i in the graph. If there is no direct path
between vertex v and i then the total number of
vertices (|V |) is used in the formula instead of the
path length.
Appendix C
Additional Analyses
Table C.1 Criteria for Count Model Selection For Actor Regressions on
Going Public as Used in Figure 6.1
Ln alpha test
Mean Variance ln alpha Pr> |z| Model
International 10.55 239.22 –0.212 * Negative binominal
Domestic 6.82 85.12 –0.486 *** Negative binominal
Notes: Levels of significance: +≤0.1, *≤0.05, **≤0.01, ***≤0.005.
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Figure C.1 Histograms for Dependent Variables in
Actor Regressions on Going Public as Used in Fig-
ure 6.1
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Table C.2 Results of Count Regression Models on the Going Public by Actors
as Used in Figure 6.1
International Domestic
Negative Negative
binominal binominal
Std. Std.
Coef. Err. P>z Coef. Err. P>z
Actors (ref = national executives)
IGO actors –1.376 0.377 *** –2.319 0.559 ***
EU actors –0.148 0.314 n.s. –1.042 0.310 ***
For. exec. adv. economies –0.426 0.315 n.s. –1.929 0.363 ***
For. exec. emerging markets –1.004 0.387 ** –2.765 0.488 ***
Econ. administrations –1.151 0.366 ** –1.873 0.394 ***
Other administrations –1.951 0.393 *** –1.985 0.379 ***
Judiciary –1.363 0.459 ** –1.779 0.465 ***
Legislatives –1.090 0.376 ** –1.142 0.376 **
Chambers of commerce –2.405 0.475 *** –3.049 0.754 ***
Peak empl. assoc. –1.295 0.329 *** –1.478 0.316 ***
Small bus. assoc. –2.290 0.384 *** –3.250 0.459 ***
Private sector unions –0.900 0.326 ** –0.503 0.281 n.s.
Publ. sector unions –2.707 0.472 *** –1.871 0.331 ***
Farmer org. –2.075 0.454 *** –3.017 0.715 ***
White collar assoc. –1.999 0.434 *** –1.997 0.381 ***
Communists/Left soc. –2.140 0.475 *** –2.007 0.418 ***
Greens –2.358 0.555 *** –2.141 0.390 ***
Social democrats –0.757 0.327 * –0.942 0.292 ***
Liberals –1.691 0.372 *** –1.753 0.362 ***
Christian dem./Cons. –1.044 0.339 ** –1.243 0.307 ***
Right–wing populists –1.381 0.422 *** –1.443 0.426 ***
Global players –0.259 0.323 n.s. –1.156 0.317 ***
Niche firms –0.725 0.317 * –1.062 0.291 ***
Public enterprises –1.743 0.391 *** –1.287 0.297 ***
Econ. think tanks –2.096 0.431 *** –2.511 0.637 ***
Public advisory actors –1.426 0.331 *** –1.125 0.304 ***
Public welfare org. –2.128 0.431 *** –2.687 0.461 ***
Public welfare mov. –1.771 0.439 *** –2.562 0.778 ***
Countries (ref = France)
Austria –0.436 0.190 * –0.183 0.190 n.s.
Germany –0.065 0.193 n.s. –0.050 0.181 n.s.
Netherlands –0.017 0.190 n.s. –0.368 0.213 n.s.
Switzerland 0.342 0.186 n.s. –0.099 0.187 n.s.
U.K. 0.042 0.189 n.s. –0.435 0.203 *
Arenas (ref = Input arenas)
Janus–faced 0.327 0.163 * –0.080 0.145 n.s.
Output 0.375 0.165 * 0.008 0.156 n.s.
Constant 3.065 0.273 *** 3.338 0.246 ***
N 333 286
Wald tests
Overall model 196.41 *** DF=35 173.74 *** DF=35
Actors 166.46 *** DF=28 167.21 *** DF=28
Notes: Coefficients, robust standard errors and levels of significance of count regression models on
the level of actors; Levels of significance: *≤0.05, **≤0.01, ***≤0.005.
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Table C.3 Dunn Indices of Different
Cluster Solutions to Determine the
Number of Coalitions as Used in
Figure 8.4 and 8.5
Country 2 cluster 3 cluster 4 cluster
France 0.270 0.263 0.290
Austria 0.197 0.306 0.300
Germany 0.120 0.221 0.537
Netherlands 0.242 0.187 0.369
Switzerland 0.320 0.209 0.200
U.K. 0.197 0.306 0.300
Table C.4 Cluster Centers of Coalitions Calculated by Kmeans++ as Used
in Figure 8.4 and 8.5
1st center 2nd center 3rd center 4rd center
Country int. dom. int. dom. int. dom. int. dom.
France –0.614 –0.922 0.270 0.280 –0.740 –0.095 –0.496 0.922
Austria 0.206 –0.192 0.279 0.601 –0.607 –0.121
Germany 0.458 0.686 –0.902 –0.721 0.328 –0.556 –0.610 0.471
Netherlands –0.566 –0.175 0.243 0.947 0.335 0.129 0.390 –0.692
Switzerland –0.131 –0.743 0.312 0.427
U.K. 0.169 0.052 0.431 0.711 –0.227 –0.854
Note: Labels: int.=international liberalization, dom.=domestic liberalization.
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Table C.5 Closeness Centrality Overall and by Subject or
Object Status as Used in Figure 9.1
Overall Subject Object
centrality centrality centrality
IGO actors 60.9 47.5 52.5
EU actors 82.4 44.9 55.1
For. exec. adv. economies 100.0 38.9 61.1
For. exec. emerging markets 60.9 47.9 52.1
National executives 96.6 65.1 34.9
Econ. administrations 75.7 46.3 53.7
Gen. administrations 62.2 46.9 53.1
Judiciary 62.2 52.6 47.4
Legislatives 70.0 45.7 54.3
Chambers of commerce 57.1 51.4 48.6
Peak employer assoc. 73.7 50.6 49.4
Small business assoc. 68.3 52.1 47.9
Private sector unions 80.0 51.9 48.1
Public sector unions 65.1 52.0 48.0
Farmer organizations 53.8 51.7 48.3
White-collar organizations 59.6 51.0 49.0
Communists/Left socialists 60.9 47.6 52.4
Greens 62.2 50.0 50.0
Social democrats 77.8 49.4 50.6
Liberals 65.1 51.5 48.5
Christian dem./Conservatives 82.4 51.3 48.7
Populist right 62.2 48.0 52.0
Global players 87.5 48.6 51.4
Niche firms 96.6 44.8 55.2
Public enterprises 73.7 50.0 50.0
Econ. Think tanks 60.9 49.0 51.0
Public advisory groups 77.8 51.8 48.2
Public welfare organizations 60.9 53.0 47.0
Public welfare movements 62.2 54.3 45.7
Notes: Numbers in %; Subject centrality + object centrality=100 %.
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Table C.7 Criteria for Count Model Selection For Actor Regressions on
Framing Reported in Table C.7 and Used in Figure 9.3
Ln alpha test
Mean Variance ln alpha Pr> |z| Model
Liberalist 6.60 73.37 –0.642 + Negative binominal
Social democratic 5.05 38.05 –0.749 n.s. Poisson
Mercantilist 5.10 36.03 –0.732 n.s. Poisson
Notes: Levels of significance: +≤0.1, *≤0.05, **≤0.01, ***≤0.005.
Additional Analyses 189
Table C.8 Results of Count Regression Models on the Frame Usage by Actors as Used
in Figure 9.3
Liberalist Social democratic Mercantilist
Negative Poisson Poisson
binominal
Std. Std. Std.
Coef. Err. P>z Coef. Err. P>z Coef. Err. P>z
Actors (ref = national executives)
IGO actors –1.009 0.237 *** –0.777 0.338 * –0.795 0.422 n.s.
EU actors 0.198 0.364 n.s. –0.184 0.320 n.s. –0.370 0.273 n.s.
For. exec. adv. economies –0.318 0.226 n.s. –0.624 0.258 * –0.782 0.239 ***
For. exec. emerging markets –0.936 0.287 *** –0.298 0.323 n.s. –0.682 0.337 *
Econ. administrations –0.886 0.277 *** –0.729 0.314 * –1.158 0.292 ***
Other administrations –1.441 0.374 *** –0.985 0.349 ** –1.683 0.312 ***
Judiciary –0.638 0.331 n.s. –0.643 0.521 n.s. –1.070 0.351 **
Legislatives –0.892 0.379 * –0.925 0.435 * –0.986 0.397 *
Chambers of commerce –0.943 0.318 ** –0.408 0.256 n.s. –1.516 0.280 ***
Peak empl. assoc. –0.889 0.229 *** –0.996 0.301 *** –1.189 0.253 ***
Small bus. assoc. –0.758 0.346 * –1.424 0.259 *** –1.825 0.395 ***
Private sector unions –0.92 0.246 *** 0.314 0.292 n.s. –0.912 0.334 **
Publ. sector unions –1.335 0.224 *** –0.316 0.263 n.s. –1.376 0.230 ***
Farmer org. –1.037 0.449 * –0.831 0.219 *** –1.565 0.304 ***
White collar assoc. –0.987 0.288 *** –1.115 0.303 *** –1.839 0.733 *
Communists/Left soc. –2.233 0.497 *** –1.265 0.414 ** –2.398 0.267 ***
Greens –1.661 0.274 *** –1.451 0.343 *** –1.464 0.481 **
Social democrats –0.815 0.258 ** –0.099 0.341 n.s. –0.773 0.311 *
Liberals –0.806 0.399 * –1.344 0.273 *** –1.545 0.312 ***
Christian dem./Cons. –0.676 0.222 ** –0.516 0.247 * –0.850 0.257 ***
Right-wing populists –0.432 0.469 n.s. –1.027 0.428 * –1.309 0.351 ***
Global players 0.161 0.265 n.s. –0.636 0.353 n.s. –0.489 0.333 n.s.
Niche firms –0.355 0.261 n.s. –0.097 0.284 n.s. –0.838 0.273 **
Public enterprises –0.396 0.290 n.s. –0.879 0.328 ** –1.249 0.286 ***
Econ. think tanks –1.331 0.372 *** –1.114 0.449 * –1.428 0.267 ***
Public advisory actors –0.682 0.219 ** –0.877 0.302 ** –0.846 0.243 ***
Public welfare org. –0.942 0.418 * –0.662 0.407 n.s. –1.599 0.479 ***
Public welfare mov. –0.98 0.221 *** –0.585 0.415 n.s. –0.575 0.193 **
Countries (ref = France)
Austria 0.447 0.177 * 0.482 0.256 n.s. 0.443 0.207 *
Germany 0.795 0.186 *** –0.071 0.277 n.s. 0.489 0.280 n.s.
Netherlands –0.054 0.210 n.s. –0.122 0.237 n.s. –0.186 0.183 n.s.
Switzerland –0.223 0.171 n.s. –0.470 0.231 * 0.405 0.186 *
U.K. –0.047 0.181 n.s. –0.356 0.248 n.s. 0.328 0.200 n.s.
Arenas (ref = Input arenas)
Janus-faced –0.048 0.135 n.s. –0.235 0.174 n.s. 0.366 0.174 *
Output 0.127 0.154 n.s. –0.003 0.192 n.s. 0.100 0.169 n.s.
Constant 2.194 0.221 *** 2.268 0.278 *** 2.000 0.233 ***
N 316 260 276
Wald tests
Overall model 299.70 *** 152.20 *** 181.60 ***
Actors 120.11 *** 112.38 *** 145.89 ***
Notes: Coefficients, robust standard errors and levels of significance of count regression models on the level
of actors; Levels of significance: *≤0.05, **≤0.01, ***≤0.005.
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Figure C.2 Histograms for Dependent Variables in
Actor Regressions on Framing as Used in Figure 9.3
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